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Harris: Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act

ARTICLES
CONCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Seth D. Harris*

I. INTRODUCTION
Few observers would dispute the axiom that wealthier interests
have greater bargaining power in the political market than poorer,
unorganized interests. Given this disparity in political bargaining power,
an objective observer would not expect statutes to be enacted that seem
to benefit less powerful interests at the apparent expense of the more
powerful. Yet, such statutes have been enacted. The Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"),' the nation's minimum wage, maximum hours,
and child labor law, is one such statute. This article uses the history of
the debate over fairness in wages that culminated in enactment of the
Fair Labor Standards Act as a case study that offers useful, if only
preliminary, insights into this apparent power paradox.
The Civil War's close signaled an end to an alliance of Northern
laborers and their employers against the common enemy of slavery.
After abolition, a strong belief rose among American workers and labor
observers that fairness for workers meant more than the absence of
slavery.2 The artisan who was the common "worker" from colonial
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. Former Counselor to the U.S.
Secretary of Labor. B.S. 1983, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations. J.D.
1990, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Charles Craver, Julius
Getman, Roger Hartley, Michael Gold, Marc Linder, and Benjamin Mintz for their valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this article. All errors are mine. I dedicate this article to Jonathan
Harris the Elder, who taught me the power of history's lessons, and Jonathan Harris the Younger,
who fills me with unlimited optimism for the future.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
2. See LAWRENCE B. GuCKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING
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times until the Civil War controlled his means of production and reaped
the full products of his labors.' His earnings reflected the quantity and
quality of his products. Beginning from 1815 to 1850, however, one task
after another was taken out of the home or artisan's shop and placed in
the factory. Goods and services formerly produced by the family or
independent artisans were moved into mass production. The wage
laborer who replaced the artisan after the Civil War sold his time and
yielded near-absolute control over his work to his employer. Earnings
were the product of a wage deal imposed by the employer that set an
hourly wage and multiplied it by work hours.4
From the demise of slavery through the passage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in 1938, participants in the debate over fairness in wages
increasingly accepted the premise that individual workers had
significantly less bargaining power in the labor market than employers.
They also acknowledged the empirical evidence that, in some
circumstances, employers used their superior bargaining power to drive
workers' wages below the level of subsistence. Nonetheless,
disagreements persisted over the normative question of what, if
anything, should be done to remedy the subsistence wages that resulted
from unequal bargaining power in the labor market. Accordingly, the
question remains, how did it come to pass that government intervened to
remedy exploitative wage deals that resulted from superior employer
bargaining power in the labor market when employers' bargaining
power in the political market exceeded that of low-wage, unskilled
workers.
The history of the debate over fairness in wages offers two
answers. First, bargaining power is dynamic, not static. Both socioeconomic crises and effective political advocacy by living wage
proponents during the first two decades of the twentieth century
sufficiently empowered the living wage movement to permit, first,
passage of state minimum wage laws and, later, federal living wage
regulations applicable to World War I's war industries.
The living wage movement propounded two normative answersthat is, conceptions of fairness-that would remedy the ill effects of
employers' superior bargaining power in the labor market. "Fairness is a
Living Wage" ("Absolute Fairness"),5 would have dictated a substantive
result. Government would require employers to pay each worker at least
OF CONSUMER SocIETY 20-21 (1997).

3. Seeid. at18.
4. See id. at 18-22.
5. See infra Part II.
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a wage sufficient to support a family. "Fairness' is Equality of
Bargaining Power" ("Bargaining Fairness"),6 would have imposed a
procedural remedy. Government would equalize workers' and
employers' bargaining power and then provide a forum for "public
bargaining" over wages and hours in hopes that subsistence wages
would result.
The goal of Absolute Fairness-a living wage-became the moral
lodestar of the movement for minimum wage laws in the United States,
although its means for achieving the goal never succeeded in the
political market. But several states enacted "public bargaining" laws
based on the conception of Bargaining Fairness prior to the enactment
of the FLSA. These public bargaining laws sought to redress unequal
bargaining power in the labor market by removing minimum-wagesetting from the labor market and putting it in a public administrative
forum. These laws assured that workers and employers had equal power
and an equal opportunity to be heard in the setting of minimum wages.
Also, public bargaining laws removed minimum-wage-setting from the
political market and effectively immunized it from the influence of
comparatively more powerful interest groups.
The history of the debate over fairness in wages suggests a second
answer to the question of how statutes seemingly designed to benefit
disempowered interests become law. Laws that appear to be intended
for the benefit of workers may principally operate by conferring a
benefit on employers or, perhaps more likely, one group of employers at
the expense of another.
The crisis wrought by the Great Depression of 1929 appeared to
swing sufficient bargaining power to workers and their representatives
to create the opportunity for national legislation premised on Bargaining
Fairness. In some respects, the National Industrial Recovery Act was a
bargaining fairness law.7 But the failure of that law, along with sharp
divisions in the movements that purported to speak for working
families, kept Congress from enacting a "public bargaining" statute that
would survive. Rather, the FLSA ultimately enacted in 1938 sought to
redress substandard wages as a means to remedy the underconsumption
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his allies believed sparked
and prolonged the Depression. Fixing a uniform, national wage floor
and maximum work week limited employers' ability to use labor cost-

6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part V.B.
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cutting as a means to gain a price advantage in increasingly national
product markets.
Regulating labor markets through the FLSA became a device for
assuring fair competition in product markets and a hedge against the
Depression. "Fairness is Fair Competition" ("Competitive Fairness"),
would prohibit some low wages and excessive hours as a means to
fairness between employers, not as a means to fairness for workers
disadvantaged in the labor market by inferior bargaining power. The
FLSA codified this conception of Competitive Fairness. While workers
benefited and continue to benefit from the FLSA's protection, the FLSA
was principally designed to preserve capitalism by protecting employers
from themselves and each other.
Congress enacted a FLSA premised on Competitive Fairness rather
than Bargaining Fairness, at least in part, because the political
bargaining power that worker advocates wielded as a result of the
Depression was impaired by a long-standing split between the living
wage movement and the labor movement.' The living wage movement
was a middle-class assemblage of academics, social workers, Catholic
theologians, and other reformers who trusted in government intervention
to strengthen workers' position in labor markets. Because the living
wage movement depended on the political process for its success, it had
no choice but to appeal to the forces that dominated the economy. As a
result, they argued that a living wage best served society's larger
economic goals, not workers alone. But the American Federation of
Labor ("AFL") and important forces within the Committee on Industrial
Organizations ("CIO") had been thwarted and harassed by the
government such that they could not reconcile themselves to the idea
that government would be a neutral mechanism for assuring fairness to
workers. Organized labor held vigorously to the superiority of private
collective bargaining over "public bargaining" as the remedy for
unequal bargaining power in the labor market. 9

8. Gender roles and complicated politics within the early feminist movement formed
another important dividing line in the debate over fairness in wages. Although this article will
touch on this debate only briefly, there is an excellent body of literature that discusses at greater
length the differing views of gender that helped shape the debate over fairness in wages. See, e.g.,
JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR
LEGISLATION 23 (1978); VIViEN HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTTiON: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND
THE MINIMUM WAGE (1994); Sybil Lipschultz, Workers, Wives and Mothers: The Problem of
Minimum Wage Laws for Women in Early Twentieth-Century America (1986) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
9. See infra Part V.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/2

4

Harris: Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act
2000]

Conceptionsof Fairness

The struggle between interest groups over a piece of legislation
cannot be fully understood absent consideration of courts' interpretation
of the legislation.'0 In the case of the FLSA, courts intervened in the
debate over fairness in wages before the FLSA became law and played a
central role in the political struggle for minimum wage legislation. A
vigorous Spencerist majority on the Supreme Court used its own
conception of fairness in wages, "Fairness is the Economic Hierarchy"
("Hierarchic Fairness"), to block state laws codifying the conception of
bargaining fairness. While acknowledging that labor market hierarchies
placed employers in a superior position, proponents of Hierarchic
Fairness opposed any remedy for this condition. Rather, Hierarchic
Fairness sought to preserve the economic status quo, except when
societal imperatives dictated limited strategic retreats. The pre-FLSA
debate over fairness in wages was largely a struggle between Bargaining
Fairness and Hierarchic Fairness. With the emergence of Hierarchic
Fairness as the Supreme Court's governing economic philosophy,
Bargaining Fairness would prevail only when a social or economic crisis
radically shifted the political bargaining power calculus.
In a short-lived judicial oddity, the Spencerists on the Supreme
Court undercut the economic hierarchy by adopting a second conception
that "Fairness is Commutative Justice" ("Commutative Fairness"). This
canonization of a bastardized Theory of Marginal Productivity held that
a minimum wage law could pass constitutional muster only if workers
receive the wages that equaled the value of their production. But this
anomalous conception of fairness survived through only one Supreme
Court decision. The dominance of Hierarchic Fairness also ended with
the arrival of the Great Depression and the New Deal.
Since passage of the FLSA, the courts have reentered the debate
over fairness in wages. In essence, they have abandoned the conception
of Competitive Fairness embodied in the FLSA." With no support in the
legislative text or history, courts have concluded that only those workers
who are "dependent" on their employers are entitled to the minimum
wage protections guaranteed by the FLSA. This artificial threshold
amounts to a rejection of the long-standing consensus that workers in
the low-wage labor market lack sufficient individual bargaining power
to protect themselves against employers' wage demands. It effectively
requires workers to prove that they individually lack sufficient
10. This insight on the intersection of legislative process and judicial statutory interpretation
was contributed by the public choice movement. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
11. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
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bargaining power before they will be permitted to benefit from the
FLSA's protections. This judicial construct reflects a sixth conception
of fairness extant, but hidden, in the current judicial interpretation of the
FLSA's definition of "employee." "Fairness is an Implied Contract" is
wholly inconsistent not only with the entire history of the American
debate over fairness in wages that preceded the FLSA, but with the
purpose and structure of the FLSA itself.
This Article organizes the history of the American debate over
fairness in wages around the competing normative conceptions of
fairness propounded in the political arena from the demise of slavery
through the modem conflict over which workers should be protected by
the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum hours guarantees. Economic
thought influenced, but did not determine, the path of legislation
relating to minimum wages. It is a necessary element in this story.
Classical economics and its Wages Fund Theory essentially posited that
all workers drew wages from a single, fixed source; thus, any wage
increase for one worker came out of the pocket of another. When the
Wages Fund Theory was replaced by the Theory of Marginal
Productivity, an intellectual justification for increasing workers' wages
was born. Section II describes this evolution in classical economic
theory. Section II also introduces the socio-economic school of thought
pioneered by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and Richard Ely, and further
developed by John Commons. In an effort to preserve capitalism from
the Marxist challenge spawned by its excesses, the socio-economists
supplied intellectual justification and empirical evidence that supported
the living wage movement's advocacy for a statutory minimum wage.
The socio-economists' research helped to sway American public
opinion towards the view that workers' wages could be and had been
driven below subsistence.
Section ImI discusses the conceptions of Absolute Fairness and
Bargaining Fairness advocated by the living wage movement. It also
discusses the disabling split between the living wage movement and the
labor movement that helped produce the outcome of the legislative
debate over the FLSA. Section IV discusses the conception of
Hierarchic Fairness produced during the Spencerist period in the
Supreme Court's history, often referred to as the Lochner era. It will
explain how Hierarchic Fairness prevailed over Bargaining Fairness,
and how its judicial purveyors sustained its victory by yielding ground
in societal crises. Section V discusses the Great Depression and how the
opportunity for success presented by the resulting drastic shift in
political power relationships turned into Bargaining Fairness' final
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defeat. Section V also explains the conception of Competitive Fairness
and how it is codified in the FLSA.
Finally, Section VI addresses the modern controversy over which
workers are "employees" under the FLSA and places it in the context of
the history of the debate over fairness in wages. The judicially
constructed conception that "Fairness is an Implied Contract," which
this article infers from judicial decisions interpreting the FSLA marks a
further substantial retreat from an effort to remedy the wage and hour
consequences of unequal bargaining power in the labor market.

II. REFORMING EcoNOMIc THOUGHT
A. ClassicalEconomics Re-Thinks Wage Determination
There were essentially two periods in the history of wage theory
during the industrial era extending from the demise of slavery through
the passage of the FLSA. 2 The classical period during which the Wages
Fund Theory prevailed ended around 1875.'" The Wages Fund Theory
was challenged and eventually abandoned in favor of Marginal
the Great Depression of
Productivity Theory which prevailed through
4
1929 and still holds significant sway today. '
Classical economics viewed the issue of wage determination
principally as a problem of distribution; that is, how did society divide
the national dividend among factors of production in the form of rents,
profits, and wages.'5 The first answer was the Wages Fund Theory,
propounded around 1823 by J.R. M'Culloch. The Wages Fund Theory
held that there exists a single pool of capital derived from savings from
past national product. This capital pool is divided among the factors of
production, including labor, with first priority given to plants and
materials. Hence, the amount in the wages fund at any particular
moment was predetermined, partly by the action of the community in
the past and partly by the technical character of the industries in the
present."
12. See John T. Dunlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory, in THE THEORY OF WAGE
DEERMINATION: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATION 3, 4 (John T. Dunlop ed., 1957) (discussing the classical period and the period
during which the Marginal Productivity Theory was accepted).

13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 5.
16. See id. at 4-6; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE
(1965).
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The wage bargain's bottom line flows therefrom. Average wages
equal the amount of the wages fund divided by the number of workers.
More capital available for wages meant higher wages for workers,
assuming a fixed labor supply. But labor supply would adjust, in the
long run, as workers reproduced at a rate determined by their economic
circumstances. 7 As a result, wages would tend to be fixed at the
minimum subsistence level. 8
The Wages Fund Theory posited that wages are a zero-sum game.
Assuming a fixed supply of workers, any increase in wages for one
worker reduced another worker's share of the wages fund. Workers
could increase their wages only by reducing the supply of labor relative
to the supply of capital. The options were few: reducing the birth rate, or
hoping "some pestilence, earthquake, or other natural catastrophe, or
even war itself' would thin the labor's ranks. 9 In reality, the Wages
Fund Theory left workers and their advocates without recourse to
appeals for higher wages absent responses that set workers against one
another.
The Wages Fund Theory was abandoned by classical economists
largely because it did not explain how individual wages were actually
determined. 2 In its strict formulation, the theory assumed that a
subsistence wage would result from long-run shifts in population.2' But
the theory also recognized that subsistence was a customary or social
standard. Workers received wages sufficient to enable them, on the
average, just to sustain their habitual standard of life. Thus, wages were
not determined within the system as the theory described it, but
according to social convention. '
Further, even the briefest inquiry into the real-world operation of
firms threatened the theory's integrity. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb
wrote years after the demise of the Wages Fund Theory:
Whatever may be the tasks on which the workmen are engaged, they
are, as a matter of fact, fed, week by week, by products just brought to
market, exactly in the same way as the employer and his household are
fed. They are paid their wages, week by week, out of the current cash
balances of their employers, these cash balances being daily

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Dunlop, supra note 12, at 4-6.
See id.; see also WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 604-06, 615.
W. JETr LAUCK, Tim NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND WAGES 8 (1929).
See Dunlop, supra note 12, at 6.
See id.
See Id.
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replenished by sales of the current product. The weekly drawings of
the several partners in a firm come from precisely the same fund as the
wages of their workpeople. Whether or not any assignable limits can
be set to the possible expansion of this source of current income, it will
be at once evident that there is no arithmetical impossibility in the
workmen obtaining a larger, and the employers
a smaller, proportion
23
of the total drawings for any particular week.
Thus, the Wages Fund Theory was abandoned as being inadequate to the
central task of describing how wages are determined.
Early theories of wage determination tended to be the products of
practitioners and political or moral philosophers. The economics field
began to professionalize only in the 1870s as the first university
professors of economics were hired. 24 At the same time, the strong
challenge of Karl Marx's critique of capitalism highlighted the problem
of determining how the benefits of the new industrial era would be
distributed.25 It was in this context that the Marginal Productivity Theory
was born.
Marginal Productivity Theory begins with labor supply and
employer demand curves, and the premise that the production of
everything is continued up to that limit or margin at which there is
equilibrium between supply and demand. 6 Supply and demand curves
assume that as wages increase, the amount of labor workers are willing
to supply increases and the amount of labor employers are willing to
purchase decreases. 27 The downward slope of the demand curve is a
consequence of the assumption that the marginal productivity of each
additional worker declines. Since capitalism properly assumes that
every employer seeks to maximize profits, the Marginal Productivity
Theory deduces that an employer will not hire a worker at a wage that
exceeds the equivalent of that worker's productivity.29 Thus, the point at
which employers' downward sloping demand curve intersects with
workers' upward sloping supply curve is called "equilibrium."3
Equilibrium is expected to mark the wage at which workers and

23.
24.
GROUND
25.
26.
27.

WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 619-20.
See RICHARD T. ELY, GROUND UNDER OUR FEET 123-24 (1938) [hereinafter ELY,
UNDER] (stating that the first chair in economics was created at Harvard in 1871).
See Dunlop, supra note 12, at 7.
WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 643.
Dunlop, supra note 12, at 5-6.

28. See id
29. See id. at 9.
30. See id
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employers will strike a deal in the labor market." It is also expected to
mark the point at which the marginal worker's wage is equivalent to his
productivity. 2 This has been said to be "true of any factor33 of production
..and holds regardless of the character of competition."
Marginal Productivity Theory also failed to describe how
individual wages are determined. The prices of factors (e.g., the wages
of labor) are not determined by marginal productivity. Marginal
productivity establishes employers' demand schedules. Factor pricing
also requires supply schedules.' The rational choice of the employerto hire workers only as long as their productivity is equal to or greater
than its cost--does not apply equally to workers' supply curve.
Various explanations of how workers decide how much labor to supply
at a given wage have been attempted. For example, a "pain-cost
explanation," in which the amount of labor offered would be set at the
point where the marginal utility equaled the marginal disutility; and
individual choices between income and leisure at varying wage rates.
But these explanations have invariably been found wanting and, in any
event, bear little relation to productivity analysis. Marginal Productivity
Theory is a statement of the demand side rather than a complete model
of wage determination.
As with the Wages Fund Theory, inquiry into the actual operation
of labor markets suggested imperfections in the Marginal Productivity
Theory. For example, it is frequently impossible to determine an
individual worker's marginal productivity.36 Similarly, while marginal
productivity may help describe the marginal worker's wage, it offers
little help in describing the wages of infra-marginal workers.37
Assuming a downward slope to the employer demand curve, inframarginal workers' productivity always exceeds their wages.38 Finally,
traditional Marginal Productivity Theory does not take into account the
possibility that an employer might have sufficient power in the labor
market to drive a worker's wage below the value of that worker's

31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
See Dunlop, supranote 12, at 9.
Id.
See id.

35. See id
36. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 646; JOHN A. RYAN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE:
SELECTIONS FROM DiSTRmUTvE JusTcE AND A LIVING WAGE 72-73, 109-11 (Harlan Beckley ed.,
1996) [hereinafter RYAN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE].
37. See Dunlop, supra note 12, at 9-10.
38. See id.
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productivity.39 Many analysts concluded that wages were determined
outside Marginal Productivity Theory and that the theory merely

described how much labor would be employed at a particular wage.
Nonetheless, Marginal Productivity Theory was an important
precursor to the debate over the FLSA. It offered a way around the zerosum choices posed by the Wages Fund Theory. Every worker's wages
could rise along with productivity.04 During an industrial revolution with

new technologies and work organization, rising productivity was a
smaller obstacle to overcome than a fixed and pre-determined wages
fund. Thus, the shift in classical economic thinking from the Wages
Fund Theory to the Marginal Productivity Theory opened the
possibility, within the capitalist framework, that workers' wages could
be increased through social reform.
B. Socio-EconomistsRe-Think ClassicalEconomics

Karl Marx's revolutionary challenge to classical economics,
particularly his critique of the relationship between subsistence and

labor, contributed to a fundamental reconsideration of theories of wage4
determination among economists who sought to preserve capitalism. '

Marx's challenge was taken up by a generation of economists who
agreed with, or perhaps co-opted, significant portions of his diagnosis,
while rejecting his prognosis. Their answer to revolution was to seek
reforms that would leave capitalism standing.42

39. See id.
40. See id. at 9.
41. Marx's discussion of wages and subsistence is most famously set forth in KARL MARX,
CAPITAL, VOLUME ONE, reprintedin THE MARX-ENGELS READER 294-442 (Robert C. Tucker ed.,
2d ed. 1978). Other relevant works include KARL MARX, WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL, reprinted
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 203-17 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); KARL MARX,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLmCAL ECONOMY, reprinted in THE MARx-ENGELs
READER 221-93 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); KARL MARX, CRrIQUE OF THE GOTHA
PROGRAM, reprinted in THE MARx-ENGELS READER 535 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
42. Richard Ely conceded that his purpose in constructing socio-economics was, in part, to
protect against a turn towards socialism. See ELY, GROuND UNDER supra note 24, at 152-53; see
also RICHARD T. ELY, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 248-56 (Kraus Reprint Co.
1969) (1889) [hereinafter ELY, POLmCAL ECONOMY] (discussing various aspects of socialism);
Henry Rogers Seager, The Theory of the Minimum Wage, 3 AM. LAB. LEGIs. REv. 88-89 (1912)
(stating that the goal is to make socialism unnecessary and undesirable). Marx's critique of
capitalist production challenged not only classical and neoclassical economists, but also defenders
of capitalism among the clergy, social reformers, and trade unionists, to re-shape the capitalist
framework entirely or lose a struggle for the hearts and minds of the world's growing working
class.
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1. Repairing the Flaws in Classical Economics
These reformers identified two fundamental flaws in classical
economics. The first flaw was methodological. Classical economics held
that natural laws established for all times and places, certain
fundamental principles to govern economic behavior.4 1 Theories of
classical economics began with fundamental premises from other
sciences or certain general traits of human nature and familiar
observations. 4 All of these premises were already known. Facts from
the outside world were not necessary to the inquiry. Instead, a classical
economist would deduce an economic system from the fundamental
premises. Since all the premises were known and the necessary
deductions made, classical economics was a finished product by the end
of the nineteenth century, said the socio-economists.45 Richard Ely noted
sardonically that it required only one text--"Mrs. Fawcett's Political
Economy for Beginners"-to capture the complete body of classical
economic theory.46
This methodological flaw brought with it an ethical flaw, according
to the socio-economists.4 7 Classical economists and their deductive
method were at once blind to the real world and the moral implications
of their work.48 Ely referred again to Mrs. Fawcett, citing the definition
of political economy from her text as the "science which investigates the
nature of wealth and the laws which govern its production, exchange,
and distribution., 49 Ely retorted that:
[m]an was not mentioned in this definition; it was implied that man is
simply an instrument by which wealth is created and not the end for
which it exists. In this volume free competition plays the part of the
deus ex machina, which, if left well alone, will regulate andbring into

43. See ELY, GROUND UNDER, supranote 24, at 126.
44. Richard T. Ely, The Founding and Early History of the American Economic Association,
26 AM. ECON. L. REv. 141, 145 (1936) [hereinafter Ely, AEA History]; ELY, GROUND UNDER,
supra note 24, at 126.
45. See ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 128; Ely, AEA History, supra note 44, at
145.
46. See ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 125.
47. See LAFAYETrE G. HARTER, JR., JOHN R. COMMONS: HIS ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE
32-33 (1962); ELY, GROUND UNDER, supranote 24, at 144.
48. See HARTER, JR., supranote 47, at 32-33; ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 144.
49. ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 125.
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harmony all the relations that arise among men in theirefforts to make
a living. 50
Thus, Ely viewed classical political economy as refusing to recognize
any ethical element in economic life.51 Classical political economy
"opposed all social reforms for social uplift as futile... [and] exalted
into a principle of economic righteousness the individual... look[ing]
upon laissez faire" as the optimal philosophy for economics. 2
In fact, classical economics and the laissez-faire philosophy it
embodied did advance a vision of morality well-articulated by Herbert
Spencer. 53 But the socio-economists rejected this morality. Richard Ely
captured the motivation of the young reformers who challenged
classical economics in the midst of industrialization: "[a] new world
was coming into existence and if this world was to be a better world, we
believed we must have a new economics to go along with it.' 'M The
reformers sought to remedy the flaws of classical economics by
reconnecting political economy to a socially progressive ethic and reallife experiences in the American economy. Ely and a group of
colleagues returned from Germany in 1885 conscious that "[they] were
human beings as well as economists and that [they] were engaged in the
task of furthering a science which is first and foremost a science of
human relationships."55 They substituted morality for pure economic
analysis, in many ways returning to the political economy of Mill and
Ricardo.
The socio-economists rejected the effort in classical economics to
make their field into a positive science. 56 Ely and his compatriots viewed
economics as a division of sociology, broadly defined as everything that
concerns people living together and having necessary, desirable, and
agreeable relations. Within sociology, political economy addressed that
portion of these relations associated with men and women earning a
living.58 But political economy could never decide a societal question
alone. 59 Final judgments must come from the synthesis of economic,
moral, and political considerations, among others. The economist speaks
50. Id.
51. Id. at 144.
52. Id.; see also Ely, AEA History, supranote 44, at 143 (discussing laissez-faire).

53. See infra Part IV.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Ely, AEA History, supranote 44, at 144-45.
ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 121.
See GLICIIAN, supranote 2, at 57-58.
See ELY, PoLITIcAL ECONOMY, supra note 42, at 9, 12.

58. See id. at 8.
59. See id.
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with no special authority on moral and political questions, said the
socio-economists. °
The American Economic Association ("AEA") was founded in
1885 as a gathering place for those who protested against laissez-faire.6'
Ely proposed a platform for the AEA that directly challenged the
governing theory of classical economics:
We regard the state as an educational and ethical agency whose
positive aid is an indispensable condition of human progress. While we
recognize the necessity of individual initiative in industrial life, we
hold that the doctrine of laissez faire is unsafe in politics and unsound
in morals; and that it suggests an inadequate explanation of the
relations between the state and the citizens. 62
In an apparent compromise to broaden the organization's base, the
platform as adopted was somewhat less direct: "We regard the state as
an agency whose positive assistance is one of the indispensable
condition of human progress." 6 Nonetheless, Ely expanded upon the
reformers' moral agenda in a textbook he co-authored roughly during
the same period:
the persistent hope [is] that by systematic study we may eventually
abolish the material poverty which deadens and dwarfs the lives of
million of our fellows. Economics is a science, but something more
than a science; a science shot through with the infinite variety of
human life, calling not only for systematic, ordered thinking, but for
human sympathy, imagination, and in an unusual degree for the saving
grace of common sense... Satisfaction of social need, and not
individual profit, is the objective point of the science.6
Ely and his prot6g6 John Commons based their moral agenda on
religious teachings as well as their economic analyses.65
60. See RicHARD T. ELY Er AL., OUTLINES OF ECONOMics 3-4, 9-10 (3d ed. 1918)
[hereinafter ELY Er AL., OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS]; ELY, PoLmcAL ECONOMY, supra note 42, at

12-16. "Political economy takes what ethics has to offer as a guide for the development of
economic life. Ethical conceptions have always governed all social life more or less perfectly." Id.
at 118.
61. See ELY, GROUND UNDER, supranote 24, at 132-33, 136.
62. Id at 136.
63. Id. at 140; see also Ely, AEA History,supra note 44, at 144.
64.

ELY Er AL., OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS, supra note 60, at 4; see also ELY, POLITICAL

ECONOMY, supra note 42, at 116 ("It is the business of the political economist to guard the
interests of the masses, and to suggest measures to promote their welfare.").
65. Both Ely and Commons became involved with the Social Gospel movement, a
theological social reformist movement. See HARTER, JR., supra note 47, at 39-40; see also
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The reformers' critique of classical economics consisted of more
than spraying a patina of politically progressive morality on deductively
reasoned conclusions. It was inextricably bound up with their
methodology. They rejected the idea that natural laws and the
purportedly neutral principles deduced therefrom were the fount of
political economy. 66 Instead, they adopted a view consistent with Henry
George's observation that political economy is "the science which the
ordinary man may most easily study. It requires no tools, no apparatus,

no special learning. The phenomena which it investigates need not be
sought for in laboratories or libraries; they lie about us and are

constantly thrust upon us."'67
Where classical economics was deductive, the socio-economists
used an inductive approach which Ely dubbed the "look and see"
method.6 Political economy has to do with society, they posited, so
knowledge about society should be acquired by systematic empirical
study. Rather than relying on a set of fixed premises, the "look and see"
method would gain new premises and new generalizations through the

study of life. Facts would be gathered in accordance with a hypothesis,
common factors associated with the hypothesis would be found, and
generalizations from these common factors would be launched. 6 Any
generalizations would be tested against external facts both to judge the
accuracy of the reasoning and to determine whether the initial
generalization was supported by sufficient evidence. 70 These conclusions
would be arranged in a way to gain new knowledge in order to tell the

story of economic life."
RICHARD T. ELY, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHRISTIANTrY 123-24, 128-29 (1889) (discussing the

relationship between the Christian doctrine of talents and the goal of political economy to help
establish a system for production and distribution that elicits the best from each individual).
66. See Ely, AEA History, supranote 44, at 149.
67. GLICKMAN, supra note 2, at 59.
68. Ely, AEA History, supra note 44, at 149; ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 161,
185-89.

69. See HARTER, JR., supranote 47, at 32.
70. See id; ELY, GROUND UNDER, supranote 24, at 189.
71. See ELY, GROUND UNDER, supra note 24, at 154-55, 189; HARTER,

JR., supra note

47, at

32; see also Ely, AEA History,supra note 44, at 149 (stating that all members of the AEA used the
"look and see" method). The teacher-student relationship between Richard Ely and John Commons
offers a good illustration of their methodology and its intellectual underpinnings. Commons
attended Johns Hopkins University in 1888 largely because of his admiration for Ely. Ely's
economics courses required field work and research experience, and included the study of
sociology and political science. Ely's approach was, to a large extent, an anti-theoretical method.
The focus of every study was the finding of facts. As part of the course work, he sent Commons on
extensive projects as a caseworker for charitable organizations while also encouraging him to do
historical research. Commons followed Ely to the University of Wisconsin beginning in 1904,
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But the work of the socio-economists did not end with teaching,
study, and reason. From Ely's and Commons's perspectives, knowledge

should be the precursor to action. 2 Political economy and law are
closely linked, according to the socio-economists, and many live

questions from political economy necessarily become legislative
questions. Specifically, Ely and Commons promoted new laws that
governed economic life. Like Ely and the AEA, Commons helped to
organize the American Association for Labor Legislation ("AALL")
which consisted of academics, social workers, and state and federal
officials dealing with labor problems." The AALL was intended to
develop plans for labor legislation. 4 Among the leading examples of
these efforts was the campaign to enact a minimum wage.
2. Socio-Economics and the Way Labor Markets Work
The British socio-economists Sidney and Beatrice Webb offered
perhaps the clearest exposition of the socio-economic diagnosis of the
labor market. They rejected the Wages Fund Theory and the premise
that wages are determined by natural law. Instead, they concluded that
wages are a matter of human arrangement that can be altered,
effectively and permanently, to the advantage of one class or another by
appropriate action.'

where Ely chaired the economics department, and advanced the same teaching philosophy he had
experienced at Hopkins. See HARTER, JR., supranote 47, at 17-19, 24, 32,38.
72. See HARTER, JR., supranote 47, at 34-40.
73. See id. at 72.
74. See id.; ELY, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supranote 42, at 135. Commons served as President
of the AEA in 1917 and President of the National Consumers League ("NCL") in 1923. From the
beginning, however, Commons was a leading force in the AALL and his student and future coauthor, John Andrews, served as the group's Executive Secretary. See HARTER, JR., supranote 47,
at 72-74.
Although a full discussion of the subject is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth
noting that a similar reform of jurisprudence occurred at roughly the same time the socioeconomists sought to reform economics. Sociological jurisprudence, named by Roscoe Pound,
promoted a legal order informed by social and economic conditions, and guided by ethical
considerations, rather than a priori legal rules. Roscoe Pound's seminal works on sociological
jurisprudence were published around the same time that a national campaign to establish statutory
minimum wages in the states began. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence,Part1, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 593 (1911); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose
of Sociological Jurisprudence,Part11, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911); Roscoe Pound, The Scope
and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence,Part 11, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912); see also G.
Edward White, From SociologicalJurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social Change in
Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
75. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 560-61.
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In the absence of a "Common Rule," such as a standard rate of pay
or a fixed work day imposed through legislation or collective
bargaining, working conditions are the product of individual bargaining
between the employer and the worker in the labor market.76 One
important factor in the comparative bargaining positions of workers and
employers is a difference of alternative. The employer can refrain from
making a deal with the worker with the knowledge that it will suffer
only the inconvenience of rearranging the work of its establishment and,
perhaps, temporarily reduced profit. The worker, if the deal is delayed,
loses an entire day's subsistence. He faces starvation in the worst case
or the deprivation of savings in the best case if he doesn't accept the
employer's offer.'
The worker frequently has no opportunity to bargain at all when he
is forced to compete against numerous other workers willing to accept
an employer's offer in order to feed themselves and their families.
Henry Rogers Seager, an AALL President, explained that this
destructive competition between workers in the low-wage labor market
resulted from a chronic oversupply of workers. 7' Low-wage work was so
simple in character that it could be sought by people of all ages and both
genders, without a threshold for intelligence or special training. 9
As a result, employers have a sufficiently superior bargaining
position to drive these workers' wages below bare subsistence. This
result is possible even accepting Marginal Productivity Theory's
conclusion that there is a tendency toward equality of supply and
demand at the margin. Infra-marginal workers do not have the
bargaining power to assure wages equal to their marginal productivity
which, even if it could be measured, is typically assumed to be higher
than that of the marginal worker. Their wages are, therefore, reduced to
the value assigned to the productivity of the marginal, or lowest paid
worker. But even this most salutary view of labor markets assumes the
perfectly free and unrestrained competition which the socio-economists'
empirical research found did not exist. 0 The Webbs considered perfectly
76. See id. The socio-economists were strongly influenced by the Webbs' work. See
HARTER, JR., supra note 47, at 169.
77. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 649-60.
78. See Seager, supra note 42, at 82.
79. See Ud; ELY ET AL., OUTLINES OFECONOMICS, supra note 60, at 674.
80. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 644-49; see also id. at 560-61 (explaining that the
employer-worker bargain tends towards the worst possible conditions for labor while even the
exceptional few do not gain as much as they otherwise would); Sidney Webb, The Economic
Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage, 20 J. POL. ECON. 973, 990 (1912) [hereinafter Webb, Legal
Minimum Wage] (stating that the fact that the employer pays less than subsistence does not prove
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free bargaining in the labor market "entirely obsolete."'" Conditions of
employment, rather than the abstractions of supply and demand curves,
vary according to the strategic bargaining position of workers, said the
socio-economists.
To achieve subsistence working conditions, the socio-economists
concluded, either a law or collective bargaining must protect workers
while they hold out long enough to bargain for a living wage. But the
socio-economists predicted that collective bargaining would not succeed
for low-skill, low-wage workers for the same reason Seager offered to
explain the difficulty with the individual bargain. There is an army of
people seeking the same few jobs. The fixing of wages according to
strategic position meant the barest possible subsistence wages, if that.
The question remained: given this diagnosis of the labor market,
what should be done? The socio-economists chose a reformist course.
Accepting supply and demand as the ordinary mechanism for setting
prices, the socio-economists concluded that government should
intervene to prohibit certain outcomes of labor market deal-making with
the goal of assuring workers all that is necessary for their health and
efficiency. Safety and sanitation would certainly be appropriate arenas
for government action, they concluded. Hours of work would also be a
suitable target of government action because excessive work poses a
threat to physical health and civic efficiency. The Webbs' view, shared
by the other socio-economists but not universally accepted by worker
advocates, was that wages belonged on this list of issues. A minimum
wage should be fixed with the state as arbitrator and the standard
embodied in statute, said the Webbs.8
3. The Economic Theory of a Living Wage
By dedicating themselves to reform within capitalism, the socioeconomists wedded themselves to a strategy of persuading those who
controlled the economic system that reform would be to everyone's
benefit. Employers offered the wages that market conditions and
superior power permitted and considered it the worker's business to
decide whether he could afford to accept these wages." The sociothat the work is worth less than subsistence; pay is a reflection of the urgent necessities of the
marginal man or woman); Seager, supra note 42, at 81 (stating that, for employees, competition for
employment may be so intense as to force wages below the living level).
81. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 688.

82. See iU.at 582-84, 596-97, 694-99,758.
83. See Seager, supra note 42, at 81.
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economists considered the products of these wage deals to be society's
business as well. Ely and his co-authors found that the majority of
women in many trades did not receive enough wages to maintain their
physical efficiency in turn of the century America. Since workers must
find sufficient resources to subsist, an employer paying women and
children a wage below the subsistence level in effect received a subsidy
from some other sources: families, charity, and even prostitution.' The
subsidies gave underpaying employers a cost advantage over employers
of fully paid labor.&
A second subsidy concerned the socio-economists more. They
posited that the continued efficiency of a nation's industry depended
upon the continued health and strength of the nation's workers.86 If an
employer paid workers wages that were insufficient to provide food,
clothing, and shelter to maintain them in average health, if long hours
deprived workers of adequate rest and recreation, or if workers were
subjected to dangerous and unsanitary conditions that shortened their
lives, that employer had obtained a supply of the labor force to which it
was not entitled.7 These employers were spending the capital value of
future generations by taking more from their workers than their pay
justified."
Thus, the socio-econoists viewed a mandated minimum wage not
merely as the elimination of unfair subsidies, but as a boon to
efficiency. In the first instance, employers would be forced to make
more efficient hiring decisions. A statutory minimum wage permits
employers to hire any worker. It merely shifts the basis for the selection
from price (i.e., wage) to quality. 89 Absent a minimum wage, the socioeconomists observed, employers would tend to hire whomever they
could get at the lowest wage possible. If blocked from cutting wages by
law, however, employers would be economically impelled to raise
workers' efficiency. Work would flow to the most efficient firms.
Aggregate efficiency in the economy would increase. 90 Dislocations of
less efficient workers, including women and children, would result, the
socio-economists conceded. 9' But this beneficial competition would
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
note 16,
91.

See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 749-50.
See Webb, Legal Minimum Wage, supra note 80, at 986-89.
See id. at 987.
See id.
See id. at 987-88; see also WEBB & WEBB, supranote 16, at 723.
See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 721.
See Webb, Legal Minimum Wage, supra note 80, at 977-79, 984; WEBB & WEBB, supra
at 715-16, 723-24; Seager, supra note 42, at 86.
See WEBB &WEBB, supra note 16, at 86.
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create an imperative for workers to increase their efficiency
to compete
92
on the basis of productivity rather than wage cutting.
Workers would increase their efficiency simply because they lived
an improved quality of life made possible by higher wages and better
working conditions. 9 Unrestrained competition that drives down wages
and thereby supports less mental and physical energy than necessary for
peak efficiency threatens the economic system, observed the socioeconomists.9 Even Alfred Marshall and J.R. M'Culloch noted that
improved conditions of employment for the weakest and most
necessitous workers increased productivity. 95 Thus, the establishment of
a minimum wage would increase worker efficiency, impel more
efficient hiring decisions by employers, and relieve families and society
from the burden of subsidizing wage-cutting employers.
In sum, the socio-economists concluded that society had an interest
in fulfilling Adam Smith's adage: "A man must always live by his work,
and his wages must at least be sufficient to maintain him. 9 6 The socioeconomists believed that a minimum wage should be determined
through practical inquiry as to the cost of food, clothing, and shelter
physiologically necessary to prevent workers' mental and bodily
deterioration."' Foreshadowing important disagreements to come,
however, the Webbs distinguished this national minimum from a "living
wage." They argued that a living wage differed for each region and
person, with gender being one ground for distinction. Perhaps most
important, setting a living wage by legislation threatened trade union
successes in establishing higher rates for skilled workers. Articulating a
position that would become central to the debate over the FLSA several
decades later, the Webbs would leave the establishment of a "living
wage" to collective bargaining."

92. See Webb, Legal Minimum Wage, supra note 80, at 979; see also WEBB & WEBB, supra
note 46, at 721, 723-24 (discussing unrestricted individual competition among wage-earners);
Seager, supra note 42, at 86 (same).
93. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 46, at 715-16.
94. See Webb, Legal Minimum Wage, supra note 81, at 981.
95. See id at 980-81; WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 723 (quoting ALFRED MARSHALL,

PRINCI'LES OF ECONOmiCS 779 (3d ed.) and stating that "[a] rise in the Standard of Life for the
whole population will much increase the National Dividend, and the share of it which accrues to
each grade and to each trade.").
96. Seager, supra note 42, at 81 (quoting Adam Smith).
97. Webb, Legal Minimum Wage, supra note 80, at 993; WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at
774-75. A similar inquiry would be made as well into minimum safety and sanitation and

maximum hours of work. See id. at 774.
98. See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 806.
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II. THE LIVING WAGE MOVEMENT AND Two CONCEPTIONS OF
FAIRNESS

A. Fairnessis a Living Wage

1. The Living Wage as a Natural and Absolute Right
With their focus on remedying unequal bargaining power in the
labor market and its consequences, the socio-economists responded to
Marx's challenge by providing an economic justification for a mandated
minimum wage within the context of a flourishing capitalist production
system. A papal encyclical entitled Rerum Novarum, or "The Condition
of the Working Classes," 99 provided an early moral conception of
fairness in wages for important leaders of the American living wage
movement. Also responding to Marx, Rerum Novarum sought to
proclaim a moral justification for tending to the needs of society's
poorest workers while preserving the wage labor system that
characterized industrial capitalism'r ° Most important for the effort to
enact minimum wage laws in the United States, Rerum Novarum
motivated two priests who played central roles in the American living
wage movement. The two priests, a teacher-student pair like Ely and
99. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1891), reprinted in SEVEN GREAT
ENCYCLICALS 1 (1963) [hereinafter Rerum Novarum]. Rerum Novarum was the most influential
modem declaration of Catholic doctrine on the subject of workers and their place in society, but it
drew upon a long history within the Catholic church on the subject. See generally JAMES HEALY,
THE JUST VAGE, 1750-1890: A STUDY OF MORALISTS FROM SAIMT ALPHONSUS TO LEO XIII
(1966) (discussing Catholic theorists and the just wage leading up to Rerum Novarum). Further,
although this article focuses on the contributions of two Catholic clergymen, many Protestant
churches and Jewish leaders shared their concern and their vision. See, e.g., Don D. Lescohier,
Working Conditions, in 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 63 (1966)
[hereinafter Lescohier, Working Conditions] (citing the support of the Federal Council of Churches
in Christ and the Methodist Episcopal Church, among others).
100. Pope Leo XIlI's seminal encyclical on the state of the working class stated the challenge:
"It is not an easy matter to define the relative rights and mutual duties of the rich and of the poor,
of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators are intent on making use of
these differences of opinion to pervert men's judgments and to stir up the people to revolt." Rerum
Novarum, supra note 99, at 2. The references become less veiled later in this encyclical when the
Socialists-and their belief in social ownership of property-are condemned by name. See id.
at 28; cf.FRANCIS L. BRODERICK, RIGHT REVEREND NEW DEALER: JOHN A. RYAN 53 (1963) (quoting
John A. Ryan, The Marxian Theory of Productivity and of Value, 11, 1 CATHOLIC FORTNIGHTLY
REV. 613-16 (1909)) ("[Catholics are] so preoccupied refuting Socialism and defending the present
order, that they go to the opposite extreme, understating the amount of truth in the claims of the
Socialists and overstating the rights of property and the advantages of the present system.").
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Commons, developed closely related but different conceptions of
fairness that would define the American living wage movement from the
turn of the century through the debate over the FLSA.
The first of these priests-the teacher-was John A. Ryan. In 1894,
while a student at St. Paul Seminary in his home state of Minnesota,
John Ryan was assigned to write an essay on the newly issued Rerum
Novarum. From that day forward, explaining the papal encyclical and

applying its dictates to industrial America dominated his life's work.
Ryan was by no means the first or the only American churchman to
comment on Rerum Novarum or the economic and moral conditions of

working people,''

but he had vast influence on the American living

wage movement and the eventual passage of the FLSA. 02 The

conception of fairness Ryan advanced set an ethical standard for the
American debate over fairness in wages.
The reach of Ryan's influence can be explained, in part, by his
refusal to limit himself to moral judgments drawn exclusively from
theology and philosophy. Ryan immersed himself in the study of

political economy as a means of carrying out Rerum Novarum's
dictate.' 3 Richard Ely was an important secular influence on Ryan, both
as a guide in understanding political economy and as a friend.'
Through their collaboration, Ryan added a Catholic theological voice to
the socio-economists' reformist chorus.' 5

101. See generally JOHN A. RYAN, SOCIAL DocrRINE IN ACTION: A PERSONAL HISTORY 2128 (1941) [hereinafter RYAN, SOCIAL DOCrRINE] (discussing other churchmen who influenced his
views).
102. Representative Connery, who chaired the House Labor Committee and sponsored the
original version of the FLSA, praised Ryan as one of the originators of the FLSA: "[1]f this
legislation becomes law, this Black-Connery bill will be the fruition of a lot of hard work on your
part through many, many years."FairLabor Standards Act of 1931: Joint Hearings on S.2475
Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Laborand H.R. 7200 Before the House Comm. on Labor,
75th Cong. 501-02 (1937) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Monsignor John Ryan).
103. See generally RYAN, SOCIAL DOCTRINE, supra note 101, at 59:
At this moment the condition of the working population is the question of the hour; and
nothing can be of higher interest to all classes of the State than that it should be rightly
and reasonably decided.... Every minister of Holy Religion must throw into the
conflict all the energy of his mind, and all the strength of his endurance....
Id. (quoting Rerum Novarum).
104. For example, Ely helped Ryan find a publisher for his influential text, A Living Wage,
and wrote its introduction. See id. at 49.
105. In particular, Ryan reinforced the socio-economists' willingness to challenge classical
economics: "Heresy in religion is unwarranted and irrational because it opposes infallible
pronouncements; heresy in economics may be and sometimes is in accord with truth, because the
exponents of the 'orthodox' doctrine do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility." RYAN, SOCIAL
DOCTRINE, supra note 101, at 67 n.2.
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In his first magazine article, published in Catholic World in 1900,
Ryan endorsed the socio-economists' diagnosis of the wage system:
The whole argument for an unlimited right of free contract is based on
a false assumption, the assumption that in all agreements between
labor and capital the contract is really free. As a matter of fact
whenever an employer, relying on an overstocked labor market, forces
his men to accede to his terms, the name free contract is a misnomer.
There can be no freedom of contract between laborers who must work
today or starve and a capitalist who may pay the wages demanded or
wait until hunger compels the men to submit. And, as the labor market
is overstocked the greater part of the time, the employer's plea for noninterference and freedom of contract is in reality a demand that he be
allowed to use his economic advantage to force his men into a contract
that on their side is not free in any adequate sense of that word.' 6
Like the socio-economists, Ryan's diagnosis of unequal bargaining
power in the labor market was a mere beginning. O' The question
remained how, if at all, society should intervene in the operation of the
labor market when it produced inadequate wage deals. For Ryan, who
laid out his conception of fairness most thoroughly in The Living Wage
in 1906 and Distributive Justice in 1916, the answer began with the
principle of natural rights.
According to Ryan, the natural right to a Living Wage is derived
from the recognition that God created the earth for the sustenance of all
106. Id. at 71. Although somewhat less directly, Rerum Novarum also adopted this diagnosis
of the labor market.
Let it be granted, then, that, as a rule, workman and employer should, make free
agreements, and in particular should agree freely as to wages; nevertheless, there is a
dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and
man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable
and frugal comfort. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts
harder conditions because an employer or contractor will give him no better, he is the
victim of force and injustice.
Rerum Novarum, supra note 99, at 21-22.
[R]ich men and masters should remember of this-that to exercise pressure for the sake
of gain, upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one's profit out of the need of
another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine.... The rich must religiously
refrain from cutting down the workman's earnings, either by force, fraud, or by
usurious dealing; and with the more reason because the poor man is, weak and
unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their
scantiness.
Id. at 9-10.
107. This diagnosis remained central to Ryan's philosophy throughout his career. See RYAN,
SOCIAL DOCTRINE, supra note 101, at 103; see also ELY Er AL., OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS, supra
note 60, at 13-14.
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His children; therefore, all persons possess an inherent and equal claim
upon nature's products. Those who possess the land (i.e., wealth) do not

have an unlimited claim to its enjoyment. They hold it in trust for
society, as Rerum Novarum announced.' s But neither is every person
entitled to equal sustenance. The products of the earth do not become

available without labor; therefore, labor is the precondition for
sustenance. Only those who cannot work, like the young and infirm, and
those who need not work, the wealthy, are excepted. Every other person
willing to work, however, has a right to sustenance from the earth on

reasonable terms or conditions.
Natural rights are not intrinsic, according to Ryan. They are means
to developing the intellectual, moral, and spiritual faculties. The end to
be achieved is right and reasonable living and, since the end is sacred
and inviolable, the means to the end are as well. 19 But the means are not

without limitation, and Ryan's view of the Living Wage was at once
generous and frugal. Right and reasonable life consists of the
development of a worker's personality through harmonious and properly
ordered exercise of his facilities. But Ryan argued that the worker

should subordinate his sense faculties to his rational faculties. Rational
faculties must be exercised consistently with religious dictate and the
reasonable demands of others in society. The demands of the senses and
the selfish promptings of the spirit must be subordinated to the higher
goods, namely, the intellect and the disinterested will. Within these

confines of personal conduct, all other persons are morally restrained
from interfering with the pursuit of a right and reasonable life."

108. See RYAN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 89-90. Ownership is stewardship,
according to Ryan, who quoted St. Thomas Aquinas: .'As regards the power of acquiring and
dispensing material goods, man may lawfully possess them as his own; as regards their use,
however, a man ought not to look upon them as his own, but as common, so that he may readily
minister to the needs of others."' Id. at 89; see also Rerum Novarum, supra note 99, at 11 ("Man
should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them
without difficulty when others are in need. Whence the Apostle saith, Command the rich of this
world... to give with ease, to communicate."); John A. Ryan, Social Reconstruction:A General
Review of the Problemsand Survey of Remedies (Feb. 12, 1919) (a/k/a Bishops' Programof Social
Reconstruction), reprinted in JOHN T. ELLIS, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY 604,
606-07 (1967) [hereinafter Ryan, Social Reconstruction] ("[The employer] needs to learn the longforgotten truth that wealth is stewardship, that profit-making is not the basic justification of
business enterprise, and that there are such things as fair profits, fair interest, and fair prices.").
109. See RYAN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supranote 36, at 163.
110. See id. at91-96, 163-64.
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2. Quantifying the Living Wage
Ryan argued that there is a certain minimum of goods to which
every worker is entitled by reason of his inherent right of access to the
earth."' "The wage earner's right to a decent livelihood in the abstract
means in the concrete a right to a living wage," he wrote."2 Ryan's view
was that personal dignity extends beyond the conditions of reasonable
physical existence. Each worker has a right to at least those requisites
that will enable him to live in a manner worthy of a human being: food,
clothing, and housing sufficient in quantity and quality to maintain the
worker in normal health, elementary comfort, and an environment
suitable to the protection of morality and religion; security in the event
of retirement, sickness, accident, or disability; and some opportunity for
recreation, social intercourse, education, and church-membership as is
required to conserve health and strength and to render possible the
exercise of the higher faculties." 3
Employers, not the state, owe the obligation to pay a living wage.
The duty lies with the employer, in part, because it receives the worker's
product. But the employer's duty is not merely contractual. It is social.
Employers control the resources of the community. As a result, the
employer must be the distributor of the product of nature-"society's
paymaster"-and must do so in accord with fairness. Government
would set the standard of fairness. In his thinking about Rerum
Novarum, Ryan was most deeply struck by the Pope Leo XII's view of
the regulatory role of the state as an instrument of social reform:
To American Catholics, who, like their fellow Americans had been
indoctrinated with theories of nonintervention which were not far
removed from laissez-faire, the declarations of Pope Leo on the
regulatory4functions of the state over industry were new and, indeed,
startling."1

The state was subject to a moral right and duty, according to Ryan's
interpretation of Rerum Novarum, to intervene in the power imbalances
that exist in labor markets to assure workers a living wage."'
Ryan acknowledged that a fair wage based on the living standards
of workers could not be a fixed sum."6 In the first instance, every
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Seeid.at116.
Id.
See id. at 113-15.
RYAN, SociALDocrINE, supranote 101, at44.
See RYAN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 116-17, 119-20, 145.
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employer could not equally afford to pay a living wage. Ryan's solution
was that employers would not be obliged to pay when to do so would
deprive the employer's family of a decent livelihood: "The product is in
a fundamental sense the common property of employer and employees.
Both parties have cooperated in turning it out, and they have equal
claims upon it, in so far as it is necessary to yield them a decent
livelihood."". Nonetheless, in a choice between the employer's and the
worker's right to a decent livelihood, the employer may choose his own
over the worker's family. In fact, the employer is entitled to take enough
to justify a higher standard of living than the worker "for he has become
accustomed to this higher standard, and would suffer a considerable
hardship if compelled to fall notably below it."". The employer may
also pay interest on loan capital before paying his workers a living
wage, although he may not take interest on his own capital before
paying a living wage." 9 But only these limited circumstances would
justify an employer's claim that he cannot pay a living wage, in Ryan's
view.
Ryan also acknowledged that differences in the status of women
and men in American society might justify differentials in their living
standards and wages. Ryan's original conception of the living wage was
premised on an average male worker.2 However, "the support of the
family falls properly upon the husband and father, not upon the wife and
mother. The obligation of the father to provide a livelihood for the wife
and young children is quite as definite as his obligation to maintain
himself."' 2 The living wage, therefore, must be a "family wage"
sufficient to support the worker, his spouse, and children, according to
Ryan.1

Ryan could not ignore the fact that women participated in the labor
force, but he struggled with what constituted fair wages for women. In
the first instance, he would set their wage at a level sufficient to support
a woman living alone and away from home, if only because that is how
a considerable number of women lived in the early twentieth century. If
employers were morally free to pay women living at home less than
those living on their own, Ryan predicted, then employers would

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Seeid at 118.
Id.
Id. at 117.
See Ryan, EcoNoMIc JUsTICE, supra note 36, at 118.
See id. at 121.
Id.
See id.
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employ only the former. Ryan would have required that an unmarried
man receive a family wage for the same reason; that is, so that the
unmarried man would not undercut the employment prospects of the
family man. But what of competition between women and men? Ryan
said little about it. But he acknowledged that women sometimes
supported large families and should, therefore, have been paid the
family wage. 123
In sum, Ryan's first requisite of fairness was that all workers,
including those of average ability with no special qualifications of any
sort, receive a living wage. Only when this absolute claim had been
universally satisfied would Ryan's analysis permit those groups of
workers who are in any way special to collect something more than
living wages.' 4 Thus, the living wage is the condition for Absolute
Fairness.
Ryan's conception of Absolute Fairness contains two parts of the
three-part framework established by the socio-economists. He diagnosed
the operation of the labor market to demonstrate that workers' wages
could be driven below subsistence. He also proposed a remedy for these
unfair wage deals. But Ryan was unwilling to address the third part of
the framework; that is, to establish that paying workers a living wage
benefited society. He refused to appeal to the powerful forces in the
economy and the political market. Ryan considered the living wage an
absolute right and an individual natural right not subject to the vagaries
of the comparative bargaining power of employers and workers in the
political market or the labor market.'2' This natural right to Absolute
Fairness belongs to the individual as an individual, and not to serve
society's ends, in Ryan's view.' 6 He saw no need to prove that it
produces the most efficient societal result. 27 He saw no need to establish
28
that the living wage is exchanged for labor of an equivalent value.'
Absolute Fairness is the worker's personal prerogative, not his share of
social goods. It is born with the worker. It is not a political or civil right
that can be annulled or ignored by the state. The state is the guardian of
the living wage, not its source. 9

123. See RYAN, SocLAL DoCrINE, supra note 101, at 121-22.
124. See id at 83-85.
125. See id. at 15, 145, 161-63.
126. See id.

127. See iL
128. See RYAN, SociALDocrmNE, supra note 101, at 15, 145, 161-63.
129.

See id. at 85, 161-63.
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Absolute Fairness set the ethical standard for the debate over
fairness in wages. Because of its absolutist view, however, it was illsuited to the political arena in which the living wage movement sought
to have the minimum wage question decided. Absolute Fairness was
never enacted in a national minimum wage law and never achieved by
the state minimum wage laws it inspired.
B. Fairnessis Equality of BargainingPower
Another of John Ryan's accomplishments was inspiring Father
Edwin O'Hara to become an important leader of the American living
wage movement. O'Hara led the state of Oregon to pass a living wage
law that set the standard for state laws in the period leading up to the
FLSA. In the process, O'Hara and his allies in the living wage
movement introduced a new conception to the American debate over
fairness in wages. This conception of Bargaining Fairness sought to
redress directly workers' inferior bargaining position in the labor
market. In the process of enacting legislation, however, O'Hara and his
colleagues also exposed the fissures between the forces sharing the goal
of better conditions for workers, but ultimately struggling over the shape
and content of the FLSA.
1. Middle-Class Reformers and the Labor Movement
The American minimum wage campaign was led by reformminded middle-class individuals and groups aroused by the social evil
of underpaid women workers and committed to pursuing a remedy
through state action. Their commitment to legislative action, rather than
collective action by workers, would come to define the debate over
fairness in wages. But the pursuit of a government-imposed remedy was
by no means a foregone conclusion. Two of the most important
organizations in the campaign for minimum wage laws-the National
Consumers' League and the National Women's Trade Union Leaguebegan by pursuing other courses.
The first Consumers' League was formed in New York City in
1891."0 In 1898, several local federations amalgamated into the National
Consumers' League ("NCL").13 1 The NCL's purpose at its inception was
130. See id.
131. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modem American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1062-

63 (1999).
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to use conventional middle-class behavior-shopping-to change
working conditions. Members and sympathizers would consume only
those products tagged with the NCL label which certified that
the goods
2
conditions.1
fair
and
safe,
lawful,
under
produced
been
had
The NCL's approach began to change course when Florence Kelley
became General Secretary in 1899, a position she held until her death in
1931. ' Kelley was the daughter of Congressman "Pig Iron" Kelley
from Pennsylvania 4 Among the first women to graduate from Cornell
University, Kelley also earned a law degree from Northwestern
University.' Kelley spent three years studying in Zurich where she
became interested in socialism, eventually translating Friedrich Engels's
Die Lage der Arbeiten Klassen in England (The Condition of the
English Working Classes) into English.'36 When she returned to the
United States, Kelley became an intimate of Jane Addams, the
settlement house leader, and a participant in many causes, including the
NAACP and the campaign for tenement laws. 37
In 1891, the trade unionists of Chicago appointed a committee to
study sweatshops.'38 Kelley served on the committee and urged an
investigation upon the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics.'39 She
eventually performed the investigation herself and found harrowing
conditions. Her report led the legislature to appoint its own committee
to investigate working conditions. '40 This legislative committee
recommended a regulatory act to limit hours for women and children in
clothing and other manufacturing. 4 ' Kelley led the effort in lobbying for
the bill working closely with Illinois's Progressive Governor John Peter
Altgeld. The bill passed in 1893 and, in recognition of her role, Altgeld
appointed Kelley to be chief factory inspector.' 42 She led the state's
inspection efforts, often conducting investigations herself, until the law

132. See id.
133. See GEORGE MARTIN, MADAM SECRETARY FRANCES PERKINS 52 (1976).
134. See Clement E. Vose, The National Consumers' League and the Brandeis Brief, I
MIDVESTJ. POL. Sci. 267,267-68 (1957).
135. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 53.

136. See id.
137. See Vose, supra note 134, at 269-70.
138. See Elizabeth Brandeis, Labor Legislation, in 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1896-1932 465-66 (1966) [hereinafter Brandeis, Labor Legislation] (commonly referred
to as JOHN R. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOR).
139. See id
140. See id
141. See ld
142. See id

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

Vol. 18:19

was struck down
by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1895 as
43

unconstitutional.'
Kelley's Illinois experience put her in league with the socio-

economists by reinforcing her faith in the power of facts and
pragmatism. Because of her government experience, Kelley saw

legislation as the best available solution to the problems of workers in
the labor market. Under her leadership, the NCL admitted, at least

tacitly, that twenty years of voluntary action had been 44unsuccessful in
solving the problem of exploitative working conditions.'
Kelley attended the International Conference of Consumers'

Leagues held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1908 at which national
campaigns for statutory minimum wages were urged. 45 She promptly
took the mantle, asking John Ryan to prepare a report laying out
evidence of the harsh conditions under which women worked and the
substandard wages they were paid. 46 Kelley raised the issue both at the
NCL's 1910 convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and, along with
Ryan, the 1910 St. Louis meeting of the National Conference of
Charities and Correction." In that same year, the NCL drafted a model
minimum wage bill that would become the basis for the first round of
state legislation to come.'4 8 Thereafter, the NCL became
the preeminent
49
voice for statutory minimum wage laws in the states.
The National Women's Trade Union League ("NWTUL") also
began its advocacy of the cause of exploited women workers outside the
legislative area. 50 Although its founders included middle-class social
143. See Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 465-66.
144. See MARTiN, supra note 133, at 76.
145. See TIMoTHY MIcHAEL DOLAN, "SOME FELL ON GOOD GROUND: THE LIFE OF EDWIN V.
O'HARA 32 (1992).
146. See id.
147. See Florence Kelley, The Case for the Minimum Wage: Status of Legislation in the
United States, THE SURVEY 487, 487 (Feb. 6 1915) [hereinafter Kelley, Status of Legislation].
148. See Vose, supra note 134, at 268-72; Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at
507; BAER, supranote 8, at 74.
149. The NCL did not operate alone. Kelley's efforts involved an extensive network of
supportive organizations and individuals, including the National Conference of Charities and
Corrections and its journal The Survey, the AALL, the National Child Labor Committee, and
others. Many of these organizations were housed together in the Charities Building in Manhattan.
There were also personal connections. Josephine Goldmark, Kelley's main staff support and chair
of the NCL's Committee on Legislation (later called the Committee on Legislation and Legal
Defense of Labor Laws) was the sister-in-law of Louis Brandeis, who argued many of the NCL's
early cases. Brandeis's daughter later served on the District of Columbia Wage Board. John
Commons became president of the NCL in later years, and Richard Ely and John Ryan were active
participants. The NCL's network eventually extended to figures of great importance to the future
of the minimum wage-Eleanor Roosevelt and Frances Perkins. See Vose, supranote 134, at 268.
150. See Brandeis, LaborLegislation, supra note 138, at 507.
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workers and well-off reformers, the NWTUL was an affiliate of the
AFL originally created to organize women workers into unions.' It
found some success with women working in textiles,- bakeries, clothes
manufacturing, and other industries, and played an essential role
supporting numerous strikes.1 2 It also suffered from the disapproval and
limited support of its male trade union allies who were not immune to
the gender-based fears and prejudices that infected
the rest of society.
53
But sexism was not the NWTUL's only problem.
In the early part of the twentieth century, recruiting women to join
unions was a difficult task. Many women perceived themselves to be
mere transients in the work world.'-" Comparatively few received the
kind of industrial training that would bind them to the workforce. 5 1 In
the words of worker advocate Irene Osgood Andrews:
the majority look to marriage rather than to organization or efficiency
as the way to a higher standard of living.... Working women have
remained largely unskilled and unorganized and thousands of them
have been employed at wages insufficient to "maintain them in health
and to provide reasonable comfort."' 56
In the first three decades of the 1900s, between twenty and twentyfive percent of women participated in the work force while the male
labor force participation rate during the same period approached ninety
percent.'57 Married women participated at a much lower rate of between
five and eleven percent. Roughly half of single women and about onethird of widowed or divorced women participated in the labor force.'
This aggregate data would seem to justify the expectations that marriage

151. See PILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
VOLUME VI: ON THE EVE OF AMERJCA'S ENTRANCE INTO WORLD WAR 1, 1915-1916 124, 124-26
(1982) [hereinafter FONER VI].

152. See id.
153. See id. at 125-31, 140-42 (discussing the troubled relationship between the NWTUL and
the AFL); Lipschultz, supranote 8, at 5; BAER, supra note 8, at 72-74.
154. See FONER VI, supra note 151, at 124.
155. See id.
156. IRENE OSGOOD ANDREVS, MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION, reprinted in NEW YORK
STATE FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMMISSION 7 (1914) (citation omitted). See generally
GLICKMAN, supra note 2; JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR
LEGISLATION 47 (1927).
157. See Walter Galenson & Robert S. Smith, Labor in the Twentieth Century: The United
States, in LABOR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 12, 13, 16 (John T. Dunlop & Walter Galenson
eds., 1978).
158. See id
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took women ,out of the labor force in the early part of the twentieth
century.
But the "Report on the Condition of Women and Child WageEarners in the United States," prepared at President Theodore
Roosevelt's request in 1907 and published between 1910 and 1915,
looked behind the'aggregate labor force participation numbers." 9 The
study of women and children working in several cities did not support
women's expectations of a marital escape hatch. Nearly all the female
store and factory workers either lived alone and supported themselves
(average age twenty-eight years old), or with their families and
supported them (average age approximately twenty-two).' 6° Most of
these women had been in the labor force since their mid-teens and had
little realistic hope of ever being able to quit.16' The Census showed that
between 1870 and 1920 only twenty-five to thirty percent of all women
workers were sixteen to twenty-five years old, while about forty-three
percent were between the ages of twenty-five to forty-four, and about
twenty percent were between the ages of forty-five to sixty-four.'62
Employment outside the home was an increasingly permanent situation
for women. 63
Women not only found themselves working longer than expected,
but they were typically shunted into "women's work."' 4 According to a
1914 study, the American labor market was structured by gender and
age. Women predominated in industrial, low-paying jobs concentrated
in the so-called "sweated trades."' '
New York's Factory Investigation Commission found that the labor
market functioned for low-wage women much like the socio-economists
had described:
Those that are unable to get employment at the prevailing rate of
wages will go about offering their services for less, and they will
displace other employees, who, in turn, will offer their labor for less,
and displace still others, until it will get down to the point where we

159. See BAER, supra note 8, at 21.
160. See id at 21, 22, 72 (citing REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF WOMEN AND CHILD VAGEEARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES, S. Rep. No. 610, 645, (2d Sess.); 62, 64-5, (1st & 2d Sess.)
(1910-1915)).
161. See id.at 21.
162. See id at 22.
163. See id
164. See BAER, supra note 8, at 21.
165. See HART, supra note 8, at 66; see also BAER, supra note 8, at 33 (citing a Women's
Bureau study).
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are now, the point where in a great many cases the wage that is paid is
just a little above the starvation line, if it is there.'6
Under the weight of all of these conditions-expectations of short work
tenures, limited training, isolation in gender-segregated labor markets,
and pay that barely supported subsistence-prospects for organizing
women into unions were grim. 6'
At its second biennial convention in 1909, the NWTUL
acknowledged these realities by including in its legislative program a
demand for a statutory minimum wage.' 6' For some, like Elizabeth
Dutcher of the Retail Clerks' Union, legislation was a necessary step on
the road to the ultimate goal of union organization:
It gives people enough money to pay their union dues. It gives them a
sense of security and hope that is better than a tonic for them. They
feel strengthened. They have some sort of a basis on which they can
16
stand and come forward... a training in industrial self-govemment.'
Rose Schneiderman, a founder of the International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, acknowledging that women "have not seen fit" to enter
trade unions, also endorsed the need for legislation as a temporary
measure on the road to unionism. 70
The male leadership of the AFL agreed with the goal of a living
wage. 7 ' Samuel Gompers, the AFL's first president, endorsed the living
wage as early as 1887.272 Henry Demarest Lloyd, writing in an AFL
pamphlet in 1893, gave a historical rationale for the living wage. 7
Some commentators of the period even suggested that the living wage
idea originated with the labor movement. 74 While this may exaggerate
166. HART, supra note 8, at 66 (quoting New York Factory Investigating Commission
("NYFIC") report).

167. See id. at 68.
168. See MARGARET DREIER ROBINS, NEED OF A NATIONAL

TRAINING SCHOOL FOR WOMEN
ORGANIZERS: THE MINIMUM WAGE, INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION 3 (1913); BAER, supra note 8, at 72.

169. HART, supra note 8, at 96.
170. See Lipschultz, supra note 8, at 41-42. Schneiderman was a sufficiently close friend of
Eleanor Roosevelt that she was brought to Hyde Park to meet with Franklin Roosevelt during his
convalescence from polio. Schneiderman and the Roosevelts engaged in long discussions of the
history of the labor movement and sweatshop conditions in New York. See DANIEL R. FUSFELD,
THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOsEvELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW DEAL 82-83

(1956).
171. See GLICKMAN, supra note 2, at 64.
172. See id. at 62, 64.
173. See id. at 62-65.
174. See id. at 65-66. The Webbs attributed the phrase to Lloyd Jones, who allegedly referred
to "living wages" in 1874. See WEBa & WEBB, supra note 16, at 587-90.
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the point, the AFL clearly rejected socialism as a replacement for the
wage labor system and came to support the view that the wage system
could be made fair if a living wage prevailed. 7 '
Adopting the goal was quite different from agreeing to the means.
The AFL sought living wages through collective bargaining and feared
that legislation setting wages would undermine unions.'76 Gompers
strongly opposed minimum wage legislation, and the unions of the AFL

were almost unanimous in their opposition to the inclusion of men in
minimum wage laws like those in Australia, New Zealand, and Great
Britain. '77 The wage determinations in these countries were enforced
through courts of industrial arbitration, and so they became a part of the

system of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes." 8 Trade unionists
associated compulsory arbitration with hated judicial intervention in
labor disputes that was designed, more often than not, to curtail rather
79

than further labor's ability to organize and bargain collectively.

Florence Kelley also speculated, probably with good cause, that trade

unionists may have feared that unions' power would be undermined if
unorganized workers could gain through wage commissions higher
wages that had been possible to that point only through organization.8 '

Other critics have postulated that the AFL's position was a function of
its philosophy of craft unionism.''
175. See Galenson & Smith, supra note 151, at 51 (quoting Gompers in 1903 to the socialists:
"Economically, you are unsound; socially, you are wrong; industrially, you are an impossibility.");
GLICKMAN, supra note 2, at 62-65; see also ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 82-83 (quoting the
Official Report of the AFL Executive Council at its 33rd Annual Convention in 1913:
The organized labor movement has insisted from the beginning upon the establishment
of a living wage as a minimum, and it has, through the force of organized effort,
succeeded in establishing minimum wages and maximum hours of labor far superior to
those prescribed by the wage boards of other countries.
176. See Boris Shishkin, Wage-Hour Law Administrationfrom Labor's Viewpoint, 29 AM.
LAB. LEGiS. REv. 63-65 (1939).
177. See id. at 64-65.
178. See id.
179. See ANDREWS,supra note 156, at 11; Shishkin, supra note 176, at 64-65. It is worth
noting that Samuel Gompers was a member of the NYFIC for which Andrews wrote her report. See
Kelley, Status of Legislation,supra note 147, at 489.
180. See Kelley, Status of Legislation, supranote 147, at 489.
181. See BAER, supra note 8, at 89. Still others have suggested that the AFL's goal was to
exclude women from competition with men. These critics point to a quote from an 1879 annual
report of Adolph Strasser, President of the Cigar Makers Union, which said "[w]e cannot drive the
females out of the trade, but we can restrict their daily quota of labor through factory laws." Id. at
26 (citing REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF WOMEN AND CHIILD WAGE-EARNERS IN THE UNrrED
STATES, S.Doc. No. 61-645 (1910)). A 1928 report by the Women's Bureau concluded, however,
that legislation almost never restricted women's employment opportunities because occupations
were so rigidly segregated by gender that women's opportunities were effectively restricted
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A resolution demanding minimum wage legislation introduced at
the 1912 AFL convention was condemned to a slow death by referral to
the Executive Council for further study. A new resolution adopted at the
AFL's 1913 convention articulated a watch-and-wait position regarding
minimum wage laws for women:
If it were proposed in this country to vest authority in any tribunal to
fix by law wages for men, Labor would protest by every means in its
power. Through organization the wages of men can and will be
maintained at a higher minimum than they would be if fixed by legal
enactment.
But there is far more significant ground for opposing the
establishment by law of a minimum wage for men. The principle that
organization is the most potent means for a shorter workday, and for a
higher standard of wages, applies to women workers equally as to men.
But the fact must be recognized that the organization of women
workers constitutes a separate and more difficult problem. Women do
not organize as readily or as stably as men. They are, therefore, more
are in a greater measure than men
easily exploited..s They certainly
•
182
entitled to the concern of society.
The convention instructed the AFL's Executive Council to watch
developments where "experimental" minimum wage legislation took
effect. The 1913 convention also endorsed maximum hours legislation
for women and children, although the AFL quickly reversed its position
one year later. 18 3 Opposition to minimum wage legislation for men
remained the AFL's position until the debate over the FLSA in 1937 and
1938. Kelley harshly criticized the AFL's "mildewing influence upon
such effort even when confined to women."'

without legislation. See id. at 26, 33-34. But see FONER VI, supra note 151, at 189-90 (discussing
the current within the AFL to force women out of factory and shop jobs).
182. ANDREWvs, supra note 156, at 82-83 (quoting the Official Report of the AFL Executive
Council at its 33rd Annual Convention in 1913); see also PH[LIP S.FONER, HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MovEMENT INTHE UNrrED STATES: VOLUME V: THE AFL NTHE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 19101915 128-30 (1980) [hereinafter FONER V] (quoting Louis Brandeis, the principal early legal
advocate for Bargaining Fairness laws, who also warned that too much reliance on social
legislation "would destroy the labor unions, the great protection of the workingman against the
trust.").
183. See Brandeis, LaborLegislation, supra note 138 at 556.
184. Kelley, Status of Legislation, supra note 147, at 489.
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There were many in the labor movement who disagreed with the
AFL's passive hostility to minimum wage legislation.' Support for
strikes in the garment trades cemented a relationship between the
NWTUL and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America led by
Sidney Hillman. There were other forces within labor, including John
Mitchell, President of the United Mine Workers until 1908, the United
Textile Workers, and the anarcho-syndicalist Industrial Workers of the
World ("IWW"), that joined with the NWTUL.186 Nonetheless, the
inability of the living wage movement to join with the leadership of the
nation's largest labor federation and the labor movement as a whole in
pursuit of a legislated living wage would become central to the struggle
over the shape, scope, and content of the FLSA.
2. Early Minimum Wage Laws and the Groundwork for a Living Wage
Campaign
Evolution in economic thinking laid the intellectual groundwork
for an American argument in support of a statutory minimum wage. But
the living wage movement needed added bargaining power in the
political market. This required further efforts to move public opinion
towards support for the idea of an American minimum wage. The first
step in this process was the examination of existing statutory minimum
wages that had succeeded in industrial economies similar to the United
States of the early twentieth century.
In 1894, New Zealand passed a law providing for the compulsory
arbitration of labor disputes."" The law was primarily intended to
preserve industrial peace.'
But the law also created "district
conciliation boards" empowered to fix minimum wages.'89 The first law
setting a wage floor was passed in the Australian province of Victoria
two years later, although it was also connected to a system of
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.' 90 The law established boards
consisting of worker, employer, and public representatives to fix
minimum wages in certain industries designated by the legislature.''
Other Australian provinces, such as South Australia, Queensland, and

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

generallyBAER, supra note 8, at 74-75.
id. at 74,77-78.
id. at 74; see also Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 501 n.2.
Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 502, n.2.
BAER, supra note 8, at 74.
Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 501.
id. at 501-02.
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Tasmania, adopted similar laws between 1900 and 1910,,always as part
of a system of compulsory arbitration.' Great Britain enacted its first
such law, the Trade Boards Act, in 1909 using the Victoria statute as a
model.'9 3 Representative wage boards were permitted to set minimum
wages for employees in any industry in which the prevailing rate of
wages was "exceptionally low as compared with that in other
employments."' 4 These statutes proved to Americans that minimum
wage laws could succeed in industrial economies. 9 5
Wage determinations in the Australian states were generally based
on a living wage standard.'96 In 1907, the Australian Commonwealth
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration authored a decision interpreting a
provision in the law it administered providing that the court was to fix
"fair and reasonable" minimum wages.' 9 Justice Higgins, writing for the
court, interpreted "fair and reasonable" to mean that the wage for
unskilled laborers should support "the normal needs of the average
employee regarded as a human being in a civilized community." '98 This
pronouncement set the standard for Australia." The average employee,
in this case, was a married man with a wife and three dependent
children.m But Justice Higgins's standard was broader than a mere
family subsistence wage. 2 1' Lost wages caused by unemployment were
taken into account. For men, the family had to be taken into account.
For women, the wage was based on the assumption that they supported
only themselves. When both genders worked in an occupation, the
prevailing gender determined how the wage would be set. In Great
Britain, the general practice was to level the wage up to the standard set
by the best employer in that district. 202
192. See id, at 502 n.3.

193. See id. at 502.
194. ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 49-51; see also Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note
138, at 501-02. "Exceptionally" was later changed to "unduly." See ANDREWS, supra note 156, at

49-51
195. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 8; Webb, Legal Minimum Wage, supra note 80,
at 973-74; The Minimum Wage: An InternationalSurvey, InternationalLabour Office, League of
Nations Doc. 22 SERIES D 193 (1939). For example, the Victoria law increased wages in the five
sweated trades to which it first applied by between twelve percent and thirty-five percent while
reducing hours and increasing the employment-to-population ratio. Webb, Legal Minimum Wage,
supra note 80, at 973-74.
196. See LAUCK, supra note 19, at 93.
197. See id. at 93-94.

198. Id. at 94.
199. See id. at 93.
200. See id. at 94.
201. See LAUCK, supra note 19, at 94-95.
202. See COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 58-61. See generally Henry Bournes
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The second step in the living wage movement's effort to
accumulate political bargaining power was to demonstrate the pressing
need for living wage laws like those in Australia, New Zealand, and
Great Britain. 2°3 Again, swaying public sentiment was the goal." 4 The
means to the goal was a series of budgetary studies undertaken by
governmental and charitable organizations. 5 These studies were
intended to ascertain the cost of the minimum requirements for food,
shelter, fuel, clothing, and utilities for an average unskilled wageearner's family.2 Scientific analyses were prepared as to the food
values necessary to sustain workingmen, their wives, and children. The
cost of a healthy diet was computed."' Direct investigations of the other
elements of subsistence living were also undertaken to arrive at an
aggregate family budget.= A host of studies followed: Louise Bolard
More of Columbia University studied 200 families in New York City in
1903-1905; Doctor R.C. Chapin studied 642 families in New York City
in 1907; J.C. Kennedy and others at the University of Chicago in 1914
studied 184 families of the Chicago Stockyards District; Frank
Streightoff in 1914 studied families in New York City, Buffalo,
Syracuse, Elmira and Albany for the New York Factor Investigating
Commission; the Bureau of Personnel Service of New York City
undertook a study in 1914; and Esther L. Little and W.J. Henry Cotton
in 1914 studied textile workers in Philadelphia. 2
Chapin's study was the most exhaustive. He found in 1907 that
only an income of $900 or more permitted a working family to subsist.210
More's investigation in 1906 found that $728 was needed, while the
New York State Conference on Charities and Corrections in 1907 found
that $825 was sufficient for a family of five.21 ' Kennedy's 1914 study
found that $800 was needed. Taken together, these studies put the
subsistence wage for working families during this era, based on
budgetary estimates, at approximately $800 to $900.211
liggins, A New Provincefor Law and Order,29 HARV. L. REv. 13, 16-22 (1915) (setting forth the
principles that guided his precedent-setting standard for the living wage).
203. See LAUCK, supra note 19, at 94-95.
204. See id. at 94.

205. See id. at 20.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
LAUCK, supra note 19, at 20.
idL at 21.
id. at 21-22.
idat 22.
id
LAUCK, supra note 19, at 23.
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Other investigations supported the socio-economists' conclusion
that workers' wages could be driven below these subsistence wages of
between $800 and $900 per year by employers exercising their superior
bargaining power.21 4 The Federal Immigration Commission's
investigation of almost 16,000 families in 1908 and 1909 across the
country and across industries, for example, found an average family
income of only $720.5 The Russell Sage Foundation in 1908 found the
average income of steel workers in Homestead, Pennsylvania to be only
$349216 In 1909 and 1910, the University of Chicago reported that the
families of immigrant workers had a yearly income of only $442.17
Another pre-war study found that seventy-five percent of female wage
earners received less than $8 per week and fifty percent earned less than
$6 per week, and that these wages were reduced another twenty percent
by lost time and unemployment. Yet another study found that in 1912 at
least six million adult men, married as well as single, received less than
$600 per year in wages, or $12 per week.2 '8 A 1903 report of the United
States Commissioner of Labor showed that the absolutely necessary
costs of family support were absorbing, "for a large part of the families
studied, a larger sum than could be earned by the head of the family. 219
Most of the families studied "had to obtain a substantial part of their
income from boarders, lodgers, or the earnings of [a] wife or
children."220 Later analysis proved that these bad conditions became
worse as the cost of living steadily increased from 1900 through 1914
with wages failing to keep pace.22' This substantial body of evidence
helped set the political conditions for the American minimum wage
campaign.2

214. See id. at 23-24.

215. See id.
216. Seeid. at24.
217. See id.; see also Lescohier, supra note 99, at 62 nn. 42-43; Brandeis, LaborLegislation,
supra note 138, at 507 n.19 (listing many of the same studies); HART, supra note 8, at 63
(according to a history written in 1929 by Clara Mortenson Beyer for the Women's Bureau, the
impetus for the American movement for a statutory minimum wage was a combination of news of
the British Trade Boards Act, and the publication of a series of major investigations of women's
work by the Bureau of Labor, the Pittsburgh survey, and individual social scientists).
218. See COZMIONS & ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 44.
219. Lescohier, supra note 99, at 62.
220. Id.
221. See hl at 61.
222. See id. at 478-79; LINDLEY D. CLARK, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MINIMUMWAGE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTRUCriON AND OPERATION 12-15 (Bulletin No. 285
July 1921).
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3. Massachusetts and the First American Minimum Wage Law
The leadership of the campaign for a minimum wage law in
Massachusetts came from the same interlocking group of middle-class
social reformers and academics found in Florence Kelley's network: the
Women's Educational and Industrial Union ("WEIU"), the state
Women's Trade Union League ("WTUL"), and the state Consumers'
League. In 1910, the WTUL and the WEIU formed a legislative drafting
committee that eventually included the Consumers' League, the Central
Labor Union of Boston, and the Massachusetts branch of the AALL.
Support from labor was largely the product of the United Textile
Workers' successful effort to secure endorsements from the state AFL
and the Boston Central Labor Union. m Florence Kelley's view was that
these elements within labor-particularly the clothing and textile
workers-played a crucial role in the passage of the nation's first
minimum wage law in Massachusetts in 1912.22
A special state commission of five members was formed in 1911 to
investigate wages in selected industries. The commission offered more
evidence of what the socio-economists and Ryan had found, along with
a slap at those who deified the Marginal Productivity Theory:
There is a common and widespread, but erroneous view that an
economic law by some mysterious process correlates earnings and
wages. There is no such law; in fact, in many industries, the wages
bear little or no relation to the value or even to the selling price of the
workers' output.m
The commission submitted a bill to the legislature in 1912 that closely
resembled the draft legislation prepared by the NCL in 1910.226 The bill
finally enacted, however, emerged in "a much-mangled form of the bill
proposed," according to Kelley. m All enforcement had been stripped
away absent a provision allowing information to be given to the public
regarding employers who failed to pay wages.m In effect,
223. See Arthur F. Lucas, The Legal Minimum Wage in Massachusetts, ANNALs 2-3 (Mar.

1927).
224. See BAER, supranote 8, at 83.
225. EDwIN V. O'HARA, WELFARE LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN AND MINORS 8 (1912)

[hereinafter O'HARA, WELFARE LEGISLArION] (quoting the Massachusetts Commission on
Minimum Wage Boards).
226. See Florence Kelley, Minimum-Wage Laws, 20 J. POL. EcON 999, 1002 (1912)
[hereinafter Kelley, Minimum-Wage Laws]; Vose, supra note 134, at 272.
227. Kelley, Minimum-Wage Laws, supra note 226, at 1002.
228. See Dorothy W. Douglas, American Minimum Wage Laws at Work, 9 AM. ECON. REV.
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Massachusetts' minimum wage was not mandatory. The vain hope was
that public outrage and consumer rebellion against goods produced in
exploitative circumstances would change employer behavior. 29 This was
the same hope abandoned by the NCL when it began its campaign for
legislation.
Massachusetts's tepid reform bill almost certainly would not have
been enacted at all not been for an acute social crisis precipitated by the
radicalized textile workers of Lawrence.2' 0 In 1908, the Massachusetts
legislature passed a law imposing a fifty-six hour workweek that was
further reduced to fifty-four hours per week and ten hours per day in
1911.2' In January 1912, textile manufacturers carried out their oftrepeated threat to cut their workers' already inadequate wages consistent
with the reduced work week. 2 Lawrence's millworking families, many
recent immigrants, had survived to that point by sending every member
of the family-including wives and children-into the factories to
work."' This loss of earnings was the last straw.
The IWW, with organizers Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and Joseph
Ettor, led a strike in Lawrence by 20,000 workers." The conflict was
long, violent, and bitter. It divided the labor movement and attracted
substantial publicity, especially when Margaret Sanger and other
reformers evacuated the strikers' children and the mayor called in the
militia to quell the strike.z5 The strike produced a stunning victory for
the workers. They won a ten percent wage increase and a guarantee of
overtime pay." 6 The process and the results horrified the legislature,
while educating and galvanizing the public to the workers' cause. The
strike also proved the inexorable connection between wages and
hours.27 In Kelley's words: "The experience of the textile workers at
Lawrence in the present year shows convincingly the need of minimumwage boards for both men and women in relation to the nation-wide
701,705 (1919).
229. See id. at 706; Lucas, supranote 223, at 39-46; CLARK, supranote 222, at 17, 115.

230. See MELVYN DuBoFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS
OFTHE WORLD 227-62 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing what occurred in Lawrence in 1912).
231. See id. at 227.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See id. at 227-28.
See id. at 230-31.
See id. at 236-42.
See DUBOFSKY, supra note 230, at 245, 251.

236. See id. at 253.
237. See generally PHILIP S.FONER,

HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED

STATES: VOLtMiE IV: THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD 1905-1917 306-50 (1965)
[hereinafter FONER IV]; Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 477-478, 509; BAER,
supra note 8, at 70-71.
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effort for a shorter working-day, a shorter working-week." 8 In the face
of worker advocates' strengthened political bargaining position, the
Massachusetts legislature agreed.
4. Public Bargaining and the Minimum Wage
Massachusetts was the first state to enact legislation, but eight
other states passed minimum wage laws within one year. 9 For example,
after the 1910 meeting of the NCL in Milwaukee, John Commons set
several of his University of Wisconsin students to work studying the
English and Australian minimum wage laws and investigating wages in
Milwaukee.Y The NCL later published the Milwaukee Study. 41 In 1911,
Commons drafted a minimum wage bill for the legislature which was
the first introduced in any state.2" The legislator who introduced the bill
was a former student of John Ryan who, in turn, testified before a joint
hearing on the bill on March 29, 1911. The Wisconsin law was enacted
in 1913 .
The IWW strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts was not the only
event that improved the political bargaining power of minimum wage
advocates. Industrial catastrophes also played a role. 4 For example, the
Triangle Shirt Waist Factory fire in March 1911 changed the political
calculus around fairness in wages and working conditions in New York.
Frances Perkins was having tea on the north side of Washington Square
Park when she heard the fire engines rushing to the park's east side
where the Asch Building was burning.245 Perkins saw the girls jumping
out of the factory's windows, and stayed to comfort grief-stricken
family members.2 6 The fire and the deaths it caused were
commemorated in a Consumers' League and WTUL mass meeting at
the Metropolitan Opera House on April 2, 1911 at which Perkins and
Rose Schneiderman spoke. It was also commemorated at a mass funeral
238. Kelley, Minimum-Wage Laws, supra note 226, at 1005. While it may not be possible to
know the motivations of an electorate, popular referendums in California, Oregon, and Washington
seeking to establish eight-hour days were all defeated, perhaps for the same reasons that motivated
the Lawrence strikers. See Brandeis, LaborLegislation, supra note 138, at 555.
239. See Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 501-03; THE MINiMUM WAGE: AN
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, League of Nations Series D No. 22 193 (1939).
240. See Brandeis, Labor Legislation,supra note 138, at 512.

241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at513.
244. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 84 (discussing the Triangle Shirt Waist Factory fire).

245. See id.
246. See id.
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attended by 100,000 people for the fire's seven unidentified victims.
These events sparked the creation of the New York State Factory
Investigating Commission and an overhaul of New York's labor laws.247
Yet, this early flurry of legislative activity suggests a great deal
more political bargaining power than the living wage movement
actually wielded. In fact, 1913 was the most active year for state
minimum wage laws. It took another decade before eight more states
adopted minimum wage laws, and two states repealed their statutes
during that same period.248 One early commentator pointed out that only
Massachusetts' non-mandatory law applied to an industrial state.29
Among the first states enacting early minimum wage laws, only
Arizona, Arkansas, South Dakota, and Utah enacted flat-rate minimum
wages fixed in the statute.2'0 The "public bargaining" model first
established in New Zealand, Australia, and Great Britain prevailed.25'
This model involved the creation of wage boards nominally empowered
to set wages. In fact, "public bargaining" statutes typically required the
wage boards to establish advisory committees consisting of equal
numbers of employer and worker representatives, along with one or
more people representing the public. The advisory committees used
scientifically collected data to determine what sum represented the
necessary cost of living for a working family. The committees
ultimately agreed to a rate that would be applied to all women workers
or to women working in a particular industry or occupation. Geographic
distinctions might also be made. The committee would then recommend
a minimum wage rate to the wage board which was, in turn, empowered
only to reject or accept the recommendation without alteration. z2
"Public bargaining" statutes generally contained a requirement that
'' 3
the required wage provide for a woman's "necessary cost of living. 21

247. See FUSFELD, supra note 170, at 47-48; Winifred D. Wandersee, "I'dRatherPass a Law
than Organize a Union": Frances Perkins and the Reformist Approach to Organized Labor, 34
LAB. HIsT. 5, 11 (1993).
248. See Brandeis, LaborLegislation, supra note 138, at 501-03.
249. See Alice S. Cheyney, The Course of Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States,
38 INT'L LAB. REv. 26, 31 (1938).
250. See id. at 28; Douglas, supra note 227, at 709.
251. See Cheyney, supranote 249, at 28-29.
252. See COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 524-27; ANDREWS, supra note 156, at
17-18; CLARK, supra note 222, at 19-21, 22-32; see also Douglas, supra note 227, at 707-13.
Massachusetts and California assembled wage boards by industry. Oregon, Washington, and
Minnesota assembled wage boards by industry category. See ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 29.
253. ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 16-17. Minimum wage rates were defined in various states
as follows: California: "the necessary cost of proper living and to maintain the health and welfare";
Colorado: "to support the necessary cost of living, maintain them in health, and supply the
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Only Nebraska, Massachusetts, and Colorado expressly required that
business conditions in the industry be taken into account in wage
setting.' While "necessary cost of living" might appear to be an
objective standard, wages were actually arrived at through a negotiation
among the members of the advisory committees. "As a matter of fact,"
said Wisconsin-law author and socio-economist John Commons, "the
budget is a compromise. The representatives of the employees present
their budget and their proposal for a rate based on it; the representatives
of the employers do likewise, and the two forces contend until they
come to some agreement." 5 Even where the workers' cost of living was
the sole statutory consideration, public bargaining necessarily forced
consideration of prevailing wages, the amounts of proposed increases,
and business conditions. 6 In the end, the public representative
frequently cast the deciding vote as a quasi-arbitrator of disputes
between worker and employer representatives.2 7 Nonetheless, the
strengthened bargaining position conferred on the worker
representatives improved dramatically their chances of achieving a fair
wage. These statutes assured Bargaining Fairness for the worker in the
wage determination process.
"Public bargaining" laws also served a secondary purpose: they
shielded minimum-wage-setting from the political market. The
legislatures that enacted these laws excluded themselves, and the
interest groups that influenced them, from the process that determined
the wages employers would be required to pay their lowest paid
workers. Thus, workers were protected not only from the consequences
of their inferior bargaining power in the labor market, but from any

necessary comforts of life[,]" considering also the "financial condition of the business";
Massachusetts and Nebraska: "necessary cost of living and to maintain the worker in health";
Minnesota: "to maintain the worker in health and to supply him with the necessary comforts and
conditions of reasonable life"; Oregon and Washington: "necessary cost of living and to maintain
the workers in health"; Wisconsin: a wage "sufficient to maintain himself or herself under
conditions consistent with his or her welfare" with "welfare" defined to include "reasonable
comfort, reasonable physical well-being, decency, and moral well-being." Id.; Douglas, supra note
227, at 713.
254. See Douglas, supra note 227, at 710; COMMONS, supranote 33, at 502-03.
255. ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 58-61; see also VICTOR P. MORRIS, OREGON'S
MNIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION 67-70 (1930) (discussing the effects of collective
EXPERIENCE W TH
bargaining on minimum wage earning women in Oregon).
256. See Brandeis, LaborLegislation, supra note 138, at 527.
257. See id at 524-27. One serious problem for workers was that their representatives, drawn
appropriately from the ranks of low-wage working women, often lacked the education and
experience to negotiate with the better-funded and better-prepared employer representatives. See
Douglas, supranote 227, at 717.
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outcomes that might result from their inferior bargaining position in the
political market.
The process of public bargaining was not an end in itself. The
lodestar of Bargaining Fairness was a living wage. Nonetheless, the
living wage movement did not have sufficient bargaining power even in
friendly state legislatures to enact legislation embodying the conception
of Absolute Fairness. Compromise was necessary. As a result, the state
laws never effected wages that would satisfy John Ryan's standard for a
living wage. Even on the basis of the conservative budgets used by the
wage boards, the minimum wages set by public bargaining barely
provided for subsistence. According to a Women's Bureau study
entitled "Development of Minimum Wage Laws in the United States,"
in 1913, 1914, and 1915, state minimum wages fell within a narrow
range that approximated the reasonable cost of living for a single
woman living away from home.258 But columnist Walter Lippmann
parodied the suggestion that the budgets were sufficiently generous:
"[the wages are] not enough to make life a rich and welcome
experience, but just enough to secure existence amid drudgery in gray
boarding-houses and cheap restaurants.''"
Nonetheless, a study by the Women's Bureau in 1927 showed that
wages increased as a result of public bargaining with only exceptional
cases of displacement or employer problems.2W Other analyses,
particularly from 1915 to 1920 and from 1920 to 1923, found that
legislated minimum wages did not keep pace with the rising cost of
living. But they also found some strong evidence that the minimum
wage laws resulted in wage increases for women26 Bargaining Fairness
set the living wage as its goal, but the exigencies of politics required its
proponents to settle for less.
Among the majority of states whose minimum wage laws imposed
Bargaining Fairness, Oregon stands as the first among equals. This is
partly true because of the happenstance of Oregon's status as defendant
in two leading Supreme Court cases on the validity of state minimum
wage and maximum hours laws. It is equally true, however, because of

258. See COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 156, at 527-30.
259. Walter Lippmann, The CampaignAgainst Sweating, 11 THE NEW REPUBLIC 1, 8 (1915)
(alteration added).
260. See MORRIS, supranote 255, at 69-73.
261. See COMMONS & ANDREws,supra note 156, at 527-38. A 1937 review of the available
evidence by the Women's Bureau produced the same conclusion. See Cheyney, supra note 249,
at41.
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Father Edwin O'Hara who played a leading role in bringing a public
bargaining law to Oregon.
5. Father Edwin O'Hara and Oregon's Public Bargaining Law
John Ryan was the most influential professor in O'Hara's student
career at the St. Paul Seminary. Ryan was a professor of moral theology
at St. Paul Seminary in 1902 and taught O'Hara four semesters of
"Moral Theology: Ethics and Social Problems." O'Hara was quick to
adopt Ryan's view of a living wage. 62 O'Hara was influenced by the
fact that Protestant leaders like Walter Rauschenbusch, author of
Christianityand the Social Crisis in 1907, urged a new era of social
concern among believers.2" Rerum Novarum served the same purpose
for Catholics, in O'Hara's view?" O'Hara also agreed with Ryan that
the Church could not condemn socialism and radicalism unless it
proposed workable alternatives clearly demonstrating that genuine
social reform was consonant with traditional Catholic moral principles,
and that Christ, not Marx, was the true ally of workers. 65
O'Hara was more organizer and calm promoter than soapbox
speech maker or philosopher. His initial secular vehicle for social
activism was the Oregon Consumers' League ("OCL"), the local branch
of the NCL, with which he became involved after moving to Portland in
1905 to take up his pastoral responsibilities. On June 2, 1912, at Ryan's
suggestion, the OCL established a special committee entitled the "Social
Survey Committee to Study Wage, Hour, and Working Conditions for
Women and Minors in Oregon." 2' 6 The Committee's purpose was to
study the problems of the employment of women in the state, and then
to lobby for corrective legislation.267 O'Hara was appointed chair.2 "
Consistent with the living wage movement's broader strategy of
swaying public opinion to improve their bargaining position in the
political market, O'Hara began his task by collecting evidence that
workers' wages were being driven below the subsistence level in the
unregulated labor market.2" He selected Caroline Gleason, another
Minnesotan and field secretary of the Catholic Women's League, to
262. See DOLAN, supra note 145, at 14.
263. See id. at 29.
264. See id. at 29-30.
265. See id. at 30-31.
266. See id. at 32-33.
267. See DOLAN, supranote 145, at 33.
268. See id
269. See id.at 34.
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undertake a comprehensive survey of the wages and working conditions
of Oregon's female workers. 270 As a graduate student in 1912, Gleason
had investigated living and industrial conditions as they affected women
in the factories and mills of Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
New York.21 She believed in undercover work at factories, stores, and
offices. Gleason herself worked in one of the worst factories, gluing
cardboard boxes together for ten hours a day.
Collating all of the evidence she collected, Gleason presented a
book to O'Hara which he published in January 1913 and distributed to
opinion leaders, editors, and legislatorsV2 In O'Hara's words:
It appeared from this careful report that 47 percent of the employees in
department stores, 60 percent in factories, and 37 percent of general
office help were receiving less than $9 a week; whereas it was the
conclusion of the investigation that $10 a week is the minimum on
which the average self-supporting woman could live decently.... It
was obvious from these facts that the wages of working women were
being determined purely by the law of supply and demand, with little
reference to their needs .... The hours of labor were frequently
excessive and the conditions of work detrimental to the health and
morals of employees.m
The OCL's study also concluded that the average weekly wage for
women was $8.20.274 Wages as low as $1.50 per week were found, and
many were less than $6.00 per week . 5 The budget used in the study
took into consideration food, clothing, shelter, needed medical care,
allowances for laundry, church dues, lodge dues, education and
recreation, including a vacation. 76
Like the Massachusetts Commission and the New York Factory
Investigating Commission, the OCL's study found that there existed
among employers no standards for wage-setting or promotion." Women
rendering almost identical services were paid radically different
wages. 28 The OCL study also answered the question: how can women
survive while earning below subsistence? Family members, charities,
270. See id. at 33.
271.
272.

See id.
See DOLAN, supranote 145, at 34.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
See MORRis, supra note 255, at 51.
See id. at 51-52.
See id. at 83.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 55, 58.
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and others were making up the difference between wages and
subsistence, thereby subsidizing the employer.2 9
O'Hara's committee drafted a minimum wage bill along the lines
of the Australian-British public bargaining model with advice from the
Massachusetts Minimum Wage Board Commission, the Legislative
Committee of the NCL, the officers of the AALL, and "scores of the
ablest economists, legislators and businessmen throughout the
country."' 0 O'Hara sent the draft bill for comment to Florence Kelley
and Josephine Goldmark who shared it with Louis Brandeis and Felix
Frankfurter.2' The lawyers advised O'Hara not to set an actual
minimum wage rate since that could undermine the law's
constitutionality. Instead, they urged delegating the authority to a wage
board. 2s2 The public bargaining model would have been O'Hara's
preference even absent this legal advice:
The purpose of minimum wage legislation with its conferences or
wage boards is to substitute to a limited degree a system of compulsory
collective bargaining which will give to the contract between employer
and employe [sic] some character of freedom by placing the
contracting parties on a comparatively equal basis.2 3
Unlike Massachusetts's law, the work of the wage board in Oregon
would be enforced under threat of monetary penalties and
imprisonment.'
By the time the Oregon legislature opened in January 1913, each
member had a copy of the polished bill.2 On June 3, 1913, Governor
West signed the bill into law and immediately thereafter appointed
O'Hara to Chair the Industrial Welfare Commission that would
administer the new statute. 26 Caroline Gleason, O'Hara's investigator

279. See MORRIS,supra note 255, at 56. O'Hara's push for support began with a speech to the
OCL on November 19, 1912 that combined Ryan's living wage philosophy with Kelley's
pragmatic and social work influences. See O'HARA, WELFARE LEGISLATION, supra note 225, at 2-

9.
280. O'HARA, WELFARE LEGISLATION, supranote 225, at 9.
281. See DOLAN,supranote 145, at 35.
282. See id.
283. EDwIN V. O'HARA, A LtVING WAGE By LEGISLATION: THE OREGON EXPERIENCE XiV
(1916) [hereinafter O'HARA, OREGON EXPERIENCE]; see also MORRIS, supra note 255, at 68-70
(stating that the Commission created by the bill is a means of collective bargaining).
284. See O'HARA, OREGON EXPERIENCE, supra note 283, at 43 (quoting section 17 of the
Oregon law).

285. See DOLAN, supranote 145, at 35.
286.

See id at 35-36.
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with the OCL, was to serve as the Commission's executive secretary.'
The Commission began its efforts, at the suggestion of the employer
representative serving on the Commission, by calling a voluntary
meeting of employers in hopes of gaining agreement to an acceptable
wage scale.s But business leaders refused to cooperate.2 9 O'Hara
turned to the processes set forth in the law.2 °
The Oregon law's initial standards required payment of a living
wage. Women would be paid, at a minimum, a wage adequate "to
supply the necessary cost of living and to maintain them in health."29
The law permitted geographic differentials, acknowledging that
Portland's cost of living might exceed that of Oregon's small, rural
towns. 29 But cost of living was not the only de facto standard. The
tripartite nature of the Commission and the Conferences assured that
employers' economic concerns would also be considered even without
express authorization in the statute. 93 The law specifically contemplated
different wages for different industries, thus injecting the nature of the
work into wage-setting decisions.2 In reality, later decisions of the
Commission set a uniform minimum for all occupations, with
differentials based only on geography. 25 Nonetheless, O'Hara's Oregon
law codified a different conception of fairness than Ryan's Absolute
Fairness. Bargaining Fairness did not guarantee a living wage, but a
process for equalizing the bargaining power of the parties to wage deals
so that they might agree to a living wage.

287. See id. at 36.
288. See id. at 37.
289. See id.
290. See DOLAN, supra note 145, at 81; O'HARA, OREGON EXPERIENCE, supra note 283, at xi.
"A legal minimum wage destroys the advantage which unscrupulous employers who are willing to
cut wages below the subsistence level have always enjoyed over their more decent competitors."
Id. at xviii.
291. MORRIS, supranote 255, at 81. The relevant text of section 1 of the Oregon Law is:
It shall be unlawful to employ women or minors in any occupation within the stateof
Oregon for wages which are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and to
maintain them in health, and it shall be unlawful to employ minors in an occupation
within the state of Oregon for unreasonably low wages.
Id. at 80.
292. See id. at 82.
293. Seeidat8l.
294. See id. at 100.
295. See MORRIS, supranote 255, at 81, 100-101. The uniformity resulted less from principle
than from the lack of any true cost of living differential based on occupation or location, and the
added administrative expense of individual conferences, hearings, and investigations for each
occupation or industry. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

49

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

Vol. 18:19

In fact, Oregon's law did not provide a living wage to most women
workers in Oregon. On November 10, 1913, the Commission issued the
first minimum wage orders in the United States.296 The work week for

women was set at between fifty-one and fifty-four hours with a work
day of between eight and ten hours depending upon the industry. Wages

were set at $8.25 per week for most women workers outside Portland
and $8.64 per week within Portland. Experienced office workers and a
few others were to receive $9.25 per week. Apprentices could be paid
less for one year with their wages increasing during that year to the level
of the regular minimum wage.2 7 The Commission based the wage
determinations on the costs of decent living, including respectable
lodging, three meals a day, clothing according to the standard demanded

by the position the employee fills, some provisions for recreation,
healthcare, and self-improvement.9 8
An early Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") study assessed the
effects of the Oregon minimum wage law by comparing mercantile
establishments for two months in 1913 before the law took effect and
for the same two months in 1914 after the law took effect. Rates of pay

for women increased overall, although there was a slight drop in pay for
inexperienced women. There was a dramatic increase in the number of
women and minors being paid the minimum wage or more. Any wage

rates below six dollars per week practically disappeared. Hours of
employment increased slightly. Weekly earnings also increased.

Employment among both men and women declined, probably because a
business depression intervened. There was no evidence that men were
substituted for women as women's wages rose. 299
296. See O'HARA, OREGON EXPERIENCE, supra note 283, at xi.
297. See i1 at 10-12. These apprentice provisions represented an acquiescence in the theory
that new workers, even in the lowest skilled work, were not sufficiently productive to justify being
paid the minimum wage. See MORRIS, supra note 255, at 174-75. The statutory definition of
"apprentice" and the definition used by the IWC did not require that apprentices be given any
instruction or education of any sort. See id. Similarly, section 10 of the statute allowed the issuance
of licenses for a "woman physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise a special license
authorizing her employment at such wage less than said minimum time rate wage as shall be fixed
by the Commission." O'HARA, OREGON EXPERIENCE, supra note 283, at 41. These provisions
were a further acquiescence in the productivity theory; that is, these disabled or aged workers
would be paid less because they could produce less. See id. at xvii.
298: See MORRIS, supra note 255, at 105 (quoting the First Biennial Report of the Industrial
Welfare Commission (1915)).
299. See MARIE L. OBENAUER & BERTHA VON DER NIENBURG, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, EFFECT OF MINIMUM-WAGE DETERMINATIONS INOREGON 9-18, 23, 25-28 (Bulletin
No. 176 July 1915). The authors of this study noted that there were several factors exogenous to
the minimum wage law that affected these results. See id at 7-8. Victor Morris raised similar
concerns: the business depression beginning in 1914, increased activity due to World War I, rapid
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But there was a price to be paid for the compromises that permitted
passage of the legislation. Although wages increased, the wage level set
by the IWC did not reach the ten dollar weekly wage Gleason's study
found to be the minimum required for a self-supporting woman. While
the costs of living might have been supported by the $9.25 weekly wage
rate set for Portland's experienced office workers, the lower rates set for
apprentices and women working in other sectors were plainly
inadequate.3 In the years following, there was a decided lag between
the rise in the cost of living and the wage rates. l The cost of living
increased thirty-one percent between 1914 and the close of 1917, but
302
minimum wages in Oregon were not increased again until June 1918.
By then, the cost of living had increased forty-five percent. Increases
legislated at that point ranged from between twenty-percent and fortyfive percentY.3 A near "catching up" did not occur until around 1930.3M
303
Admittedly, legislated rates and actual rates of pay were not the same.
But there is good reason to conclude that the operation of the Oregon
law fell short even of O'Hara's vision of a living wage, a less generous
vision than John Ryan's living wage.3

IV. FAIRNESS IS THE ECONOMIC HIERARCHY
The conceptions of Absolute Fairness and Bargaining Fairness
sought to correct inadequate wages that resulted from unequal
bargaining power in the labor market. Absolute Fairness would assure a
minimum result; that is, every worker would be paid at least a living
wage. Bargaining Fairness would assure rough equality of bargaining
power between workers and employers. Workers would be placed on the
same plain as employers and permitted to bargain over the amount of
their wages in hopes that the bargaining would produce a living wage.
A third conception of fairness in wages also arose in the earliest
part of the twentieth century, principally in the courts. This conception
acknowledged that unequal bargaining power existed in labor markets
and that inadequate wages sometimes resulted. But its proponents did
movement of women into work because of the war, business conservatism, and political
conservatism. See MORRIS, supra note 255, at 31.
300. See MORRIS, supra note 255, at 121.
301. See id. at 120.
302. See id.

303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See MORRIS, supranote 255, at 119.
306. See id. at 118-20.
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not seek to -fix these labor market conditions. Unequal power

relationships were not only acceptable in the normative vision of the
conception of Hierarchic Fairness, but necessary conditions of a

progressive human society.
A. Lochner andHierarchicFairness
Lochner v. New York is typically cited as defining a period during
which the Supreme Court elevated a purported liberty of contract to the
status of a fundamental right, and wielded that "right" to defeat
government interventions in markets.' This view oversimplifies the
debate over fairness in wages. Justice Holmes's famous dissent in
Lochner properly identifies Herbert Spencer's writings as the guide to
understanding the conception of fairness that emerged from the socalled Lochner Court.'
British philosopher Herbert Spencer's views focused on the
individual and his natural course of development. 30" The conception
Spencer set forth in his Social Statics is built on two foundations.
First, Spencer observed that, given cultural and personal differences, an
12
objective definition of happiness and the path to it is not possible '
Spencer would define happiness and its pursuit as each individual
exercising his faculties to his fullest extent in his own way.1 3 Second,
Spencer believed that, like their counterparts in the natural world,
human beings adapt to bad conditions in their environment through a
307. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
308. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
309. See id. at 75:
[Lochner] is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain .... The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics .... [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissezfaire.
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
310. See HERBERT SPENCER, POLITICAL WRrIINGS xiv-xvii (John Offer ed. 1994). Spencer
originally published his SOCIAL STATICS in 1850, nine years before Charles Darwin's Origin of a
Species appeared. Further, Spencer's view of evolution was quite different from Darwin's view.
See id.

311. See

HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, TOGETHER WITH THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE

10, 28 (1901) [hereinafter SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS].
312. See id. at 10.
313. See id Spencer's foreword notes that he modified his writings in this third edition to
reflect changed circumstances and the evolution of his thought. See id. at 3-4. Since this edition
pre-dates the Supreme Court decisions that drew upon Spencer's writings, it is reasonable to
assume that his modified writings influenced the members of the Court and the politics of the time
as much as did the original editions.
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necessary and natural process. 14 For example, animals moved from
warm climates to colder climates grow thicker coats. Similarly, human
beings naturally adapt to "evils" they experience. The evolution could
take generations, Spencer acknowledged.3 But exercising human
faculties strengthens them, said Spencer, thereby facilitating this
adaptive or evolutionary process.3 6 From these two foundations,
Spencer built a first principle of justice: each person must be given full
liberty to exercise his
faculties compatible with the possession of a like
317
liberty by all others.
Spencer rejected the idea that an individual's exercise of his
faculties should be restricted if it causes pain to others.3 8 Concern for
pain would interfere with both of Spencer's foundational premises. 3 9 It
would unduly limit the achievement of happiness by the party causing
the pain. It would also artificially interfere with the natural adaptation
process for the party experiencing the pain. Only self-restraint by the
pain-inflicting
party should be relied upon in these circumstances, said
Spencer. 32
Spencer's view of the proper role of government was predictable in
light of his conception of justice:
Nature will not be cheated.... No philosopher's stone of a constitution
can produce golden conduct from leaden instincts. No apparatus of
senators, judges, and police, can compensate for the want of an internal
governing sentiment. No legislative manipulation can eke out an
insufficient morality into a sufficient one. No administrative sleight of
hand can save us from ourselves.3 2'
Spencer concluded that government can neither assure happiness nor
increase the ability to exercise human faculties, particularly when its
principle means of action restricts the exercise of human faculties by

314. See id.
at 28.
315. See SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supra note 311, at 29-32.
316. See id. at 28-32 (discussing the need of man to continue in the process of adaptation).
Spencer believed that man is altered by the influences brought to bear on him and tends to become
fitted to them, for if man is unable to facilitate the adaptive process, all schemes of education,
government, and social reform are useless. See L
317. Seeidl at31-32.
318. See id. (explaining that to restrict an individual's exercise of his faculties because this
would cause pain to others would be to limit progress, which is not an accident but a necessity).
According to Spencer, by virtue of adaptation man will eventually evolve. See id.
319. See SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supranote 311, at 124.
320. See id. at 33-45, 57.
321. Id. at 116-17.
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Spencer's first principle subsumed the

ancillary principle that each person is free to claim all those
gratifications and sources of gratification he can procure through the
exercise of his faculties, as long as no other person's liberty is
constrained as a result.3 2 Thus, the regulation of commerce and

redistribution schemes like poor laws would undermine human progress,
in Spencer's view. 32
Spencer reasoned, accordingly, that government's role should be

strictly limited. 25 It should protect each person's liberty to exercise his
faculties. 34 Yet, it is a "proper sphere of government to repress
nuisances" because nuisances infringe on the liberty of others.327
Government should also sustain people in the conditions that are

necessary to natural adaptation; that is, it should support the social
status quo.2 If the state intervened to upset the social structure, then
adaptation would be suspended and evolutionary progress toward social

equilibrium could not occur.329 Finally, perhaps in its most fundamental
function, government can properly protect a society against foreign

aggression. 33°
Spencer's philosophy echoed throughout the Supreme Court's
minimum wage and maximum hours decisions in the first three decades
of the twentieth century as conservative justices attempted to apply

Spencer's conception of fairness to labor market regulation.13' Their
chosen tool was recognition of a fundamental right to contract beginning
332
with the decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.
322. See id. at 124-25.
323. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supranote 311, at 65-67, 124-25.
324. See kL at 137, 146-52.
325. See id. at 127, 149 (discussing the inevitable retardation of the process of adaptation that
occurs when the government oversteps its duty of maintaining men's rights). Spencer claims that
the state cannot exceed its duty without defeating itself. See id.
326. See id. at 124-25.
327. Id. at 124-35.
328. See SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supra note 311, at 131-35.
329. See id. at 126-27.
330. See id. at 125-37.
331. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,589 (1897).
332. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589. In fact, Lochner's author, Justice Peckham, cited his own
opinion in Allgeyer as a starting point for the Supreme Court's recognition of a fundamental right
to enter into unfettered contracts as purportedly guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. Allgeyer was by no means the first ever discussion of
the "liberty of contract" in this context. Spencer had discussed it in 1891, and a long list of state
courts had decided cases by relying on it beginning in 1886. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of
Contract, 18 Yale L.J. 454, 470-80 (1908-09); BAER, supra note 8, at 46-47. For a further
discussion of Herbert Spencer's views and their place in the intellectual history of the United
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Justice Peckham's opinion in Allgeyer struck down a Louisiana
statute that prohibited a foreign insurance company from doing any
business in Louisiana. The Allgeyer Court found that the statute
unnecessarily impinged on a "liberty of contract," defined as:
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.333
The Allgeyer Court acknowledged that the liberty of contract was not
absolute.3 4 Government had a proper role, although the Allgeyer Court
would not define it.335 The question of when and how the state's police
power could be legitimately exercised to restrain a citizen's liberty of
contract "must be left for determination to each case as it arises." 336
Such a case arose just a few years after Allgeyer, and a few years
before Lochner, in Holden v. Hardy.337 Utah had enacted a statute that
established an eight-hour daily limitation on employment in the
underground mining, smelting, reduction, and refining of ore, absent
emergencies. The statute was challenged on the same constitutional
grounds later raised in Lochner. It allegedly violated the liberty of
contract inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment. After following
Allgeyer's construction that the Constitution protects such a liberty, the
Holden Court rejected the challenge. 38
The Holden Court began its analysis by embracing a dynamic
philosophy of constitutional interpretation. Government's police powers
should expand in response to the changes to the nature of work that

States, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOcIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 31-50 (1944).
333. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
334. See id. at 591-92.
335. See id.
336. Id. at 590. Peckham illustrated his point by distinguishing Allgeyer from Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), which upheld a similar state statute prohibiting foreign insurance
companies from doing business in California unless they met certain conditions, and leaving that
earlier case standing. See id.at 583, 586-88.
337. 169 U.S. 366 (1897).

338. See Holden, at 391-92.
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arrived with the Industrial Revolution and the threats the new world of
work posed, the Court reasoned.339
Dynamic constitutional interpretation led the Court to a three-part
syllogism similar to the framework employed by the socio-economists
in their analysis of the labor market and wages. First, the Court
acknowledged that employers and workers
do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a certain
extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor
as possible from their employees, while that latter are often induced by
the fear of discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment,
fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or
strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the
laborers are practically constrained to obey them.34
Second, every owner of property, stated the Court, holds his property
"'under the implied liability that its use may be so regulated, that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community."' 34' Third, since excess time in dangerous work causes
negative health effects, and the miners could not protect themselves
because of their weaker bargaining position, Utah could regulate the
employment contracts between miners and mining companies.342 On
these three bases, the Court upheld Utah's hours law for miners. 343
Allgeyer established a liberty of contract consistent with Spencer's
focus on individuals' free exercise of their faculties. Holden established
that working conditions and unequal bargaining power could cause a
nuisance sufficient to justify government regulation, although
undoubtedly much more broadly than Spencer had suggested.
Nonetheless, Lochner was decided with these precedents in the
background.
New York had enacted a statute to prohibit bakeries from requiring
their employees to work more than ten hours in one day or sixty hours in
one week.3 The Court's rejection of New York's law depended
principally on the legal equality of the parties: "There is no contention
that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in
339.
340.
341.
342.

See id at 385-86.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 392 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84 (1851)).
See Holden, 169 U.S. at 395-97.

343. See id. at 398.
344. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46.
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other trades or manual occupations, or that they are hot able to assert
their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the
."4' Or, as the Court said in one of Lochner's progeny: "In all
State...
such particulars the employer and the employ6 have equality of right,
and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a
free land. '' 6 There was no dispute in Lochner that employers had
greater bargaining power in the labor market than workers. There was
no dispute that equality under the law did not assure a fair result. But
absent evidence of a sufficient nuisance, the government had no role
regulating the affairs of legally equal parties. 7
It was on the question of "nuisance" that Lochner effected two
modifications in the Allgeyer-Holden reasoning. First, Lochner defined
"nuisance" far more narrowly than did Holden. The health threats faced
by Utah's miners were qualitatively similar, if quantitatively greater,
than those experienced by New York's bakers. Second, and more
important, Lochner looked not to the effects of the nuisance on the
individual bakers, but to the effects on society as a whole. Spencer
focused on the individual and his liberty to exercise his faculties.
Holden similarly looked to the health and safety of the individual
workers. Lochner asked, instead, whether the bakeries threatened a
societal nuisance, and answered in the negative: "[W]e think that a law
like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the
welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the
slightest degree affected by such an act. ' In the absence of a showing
345. Id. at 57.
346. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908). The Adair Court struck down a federal
statute that established a system for arbitration of labor disputes affecting common carriers and
prohibited the threatening of any employee with loss of employment or discrimination because the
employee was a union member. See id. at 167-69, 172, 180. The statute apparently arose out of the
1894 Pullman strike led by Eugene V. Debs that resulted in the introduction of federal troops and a
violent confrontation. See id. at 185, 187 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (citing In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1894)). See generally NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CnZEN AND SOCIALIST 127-37
(1982) (describing the strike and Debs's role). See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 9, 13-14
(1915) (following Adair and striking down a Kansas law that prohibits coercing an employee not
to join a union). Coppage is noteworthy principally for this defense of the liberty of contract: "The
right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority
of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money." Id.
at 14. This suggestion is worthy of Anatole France's Le Lys Rouge: "At this task they must labour
in the face of the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95
(Winifred Stephens trans., 1930).
347. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56-64.
348. Id. at 57.
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of public nuisance, the Court found no justification for permitting New
York to mandate modifications in the employment contracts that
resulted from a fair bargaining process between bakers and bakeries.
Thus, employers could use their superior bargaining position to impose
any form of nuisance on the bakery workers absent some showing that
society would suffer some resulting externality. 49 The Lochner Court's
version of Hierarchic Fairness deprived the government of the ability to
protect one party from another, stronger party even when the weaker
party would
not be able to exercise its faculties to their fullest as a
30
result.
The idea that Hierarchic Fairness defends a Darwinistic social
system had its foundations in Greek and Roman law. These laws defined
"justice" as the maintenance of the status quo, or in Roscoe Pound's
words, "to keep each man in his appointed groove and thus prevent
friction with his fellows., 35' A plainer description of the Spencerist view
of law comes from State and Federal Control of Persons and Property,
a law school textbook published in 1900:
[The employer] has acquired this superior position... through the
exertion of his powers... and can to some extent dictate terms to [ I
his employees, because his natural powers are greater, either
intellectually or morally; and the profits, which naturally flow from
this superiority, are but just regards of his own endeavors. At any rate,
no law can successfully cope with these natural forces. 3 2
This was the conception of Hierarchic Fairness adopted by the Supreme
Court in the era of Allgeyer, Lochner, and Holden. The economic
hierarchy was not only immutable, but fair, appropriate, and optimal.
Government could intervene if, and only if, the externalities caused by
the hierarchy's operation created a nuisance for society.
The Court's adoption of Hierarchic Fairness left the proponents of
Bargaining Fairness laws with a difficult strategic path to follow after
Allgeyer, Lochner, and Holden. Arguments that government should be
permitted to intervene in the labor market to protect workers would run
directly counter to Allgeyer and Lochner. The only hope for preserving
349. See id. at 59 (stating that the trade of a baker is not so unhealthy as to authorize the
legislature to interfere with the right to labor and the right of free contract for the individual
employee or employer).
350. See id. at 53-54.
351. Pound, Liberty of Contract,supra note 332, at 458.
352. BAER, supra note 8,at 45 (quoting STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND
PROPERTY 940, 942 (1900)).
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Bargaining Fairness laws was to rely on the opportunity presented by
Holden, but sharply narrowed by Lochner, to prove that government
intervention was necessary to protect society, not merely workers, from
the externalities of unregulated labor markets. The living wage
movement's argument that a statutory minimum wage starved society's
interests, not merely the interests of low-wage workers, would be put to
the Spencerist test.
B. GenderInequality as a Remedy for Societal Nuisances
The strategic path through Hierarchic Fairness' loophole began
with Muller v. Oregon3 3 in which the Supreme Court reviewed a 1903
statute limiting the number of hours a woman could work in a laundry to
ten per day.35 Seven cases on the constitutionality of women's hours
laws had been decided in lower courts over a period of thirty-two years
leading up to Muller.355 Four statutes had been upheld, and three
overturned.3 , 6 The National Consumers' League, understanding the
importance of the case to the future of Bargaining Fairness, approached
Louis Brandeis and asked him to file an amicus curiae brief with the
Court."' Brandeis successfully demurred, insisting that he represent
Oregon directly with full control over the litigation strategy.356
Brandeis and the NCL's Josephine Goldmark decided on a strategy
of marshaling empirical evidence to convince the Court that the facts
supported Oregon's law. They produced the first-ever "Brandeis brief,"
a practical application of sociological jurisprudence and socioeconomics.359 Of 113 pages in the brief, only two were dedicated to legal
argument. Thirteen pages listed hours limitations laws elsewhere in the
world. Eighty-seven pages of the brief presented the empirical evidence
accumulated by Goldmark.3 O
Brandeis and Goldmark might have sought to overturn Lochner.
One of the justices in the Lochner majority had retired.36' Instead, they
elected to distinguish their case using an argument based on Holden and

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

208 U.S. 412 (1908).
See id. at 412-13.
See BAER, supra note 8, at 56.
See id
See id. at 57.

358. See id
359. See id
360. See BAER, supra note 8, at 57.
361. See id
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a claim of societal nuisance.362 New York's law included men. Oregon's
law applied only to women. Thus, gender became the grounds for
distinction. Goldmark's data showed that overworked women in
factories and laundries were particularly subject to disease and injury,
and that fatigue increased accidents. The cap on working hours set by
the law meant improved health, fewer injuries, less disease, and a lower
incidence of alcoholism.
But the brief failed to define clearly why women were especially
susceptible to the negative effects of excessive working hours. 63 One
answer could have been that permanent physical differences between
the sexes caused women to fare less well in identical working
conditions. A second answer could have been, as the socio-economists
and their allies in the living wage movement found, that women had to
endure inferior working conditions, were less able to unionize to protect
themselves, and were subject to family responsibilities to which men
were not. Brandeis and Goldmark did not choose a preferred answer,
essentially leaving it to the Court to choose.3 6
The opinion for a unanimous Court was written by Justice David
Brewer, a leading judicial conservative who had concurred in Lochner
and dissented from Holden. Brewer's devotion to the liberty of contract
exceeded even that of his colleagues.3' 6 Women and men have equal
contractual and personal rights under Oregon law, he noted, so the state
cannot infringe women's liberty of contract any more than it can
infringe men's liberty.'6 But Brewer accepted Brandeis's gender-based
argument, choosing to focus on physical differences: "woman's physical
structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify
special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which
she should be permitted to toil."3 67 He invoked the same claim about the
labor market for women workers that living wage advocates had
asserted for all workers:
Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be
removed bylegislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life
which will operateagainst a full assertion of those rights. She will still

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See id.
at 57-61.
See id.
See id.
at 6, 7, 10, 23, 60-66.
See BAER, supra note 8, at 62, 64.
See Muller, 208 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 420.
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be where some legislation toprotect her seems necessary to secure a
real equality of right.36
But within the conception of Hierarchic Fairness, it was not enough to
establish that women were differently affected by long hours of work or
especially subject to exploitation. Brandeis and Goldmark had to
establish that the effects on working women imposed substantial
externalities on society. Brewer concluded that they did:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are
upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the
medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work,
repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the
body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interestand
care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
.. . The limitations which this statute places upon her contractual

powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she
shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largelyfor
the benefit of all. 369

Women's reproductive health is a societal resource, said Brewer. Thus,
any substantial threat to women's ability to reproduce resulting from
women's inadequate bargaining power in the labor market imposed an
externality sufficiently egregious to permit government intervention in
the market.
Muller adhered to the conception of Hierarchic Fairness as
constructed in Allgeyer, Holden, and Lochner. In the process, it elevated
women's reproductive functions to the status of societal imperatives.
For this reason, Muller became the founding precedent for sex
discrimination against women on the basis of physical difference. A
strong presumption of legitimacy had been given to any kind of
employment discrimination which could be related to permanent
differences between men and women.37 Muller*also cast significant

368. Id. at 422.
369. Id. at421-22 (emphasis added).
370. One commentator suggested that courts, over a period of sixty years, upheld nearly all
cases of sex discrimination by relying on Muller. See BAER, supra note 8, at 66-67. The
incremental process that detached women's physical difference from substantial societal
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doubt on any wage or hours legislation that could not be justified on
these grounds.37'

C. Upholding the Minimum Wage and Achieving IndustrialPeace
During World War I
The question remained after Muller whether a minimum wage

statute, as opposed to a maximum hours statute, could satisfy the
Court's conception of Hierarchic Fairness. Minimum wage advocates

would be forced to prove that a sub-standard wage for women posed an
egregious threat to society's interest in women's maternal role. Frank
Stettler, an Oregon paper box manufacturer, set out to prove that the
advocates could not successfully make that case. Caroline Gleason had
performed her undercover work in Stettler's factory while preparing the

1913 report on women's working conditions for the Oregon Consumers'
League.372 Stettler took373it quite personally, branding Edwin O'Hara a

"radical and socialist."

O'Hara labeled Stettler "the most vicious of

the parasites feeding on vulnerable women." 374

Stettler's challenge to Oregon's Bargaining Fairness law failed in
the Oregon Supreme Court on March 17, 1914. He brought his case to
the United States Supreme Court.37 Stettler argued that the creation of

externalities began when the Supreme Court upheld statutes designed to protect women in
significantly less egregious working conditions than those presented in Muller. See Bosley v.
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (discussing a female pharmacist working in a hospital).
371. Muller set off a rush to enact new state hours legislation for women. Within five years of
Muller,thirty-nine states either enacted new legislation or strengthened laws already on the books.
But the movement came to a halt in the 1920s. No new state entered the field after 1921 and the
only significant change in an existing law came in New York with Governor Al Smith signing a
compromise bill in 1927 providing for a nine-hour day, a forty-nine and one-half hour week and
seventy-eight hours of annual overtime. Earlier, there had been an act of Congress in 1912
requiring insertion of an eight hour restriction in all contracts of employment to which the federal
government was a party. By 1929, nearly half the states had similar eight-hour limits for their
public works contracts. About half the states set a sixteen-hour day for workers on trains, street
cars, and elevated lines. With the 1916 Adamson Act, Congress established an eight-hour day on
interstate railroads, with a fifty percent premium for overtime after 1919. After 1922, fifteen states
passed laws imposing an eight-hour day on mining like that in Holden. But the Bunting v. State of
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), experience of a statute limiting men's hours generally was not
replicated after that decision. See IRViNG BERNSTEiN, THE LEAN YEARs: A HISTORY OF THE
AmEcAN WORKER, 1920-1933 223-25 (1960).
372. See DOLAN, supra note 145, at 32-34.

373. Id. at 38.
374. Id.
375. Stettler v. O'Hara, 139 P. 743 (1914); see also Simpson v. O'Hara, 141 P. 158 (1914)
(holding the police power of the state legitimately extended to the right to prevent employment of
women for unreasonably small wages).
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the Industrial Welfare Commission was an unlawful delegation by the
Oregon legislature and that the orders issued by the Commission
unconstitutionally deprived him of his property. 6 Specifically, Stettler
claimed to have been deprived of the right to employ $8.00 women for
$8.00, rather than $8.64 women for $8.64."' A companion suit by an
employee named Simpson argued that her right to work for $8.00 rather
than $8.64 had been abridged.3 78 Felix Frankfurter mocked this argument
as valuing "a liberty to employ an inefficient woman in the place of an
efficient one" which, in reality, masked the true goal of "getting labor at
less than the true value of its product." 379
O'Hara was represented at first by Brandeis and Goldmark, and
later by Frankfurter and Goldmark after President Wilson selected
Brandeis for the Supreme Court. 80 Their briefs followed the three-part
framework that originated with the socio-economists. First, wages were
not sufficient to support women in good health. The brief cited the OCL
study and others as evidence that a majority of women were earning less
than a living wage, a large number were ruining their health by not
eating enough, those eating enough lived in unwholesome conditions or
were insufficiently clothed, and others found sufficient support only
through "contributions from gentlemen friends."38' Second, society's
interests lay in protecting women from inadequate wages:
In view of the function of women as the bearers of children, and in
view of the fact that women may become in any community an
instrument of immorality, the Legislature found that in Oregon, if
women did not have wages sufficient to maintain them in health and in
morals, detriment would result to the state in two ways. In the first
376. See MORRIS, supra note 255, at 44-45.
377. See id.
378. See id. The plaintiff in Stettler also argued that the employees he paid less than the
Commission-ordered minimum were "incompetent by reason of age, inability, or otherwise to earn
greater wages than they are being paid." Thomas Reed Powell, The Oregon Minimum-Wage Cases,
32 POL. SCI. Q. 296, 302 (1917). However, the plaintiff in Stettler never applied for a special
permit to pay these workers a sub-minimum wage, so he faced an exhaustion problem with this
argument. See id.
379. Powell, supra note 378, at 303.
380. See DOLAN, supranote 145, at 38-39.
381. Louis Brandeis, The Constitution and the Minimum Wage, THE SuRVEY 490 (Feb. 6,
1915) [hereinafter Brandeis, The Constitution and the Minimum Wage] (this article was Brandeis's
summary of his legal argument for a popular audience); see also Powell, supra note 378, at 29697. The briefs echoed the socio-economists' argument that someone must support Stettler's
employees if he was to have their labor, and that he benefited from that support. If he did not
furnish the support, he profited from others' subsidies. Stettler's objection to the statute, said the
brief, was that the law deprived him of a subsidy. See id. at 305.
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place, degeneration would threaten the people of Oregon, because
unhealthy women would not as a rule have healthy children. In the
second place, unhealthy or immoral women would impose upon the
community, directly or indirectly, heavy burdens by the development
of ever larger dependent classes which would have to be supported by
tax-payers.382
The briefs supplemented this argument from Muller with a new claim
on society's interests, drawn from the socio-economists, that proper
treatment of workers produced more efficient industry.38 s
Expressly seeking an overruling of Lochner was unnecessary to
their success, but Brandeis and Frankfurter took the opportunity to lay
blame for the condition of working women at the very foundation of
Hierarchic Fairness. The "liberty of contract," they argued:
is only the 'liberty' of an employer to abuse and the 'liberty' of an
employee to be abused.... [Oregon's] very purpose is to assure the
parties an equal basis for bargaining, so that they may be free to
bargain on the merits, and not under the compulsion of a crippling
between
necessity. With no margin or the margin of but a singlemeal
34
starvation there can be no true liberty of contract. '
Thus, the brief's third and final point was that women could not protect
themselves and society from the negative results of labor market dealmaking. Men could organize into unions to secure a living wage.
Women could not and did not because their work life was shorter and
they did not have an adequate opportunity to educate themselves about
the benefits of trade unionism. The state had to step in.
The Supreme Court issued its decision without opinion on April 9,
1917. The Court evenly split 4 to 4 with newly appointed Justice
Brandeis recused. The Oregon Supreme Court's decision upholding the
law was not disturbed.8 5 But with Brandeis's views well-known, Stettler
was taken as precedent for the proposition that minimum wage laws
were constitutional. O'Hara stepped down from his position on
Oregon's Industrial Welfare Commission in June 1917 feeling his work
was done.3 6

382.
383.
at 310.
384.
385.
386.

Brandeis, The Constitutionand the Minimum Wage, supra note 381, at 491.
See id at 492; see also MORRIS, supra note 255, at 45-46; Powell, supra note 378,
Powell, supranote 378, at 308 (quoting the brief).
See Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917); see also BAER, supranote 8, at 92.
See DOLAN, supra note 145, at 39.
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On the same day the Court decided Stettler, it also decided Bunting
v. Oregon."' Bunting considered the constitutionality of an earlier
Oregon statute providing that no employee, whether male or female,
could work more than ten hours in a mill, factory, or manufacturing
establishment, except for three hours of overtime compensated at a
premium."' On behalf of Oregon, Frankfurter submitted a one-thousand
page brief, the longest yet, dedicated to proving that long working hours
were as detrimental to men as to women. 319
Bunting changed the emphasis in the argument about externalities
to society. Society needed women to be protected because of their status
as mothers of the race. Men needed protection so that they could value
leisure and recreation, and society could reap the benefits of citizenship
made possible by shorter hours. The brief quoted economists, social
reformers, and other authorities who argued that with fewer hours at
work men would educate themselves by going to libraries, night
schools, and public lectures and thereby enhance civic life. 9° It also
argued that education was a necessary part of good citizenship and
intelligent use of the vote.39' Without any reference to Allgeyer, Lochner,
or Holden, the Bunting Court agreed with Frankfurter's arguments by a
vote of 5 to 3, with Justice Brandeis again recused.3
At first glance, it would appear that Bunting and Stettler cannot be
reconciled with the conception of Hierarchic Fairness constructed in
Allgeyer and Lochner. Under the reasoning of the briefs in Stettler and
the Court's decision in Bunting, every worker forced by an employer's
superior bargaining position to enter into a disadvantageous wage or
hour deal could claim that his disadvantage resulted in societal
externalities. Thus, every worker could call upon the state to intervene
on his behalf, just as the proponents of Absolute Fairness and
Bargaining Fairness had argued.
Undeniably, it is possible that Bunting and Stettler signaled the
Court's re-thinking of Hierarchic Fairness in favor of Bargaining
387. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
388. See id. at 433-34.
389. See BAER, supra note 8, at 89.
390. See id. at 90.
391. See id. at 89-90; Lipschultz, supranote 8, at 11.
392. In Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), the same Court upheld an eight-hour day for
employees of interstate carriers and a temporary minimum wage scale without any reference to
these three cases. The Court typically distinguished contracts to which the government was a party
from contracts between private parties. The freedom of contract found in the latter was not found
in the former. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1903) (stating there is no freedom of
contract where the government is a party).
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Fairness. A second analysis, more likely given the Court's return to
Hierarchic Fairness in later years, begins from the premise that Supreme
Court decision-making does not occur in a political vacuum. A
substantial socio-economic crisis had arisen which shifted the balance of
power in favor of workers. Bunting and Stettler were both decided
during World War I just prior to the entry of the United States.
World War I, like many wars, effected a labor supply problem in
the United States. After a sizable number of men were conscripted into
military service, the remaining able-bodied men would be needed for
the war industries. The war had already caused a drastic reduction in the
supply of immigrant workers who supplied industry with a cheap and
ready supply of labor.393 From 1914 to 1915, immigration declined from
1.2 million to roughly 300,00 Y. The labor supply problem was further
complicated in 1917 with the passage of a law over President Wilson's
veto requiring any immigrant older than sixteen seeking admission to
the United States to demonstrate the capacity to read English or some
other language. The purpose of the law was to discriminate against
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe who were thought to be
less literate than their northern European counterparts. The effect was a
further reduction in the number of immigrants available to work,
particularly in lesser skilled jobs. Industry needed a steady and reliable
flow of healthy and able American men and women and a minimum of
industrial strife to supply the war effort adequately. Instead, important
industries faced labor shortages. 9 5
Concern over wages could easily have stanched the flow of labor
into the war industries. The cost of living between 1915 and 1920 rose
at two-and-one-half times the rate of increase from 1894 to 1914.396 Cost
of living increased thirteen percent from the end of 1915 to the end of
1916, and twenty percent from 1916 to 19172Y7 From 1916 to 1917,
factory workers experienced a seven percent loss in the purchasing
power of their wages. 98 Cost of living rose another thirty-one percent
from December 1917 to December 1918, with significant wage
increases still falling well behind cost of living. 99

393. See FONER VI, supra note 151, at 192.
394. See id.

395. See Lescohier, supra note 99, at 200.
396. See id. at 64.
397. See id at 65.
398. See id at 66.
399. See id at 67 (stating that the wage increases did not equal the rise in living costs in most
industries).
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Declining real wages might have inspired some workers to work
harder, but it might have caused others to drop out of the labor force or
seek employment outside the war industries. Further, unduly hard work
for those recruited to the war industries might have resulted in the litany
of horrors-including rising inefficiency-listed in the Bunting, Stettler,
and Muller briefs. The federal government could not risk failure as it
prepared for and fought the war. Thus, the judicial conception of
Hierarchic Fairness may have yielded to Bargaining Fairness laws in
Bunting and Stettler as a service to the American war effort.4 0
An important indication of the rising political importance of
workers' interest in the living wage can be found in the response of the
federal executive branch to the labor supply crisis. On April 9, 1918,
President Wilson signed an official proclamation creating the War
Industries Board, the Labor Policies Board, and the National War Labor
Board ("NWLB"). 40' The first two entities established policies of
industrial control and administration. The latter entity was judicial. In
determining wage and workplace disputes, the NWLB applied principles
and standards agreed to by the AFL, speaking for labor, and the
National Industrial Conference Board, representing capital.4 These
principles were enshrined in Wilson's proclamation and thereby made
binding on all government departments and procurement agencies for
the duration of the war.4°3
One of the proclamation's original goals was to sustain pre-war
real wages throughout the course of the conflict. Achieving this result
required assuring workers cost-of-living adjustments. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics ("BLS") was directed to formulate an index based on
pre-war conditions and determine a cost-of-living index periodically,

400. Accepting this interpretation of Bunting and Stettler does not require rejecting the
seriousness of the Spencerists' purpose. Lochner left open the possibility of putting aside the status
quo to protect against significant threats to societal interests. American interests lay in prosecuting
the war, according to the government. A more cynical, and questionable, case could be made that
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), served the same purpose by effectively prohibiting
federal regulation of child labor in legitimate industries.
401. See LAUCK, supra note 19, at 42-43.
402. See id. at 43.
403. See id. at 42-43; see also PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: VOLUME VII: LABOR AND WORLD WAR I, 1914-1918 174-76 (1987) [hereinafter
FONER VII (discussing the origins and principles of the NWLB). W. Jett Lauck served as
Secretary to the NWLB. See HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOwARD TAr
916 (1939). Lauck's economic history cited here built on earlier work he performed, including two
documents Lauck prepared for the United Mine Workers' presentation to the United States
Anthracite Coal Commission in support of that union's claim for a living wage in 1920: WHAT A
LIVING WAGE SHOULD BE and THE SANCTION FOR A LIVING WAGE.
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usually every six months, throughout the course of the war.0 Although
the original plan called for taking local standards and customs into
account, the NWLB abandoned this effort to avoid the migration of
labor toward better conditions and higher earnings and because it
concluded that regional differentials were not significant.4 5
The wages goal evolved to include the enforcement of a living
wage. The NWLB assumed the responsibility for addressing the
problem of unskilled workers' below-subsistence wages with a new
policy adopted in 1918: "1. The right of all workers, including common
laborers, to a living wage, is hereby declared. 2. In fixing wages,
minimum rates of pay shall be established which will insure the
subsistence of the worker and his family in health and reasonable
comfort."' ' The NWLB's definition of a "living wage" made provision
for the physical needs of wage-earners and their families, but also
provided for social needs such as some degree of recreation, reading,
essentials of health preservation, decent clothing for social intercourse,
and a minimum amount of health and life insurance.4 w
It turned out, however, that living wages so far exceeded the wages
then being paid to unskilled workers that the NWLB feared the potential
dislocating effects of an immediate and sudden application of its new
policy.4 In 1918 and 1919, the BLS and the NWLB made an
investigation into the cost of living in industrial centers in the United
States. The study found that the average income for a family of five for
one year was $1,513.29, with ninety-six percent of the income coming
from wages. 4°9 But the study also found that, after accounting for
expenditures on the principal items of living such as food, clothing, rent,
fuel and light, furniture and furnishings, 43.4% of families earning less
than $900 experienced a deficit in their family budget at the end of the
year. Similarly, 34.6 % of families earning between $900 and $1,200
per year experienced a deficit, and almost 25% earning between $1,200
to $1,500 experienced a deficit.4'0 Too many people received wages too

404. See LAUCK, supra note 19, at 42-43.
405. See id. at 45.
406. Id. at 47-48. Along with the living wage principle, the Board's principles included an
endorsement and protection of collective bargaining that was a clear precursor to the NIRA's
section 7 and the National Labor Relations Act. See FONER V1I, supra note 403, at 175; PRINGLE,
supra note 403, at 918.
407. See LAUCK, supranote 19, at 48, 152.
408. See id. at 76.
409. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, COST OF LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(Bulletin No. 357 May 1924).
410. Seeid at5.
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far below a living wage. Unable to apply its own generous wage
standard, the NWLB revised its policy on the motion of former
President William H. Taft, one of its public Joint-Chairmen. The revised
policy required a living wage only in those cases where wages were
abnormally low and where the physical maintenance of labor for war
production was being impaired.41
When the war and its labor supply crisis ended, the living wage
movement's political bargaining power receded to its pre-war levels. As
a result, workers saw little lasting improvement in wages.412 By 1919,
retail prices had doubled from their 1914 levels, far outstripping
increases in wages. 4 3 In 1919 and 1920, wages continued to chase prices
unsuccessfully, with unskilled workers falling farthest behind.4 14 A
depression hit in 1920 and 1921 leaving roughly twenty-one percent of
all workers unemployed, unable to satisfy even a declining cost of
living.1 5 The New York Consumers' League estimated that the living
wage for a woman in 1919 was $15.00, while the District of Columbia
Wage Commission estimated it to be $16.50.416 Wages did not match
these cost-of-living estimates. The New York Industrial Commission
found that sixty percent of women working in factories and sixty-one
percent in stores still received less than $14.00 per work week. In 1923,
fifty-seven percent of the factory women in four of the largest industries
in New York were being paid less than $16.00 per week. The Women's
Bureau found from 1920 to 1924 that state averages ranged from $11.60
in Arkansas to $14.95 in New Jersey. A series of subsequent studies
through the 1920s found that there was little improvement in wages and
States
that the majority of low-skilled industrial workers
417 in the United
self-support.
decent
for
small
too
wages
received
At the end of the war, both capital and labor were unhappy. The
cost of living advanced more rapidly than wages during the war, so
labor wanted restraints on wages lifted. Employers wanted to be free of
government intervention.4 8 Only the social reformers who constituted
the living wage movement, including John Ryan and the National
Catholic War Council, wanted to continue enforcement of the principles
set forth in President Wilson's proclamation and the operation of the
411. See LAUCK, supra note 19, at 50, 152-53.
412. See id. at 50.
413. See Lescohier, supranote 19, at 76.

414. See id.
415.
416.
417.
418.

SeeiLat79.
See id.at 528.
See id. at 77.
See LAuCK, supra note 19, at 50-51.
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NWLB. In 1919, the Administrative Committee of the National Catholic
War Council turned to its Committee on Reconstruction.4 1 9 The
Committee prepared a plan of social reconstruction, written by John
Ryan, that was issued as the "Bishops' Program for Social
Reconstruction." ' Central to the Social Reconstruction Program was
maintaining the progress made under the NWLB, its principle of the
family living wage, and its protection of the right of labor to organize
and bargain collectively. The Reconstruction Program endorsed state
minimum wage laws with minimum wage levels slowly increasing over
time so that individuals could protect their families against sickness,
accidents, invalidism, and old age.42' But the bargaining power of the
living wage movement, enhanced by the labor supply crises that
attended World War I, had faded and, with it, the prospects for
continued living wage legislation.
D. Striking Down the Minimum Wage with a Reassertion of Hierarchic
Fairness
The only new minimum wage law between 1918 and 1925 was
enacted by Congress for the District of Columbia. The District of
Columbia's law was based on Oregon's law and Bargaining Fairness."'
But the personnel on the Supreme Court changed dramatically at the
start of the 1920s to reflect the conservative resurgence after Woodrow
Wilson's presidency.4 3 William Howard Taft, former President and
sponsor of the living-wage limiting policy at the NWLB, became Chief
Justice on June 30, 1921.4 He remained until February 3, 1930. 421 Taft's
view of workers fell well short of salutary. For example, when the
newspapers reported that federal troops had killed thirty American
Railway Union workers striking against the Pullman Company, Taft
reportedly wrote: "Everybody hopes that it is true. 426
419.
420.

See id. at 54-55.
See RYAN, SOCIALDoCrRINE, supra note 101, at 228.

421. See Ryan, Social Reconstruction, supra note 108, at 589-606; RYAN, SoCIAL DOCTRINE,
supra note 101, at 146-47.
422. See BERNSTEIN, supranote 371, at 228-29.
423. Seeid. at l91.

424. See id. at 190.
425. See id.
426. Id.; see also DAVID H. BURTON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFrt: INTHE PUBLIC SERVICE 118
(1986) (stating that Taft's service on the NWLB showed a surprising sense of "fair play toward
labor not to be expected from a former judge who had a reputation for being hostile to workers");
PRINGLE, supra note 403, at 915 ("Organized labor had long viewed him as hostile to its
interests.").
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Taft was only one of President Harding's four appointments.
Harding also added George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Edward T.
Sanford to the Court. With Willis Van Devanter, James Clark
McReynolds, and Joseph McKenna, they formed a conservative
majority that Taft seemingly could move to serve his purposes. But
George Sutherland was a man with an idea. He had studied Herbert
Spencer's philosophy closely.4 7 Like Spencer, he viewed the individual
as the defining political reality and concluded that his task was to
expand personal freedom by reducing government intervention as much
as possible. Sutherland applied his philosophy of individual freedom
evenly. As a United States Senator from Utah in 1916, for example,
Sutherland had spoken vigorously for women's suffrage just as Spencer
had advocated for the equality of women. 42 Sutherland would move the
Court when it came to minimum wages.
The District of Columbia minimum wage law arrived at the
Supreme Court for review inAdkins v. Children'sHospital,429 which was
heard and decided in 1923. Elizabeth Brandeis, daughter of the Supreme
Court justice and a member of the District of Columbia Wage Board,
had earlier used a summer vacation in Europe shared by the Brandeis
and Frankfurter families to recruit Felix Frankfurter to serve as the
attorney for the Board.43 Frankfurter intended to pursue the same
strategy of establishing the existence of a societal nuisance that had
succeeded in Muller, Stettler, and Bunting. But when Frankfurter and
Mary Dewson, who replaced Josephine Goldmark at the NCL, began
collecting data for the case, they were concerned about the lack of
available evidence of conditions in the District of Columbia. They relied
on the Monthly Labor Review, BLS reports, and a 1919 wage survey of
hotel, restaurant, club, and hospital workers, but there had never been a
wages survey for the entire District. Nonetheless, Dewson collected
sufficient factual data to fill a 1,138-page tome. 43'
The brief sought to correct the strategic error in Muller by deemphasizing female dependence, difference, and domesticity in favor of
a focus on female responsibility and independence. The strategic shift
was also intended to broaden the Muller rationale to encompass

427. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 228.
428. See id. at 191, 228; see also SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supra note 311, at 73-79;
BURTON, supra note 426, at 133-35 (discussing the conservatism and anti-labor slant of the
Taft Court).
429. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
430. Vose, supranote 134, at 280-81.
431. See id. at 267, 280-81; Lipschultz, supra note 8, at 97, 125.
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minimum wage statutes, thereby reaffirming the apparent victory in
Stettler for the conception of Bargaining Fairness. The brief offered
evidence that women had responsibility for the support of others,
including parents, children, and sometimes husbands and siblings. In the
District of Columbia, thirty-one percent of female workers lived away
from home and supported themselves, while twenty-one percent
supported dependents, and forty-five percent needed outside assistance
to subsist. Many lived at home, but that did not mean that they received
support from their families. Many supported themselves and their
families. Studies with similar findings were collected from Arkansas,
California, and Georgia.432
With this evidence, Frankfurter revised the argument from Stettler
and stepped away from the defense of women as reproductive vessels.
Poverty and its ill effects would become the societal nuisances that
justified government intervention in the employer-worker bargain. Upon
establishing women as providers for their families, Frankfurter would
assert that low wages were linked to poor nourishment and lack of
medical care for families as well as for the women themselves. The
cycle of "'poor health' and 'poor wages' was a "descending spiral into
the regions of destitution." He linked women's wages to infant care,
thereby emphasizing the passage of destitution from one generation to
the next. He reiterated that women could not protect themselves from
the forced sale of their labor because they did not and could not join
unions. The individual woman had no choice but to take the wages
offered. Thus, the state must be permitted to intervene to protect women
and society.433
Justice Sutherland and the conservative majority on the Supreme
Court rejected Frankfurter's arguments, but found themselves
constrained in their reasoning by precedent. For Sutherland, Lochner
and Hierarchic Fairness remained good law: "[F]reedom of contract
is... the general rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of
legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by the existence
of exceptional circumstances. ' ' 434 But Muller and Bunting had intervened
432. See Lipschultz, supra note 8, at 127-30.
433. See id. at 135, 139.
434. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923). Chief Justice Taft, in dissent,
explicitly stated his view that Lochner was no longer good law: "It is impossible for me to
reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have always supposed that the Lochner
Case was thus overruled sub silentio." Id. at 564 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). At least two of Taft's
biographers credit his service on the NWLB "which had brought him face to face with the
exploitation of workers" for his dissent in Adkins. BURTON, supra note 426, at 135; see also
PRINGLE, supra note 403, at 915-16. The more likely explanation is that Taft's support for the
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and Sutherland was forced to address them. Rather than contest the facts
of working women's economic lives or their importance to society,
Sutherland returned to Lochner's focus on whether women needed the
state's protection.
The heart of the Adkins decision was a return to Lochner's focus on
political rights and legal equality. Sutherland never challenged the
living wage movement's diagnosis of the labor market. In his Spencerist
view, however, it was an invalid basis for government intervention. The
women employees of Children's Hospital, Sutherland noted, "were all
of full age and under no legal disability." 435 Plaintiff Lyons was a
twenty-one-year-old hotel elevator operator capable of deciding that she
should not earn more than her sub-minimum wage of thirty-five dollars
per month.436
[T]he ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as
suggested in the Muller Case has continued 'with diminishing
intensity.' In view of the great-not to say revolutionary-changes
which have taken place since that utterance, in the contractual, political
and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment,
it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come
almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point. In this aspect of the matter,
while the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases,
and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take
them into account, we cannot accept the doctrine that women of
mature age, suijuris,require or may be subjected to restrictions upon
their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the
case of men under similar circumstances.437
Unable to rely on a purported threat to society's interest in women's
reproductive systems, government had no authority to intervene in the
employer's and worker's liberty to exercise their faculty for bargaining.
This argument went too far even for Chief Justice Taft: "The Nineteenth
Amendment did not change the physical strength or limitations of
women upon which the decision in Muller v. Oregon rests. 438 Justice
minimum wage law was aberrational and due to his loyalty to precedent and stability. See
ALPHEUS THIOMAS MASON, wILLIAM HoWARD TAr: CHIEF JusTICE 250-51 (1981). Nonetheless,
Taft arrived at his vote to uphold the District of Columbia minimum wage law despite a grave
dislike for Louis Brandeis, its principal proponent and father of one of its administrators. See
PRINGLE, supra note 403, at 952-53, 970-71.
435. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 542.
436. See id.
437. Id. at 553 (citation omitted).
438. Id. at 567 (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
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Holmes agreed: "It will need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to
convince me that there are no differences between men and women, or
'
that legislation cannot take those differences into account."439
Rationalizing away gender differences allowed Sutherland to sidestep Muller and perhaps Stettler, but it did not address Bunting. To
accomplish this feat, Sutherland relied on the old distinction between
hours laws and wages laws that had separated the living wage
movement from the labor movement and helped to inspire the IWW-led
textile strike at Lawrence, Massachusetts. 4 Hours laws redressed
threats to health, safety, and well-being, while wage laws addressed
only money, said Sutherland." The police power could be used to
protect health, because society had an interest in health, but it could not
be used to redistribute money merely to avoid the imposition of pain on
some members of society."2 Of course, the District of Columbia's law
was a wage-fixing law that did not, in Sutherland's estimation, affect
workers' health or society's interests." 3 Bunting was inapposite,
according to Sutherland.
To this point in his decision, Sutherland had merely revived the
conception of Hierarchic Fairness that had yielded to Bargaining
Fairness in the days leading up to World War I. Apparently unsatisfied
that he had defeated the conception of Bargaining Fairness once and for
all, however, Sutherland imported the Marginal Productivity Theory
into his decision and introduced an entirely new conception of
fairness-Fairness as Commutative Justice-into the debate over
fairness in wages.
The wages set by the District of Columbia's minimum wage law
were not required to bear any relation to the capacity or earning power
of the worker, Sutherland noted. 44 Employers may or may not have
received services worthy of the wage:
To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services
rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for
439. Id. at 569-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
440. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554.
441. See id.
442. See id. But see Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (upholding a law protecting
women working in hospital pharmacies).
443. Both Holmes and Taft also disagreed with the distinction Sutherland drew between
wages and hours: "One is the multiplier and the other the multiplicand." Adkins, 261 U.S. at 564
(Taft, C.J., dissenting); id. at 569 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing Justice Holmes' lack of

understanding for an equal minimum wage for women).
444. See id. at 557.
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the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition rests
upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily
shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody,
belongs to society as a whole.... The moral requirement implicit in
every contract of employment, viz, that the amount to be paid and the
service to be rendered shall bear to each other some relation of just
equivalence, is completely ignored." 5
This appeal to Commutative Fairness appropriated the argument relied
upon by the living wage movement that employers failing to pay a
living wage received a subsidy from the worker, her family, and society.
In Sutherland's world, where an overgeneralized form of marginal
productivity analysis rose to the level of morality, it was the statutorily
446
protected worker being subsidized by the employer and society.
Sutherland's excessive exuberance for striking down Bargaining
Fairness created three problems for opponents of minimum wage laws.
First, Sutherland's embrace of the Marginal Productivity Theory
overreached even the internal logic of that theory. Classical and neoclassical economists could not support a suggestion that a supply and
demand model requires that every worker receive a wage equal to her
marginal productivity. Marginal Productivity Theory suggests the mere
tendency that the last worker hired would receive such a wage. Even
reaching this far requires assumptions about rational employer behavior
which may not prove true in practice. Further, measuring individual
workers' productivity may be impossible in most cases. It necessarily
follows that enforcing a law based on the premise that it could be
measured would lead to failure.
Second, and more troubling for the advocates of Hierarchic
Fairness, Sutherland's conception of Commutative Fairness directly
contradicted Lochner and Spencer. If equivalence of exchange is the
moral requirement implicit in every contract of employment, as
Sutherland suggested, then many unregulated waged deals could be
immoral. Government cannot at once leave wage deals to the
contracting parties while at the same time intervene to assure that each
party receives a fair exchange.
Finally, and most important for the history of the debate over
fairness in wages, Sutherland's detour into marginal productivity theory
opened a new strategic path for the advocates of Bargaining Fairness
laws. Adkins dealt a serious blow, almost a deathblow, to the living
445. Id. at 557-58.
446. See id. at 558.
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wage movement " 7 But after Adkins, the living wage movement could
gasp for air through Sutherland's marginal productivity loophole. New
Bargaining Fairness laws would require a wage commensurate with the
value of the worker's product, or a "fair wage." Frankfurter's view was
that adding this requirement would not change the practice of existing
wage boards, which already took other wage levels and the economic
conditions of the involved industries into account. The only alternative
was to amend the Constitution, which met with little support even
among supporters of the living wage.
This Adkins-derived strategy led to two new minimum wage laws:
Wisconsin's law of 1925 and New York's law of 1933. The New York
law created a two-step analysis. First, it established a civil offense for
paying an oppressive or unreasonable wage that was "both less than the
fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than
sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health."' 4
Second, the law established that the remedy for this offense would be a
wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service
or class of service rendered." 9
In 1936, the New York law reached the Supreme Court in
Morehead v. New York ex reL Tipaldo.450 But the Court refused to
address the apparent Adkins loophole directly. Rather, it relied on the
New York Court of Appeals' conclusion that the New York law should
be read as effectively equivalent to the District of Columbia law.4"'
Adkins, therefore, governed.45 Indirectly, the Supreme Court majority
backed away from Sutherland's conception of Commutative Fairness:
[Tihe dominant issue in the Adkins Case was whether Congress had
power to establish minimum wages for adult women workers in the
District of Columbia. The opinion directly answers in the negative.
The ruling that defects in the prescribed standard stamped that Act as
arbitrary and invalid was an additional ground of subordinate
453
consequence.

447. See generally Brandeis, Labor Legislation, supra note 138, at 504 n.14 (listing Adkins's
progeny).
448. Id. at 98.
449. See BAER, supra note 8, at 139-42.
450. 298 U.S. 587, reh'g denied, 299 U.S. 619 (1936).

451. See id. at608.
at 609.
452. See id.
453. lmLat 614.
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The Court also refused to consider overruling Adkins, hiding
4
5
behind the appellant's failure to request it.
E. Resurrectionin a West Coast Hotel
Morehead was decided in June 1936. Franklin Delano Roosevelt
was elected to a second term as President in November 1936. On March
455
29, 1937, the Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
and ended the reign of Hierarchic Fairness. Parrishcame to be known
as the "switch in time that saved nine," with Justice Owen Roberts
changing his vote to join the 5 to 4 majority that upheld Washington's
state law, thereby preempting President Roosevelt's court-packing plan.
Chief Justice Hughes, who dissented vigorously in Morehead,
launched a frontal assault on Adkins and the conception of Hierarchic
4 56 He began by
Fairness in his decision for the Court in Parrish.
sweeping aside the idea that the purported liberty of contract was
entitled to special constitutional protection:
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law.... But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in
a social organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
people. 57
Hughes then proceeded to reinstate the three-part analysis from Muller
and Bunting and clean up the mistakes that had been made along the
way.15 First, workers and employers are unequal in the labor market, a
circumstance "peculiarly applicable in relation to the employment of
women in whose protection the State has a special interest." 459 Second,
women are especially subject to exploitation and low wages, not
because of physical differences, but because of their socio-economic
position.4 Finally, society suffers the externalities of these exploitative
454. See id at 604.
455. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
456. See Parrish,300 U.S. at 391.

457. Id.
458. See idat 393-99.
459. Id at 394.
460. See id at 398 ("The [New York State] legislature... was clearly entitled to consider the
situation of women in employment, the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that
their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who would
take advantage of their necessitous circumstances.").
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wage deals and is entitled to protect itself by protecting women in the
labor market.461 With this analysis, Adkins was overruled and the way
was cleared for state minimum wage laws and the conception of
Bargaining Fairness. 62
In sum, after succeeding in some state legislatures in the early
1910s, and briefly in the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch
leading up to and during World War I, the living wage movement found
itself unable to win a significant battle in the 1920s. 463 By 1933, only
nine state minimum wage laws remained. Of these, two were rendered
inoperative by state legislatures' failure to appropriate enforcement
funds, and two effectively protected only minors. No state minimum
wage laws, other than Wisconsin's Adkins-inspired revision, were
enacted during the decade.46 4 Even before Adkins, laws previously
enacted were repealed in two states.4 65 The conception of Hierarchic
Fairness reigned through most of the first three decades of the twentieth
century until the economic earthquake of the Depression struck.
It is tempting to explain the failure of the living wage movement
and the extended success of the Hierarchic Fairness by pointing to the
apparent prosperity of 1920s America and suggesting that a widespread
contentment with economic conditions dampened the public's ardor for
minimum wage legislation. Some evidence would support such an
explanation. The average national income increased by more than 43%
from 1922 to 1929, an average of 6.25% per year.4 66 The share of
national income going to wages increased 41.5%, although the share
allotted to dividends increased 110%.4" According to Paul Douglas,
author of Wages and the Family, the average annual earnings of large
city residents working in all industries increased from $1,288 in 1923 to
$1,405 in 1928, or 9.1%. 46' Real earnings increased 10.9% during the
same period.49 Average hourly earning in all industries increased from

461. See Parrish,300 U.S. at 399 ("The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power ... is not only detrimental to their health and
well being but casts a direct burden for their support on the community. What these workers lose
in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay.").
462. See iL at 400.
463. See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 526 (holding that the Minimum Wage Act of 1918
unconstitutionally interfered with the liberty of contract).
464. See Cheyney, supra note 249, at 38.
465. See id. at 28.
466. See BERNSTEmN, supra note 371, at 54.

467. See id.
468.
469.

See id. at 64-65 (citing PAULH. DOUGLAS, WAGES AND THEFAMILY 5, 5-6 (1925)).
See id. at 65.
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66.2 cents in 1923 to 71 cents in 1928. Average weekly earnings in all
industries increased from $30.39 in 1923 to $33.32 in 1928.471
But aggregate economic data almost always mask the realities of
working families' lives. In 1929, there were approximately 27,470,000
families of two or more persons.472 Paul Douglas, in his 1925 study,
identified four standards of living: "poverty" (an inadequate diet,
overcrowded living arrangements, and no resources for unexpected
expenses); 473 "minimum subsistence" (sufficient to meet physical needs,
with nothing left over for emergencies or pleasures); 474 "minimum health
and decency" (adequate food, housing, and clothing as well as a modest
balance for recreation); 475 and minimum comfort or the "American
standard" of living.476 Living just beyond poverty required a family of
five to earn between $1,000 to $1,100 per year.477 In pre-Depression
1929, there were 5,899,000 families that did not earn enough to achieve
that standard of living.478 Minimum subsistence required between $1,100
and $1,400 for a family of five in one year.479 In 1929, there were
11,653,000 families that earned less than $1,500.4" Minimum health and
decency required between $1,500 and $1,800. 4" In 1929, 16,354,000
families earned less than $2,000. 4 2 Twenty million earned less than
$2,500 annually, and 21,546,000 families, constituting 78.4% of the
total, had no savings at all.4
Many factors accounted for this want among plenty. One of the
most important was a dramatic population shift associated with the nowmature industrial revolution. From 1920 to 1929, 19,436,000 people
moved from the farm to large and small towns.4 From 1915 to 1928,
1.2 million African-Americans migrated from South to North after
finding a foothold in the war industries.48 This mass migration was

470. See id. at 66.
471.

See BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 66.

472. See id at 63.
473. See id at 64.

474. See id.
475. See id.
476. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 64-65.
477. See id. at 64.

478. See id
479. See id.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

See
See
See
See
See

id
BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 64.
id at 64-65.
id at 63.
id. at 48.

485. See id at 49.
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caused, in part, by the economic paradox of rural depression in the midst
of relative urban prosperity.4" Agriculture prices collapsed in the
depression of 1921 and did not recover. 7 City incomes, even sweatshop
incomes, were an improvement for farm families.488 In addition,
technological farming with trucks and combines increasingly became
the rule rather than the exception. 489 As a result, industrial employers
had at their disposal a great pool of working men and women
accustomed to low wages and intermittent work to relieve the increasing
demand for labor.49°
The total number of gainfully employed workers increased from
41.6 million to 48.8 million, or 17.4%, between 1920 and 1930, while
the number of women aged fifteen and over gainfully employed rose
27.4%, from 8.3 million to 10.6 million. 49 Almost twenty-five percent
of the workforce were women by 1930 and almost twenty-five percent
of women worked.492 This significant growth in the workforce coincided
with a growing trend towards mechanization of industry. Part of the
result was a dramatic increase in productivity during the 1920s.493
Between 1919 and 1929, output per person-hour rose seventy-two per
cent in manufacturing, thirty-three percent in railroads, and forty-one
percent in mining. 4
As a result of all these factors, and the rising importance of
technology in industry, the typical employer hired workers at will. 49" Just
as the socio-economists had described, the person seeking work in most
cases was both powerless and incapable of exercising a rational choice
if alternatives were even available.496 Women, a rising share of the
workforce, remained largely unorganized and even more powerless than
men.497 Competition among workers further weakened their already
weak bargaining position.498 At least one estimate put unemployment
between ten and thirteen percent between 1924 and 1929. 49 Low-wage
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

See BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 48.
See id.
See idL
See id.
See ic at 48-49.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 55.

492. See iL at 55-56.
493. See id. at 54.
494. See id; see also Galenson & Smith, supranote 157, at 12-13.

495. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 57.
496. See icL
497. See id at 56 (discussing how women refrained from organizing).
498. See id. at 59.

499. See id.
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workers needed protection from employers exercising their superior
bargaining power in the labor markets of the 1920s as much as they had
in the 1910s.5c
Economic and social justification for state intervention in the labor
market certainly remained. But the 1920s lacked a social or political
crisis to galvanize the political bargaining power of worker advocates.
In the absence of power like that made possible by the IWW strike or
the labor supply crisis of World War I, the living wage movement could
not advance its cause. Further, the living wage movement had not
healed its long-standing rift with the labor movement. The political
bargaining power that worker advocates could claim was diffused, and
workers were left without remedial legislation.

V. FAIRNESS ISFAIR COMPETITION
A. Franklinand Frances:Experience and Understanding
The onset of the Depression effected a deep crisis in the lives of
working families and the political life of the nation. °'O National income
was cut in half. Real factory payrolls were the lowest since the turn of
the century. Actual wages were lower and hours of work were longer
than at any time since World War I. The average weekly earnings of
workers in manufacturing industries fell from approximately $28.50 to
$14.50.!0' Employment was lower than at any time since 1910, with
unemployment encompassing one third of the working population. 5°4 By
1933, for every three unemployed Americans, there were two part-time
workers.5 '5 President Roosevelt summarized the conditions in a speech
to the United States Chamber of Commerce:
It is a simple fact that the average of the wage scale of the Nation has
gone down during the past four years more rapidly than the cost of
living. It is essential, as a matter of national justice, that the wage scale

500. See BERNsTEIN, supra note 371, at 48-49 (discussing how much power employers had
over workers).
501. See generally Hearings, supra note 102, at 156-57 (testimony of Leon Henderson,
Director of Research and Planning Division of the National Recovery Administration).

502. See id.
503. See id.
504. See ild. at 156 (testimony of Leon Henderson).
505. See id.
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should be brought back to meet the cost of living and that this process
should begin now and not later.f°
The economic crisis dramatically improved the political bargaining
position of the forces seeking to enact statutory minimum wages.
Roosevelt and his Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins would spend the
next five years trying to enact into law some conception of fairness in
wages that would, once and for all, remedy the inadequate wages that
resulted from unequal bargaining power in the labor market.
Neither Roosevelt nor Perkins was new to the debate over fairness
in wages. Perkins began her career as an important but lesser player
supporting Florence Kelley.' Perkins first joined the NCL while a
student at Mount Holyoke College after hearing Kelley speak in 1902.0'
In 1909, Perkins succeeded Pauline Goldmark as the Secretary of the
New York City Consumers' League while also studying sociology at
Columbia University.i She began in October 1910 to survey the
working conditions
in New York's bakeries, becoming the state's
510
leading expert.
Perkins soon focused her efforts on enacting a bill to establish a
" ' Perkins met
fifty-four hour workweek for women and children.51
Roosevelt in 1910 while he was a state senator and she was the chief
lobbyist for the hours bill in Albany."' In Perkins's words, support for
the bill "was a measure of the progressive convictions of the politicians
of 1910.'513 Years later, Perkins remembered that Roosevelt did not
actively associate himself with the hours bill. 4 In a speech to the Young
Democratic Clubs in 1935, Roosevelt remembered his role more

charitably:
In 1911, twenty-four years ago, when I was first a member of the New
York State Legislature, a number of the younger members of the

506. Address Before United States Chamber of Commerce Appealing for Cooperation on
Recovery Program (May 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT: THE YEAR OF THE CRISIS 1933 156 (1938) [hereinafter ADDRESS BEFORE THE U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE].
507. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 52.

508. See id
509.
how she
510.
511.
512

See id at 77; see also FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEV 9 (1946) (discussing
went to Columbia for a Master's Degree).
See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 77-78.
See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 10.
See id. at 9, 10-13.

513. Id. at 14.
514. See iad
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Legislature worked against these old conditions and called for laws
governing factory inspection, for workmen's compensation and for the
limitation of work for women and children to fifty-four hours, with
one day's rest in seven. Those of us who joined in this movement in
115
the Legislature were called reformers, socialists, and wild men.

Even with the success of the hours bill, it was the Triangle Shirt
Waist Factory fire in the next year that changed the political calculus
around fairness in wages and working conditions in New York. It also
sparked the creation of the New York State Factory Investigating
Commission and an overhaul of New York's labor laws. 51 6 Future
Governor Alfred E. Smith and future Senator Robert Wagner got their
education in the realities low-wage workers' lives as members of the
Factory Investigation Commission ("FIC").' 7 Perkins served as an
investigator for the FIC, and took Smith and Wagner to see the
conditions personally. As Perkins explained, "[t]hey got a firsthand look
at industrial and labor conditions, and from that look they never
recovered. They became firm and unshakable sponsors of political and
legislative measures designed to overcome conditions unfavorable to
human life."518
By contrast, Franklin Roosevelt had been called to Washington by
President Wilson in 1913 and did not learn about the conditions
experienced in New York's sweatshops." 9 As a devotee of Woodrow
Wilson's brand of liberal social justice, Roosevelt was responsive to the
ideas, but he never saw the evidence personally.5' ° Eleanor Roosevelt,
who had joined the NCL and, after the war, the WTUL, underwent the

515. A Radio Address to the Young Democratic Clubs of America, August 24, 1935, in 4 THE
PUBLIc PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF RANKiN D. RoosEvELT: THE COURT DISAPPROVES

1935 341

(1938). Perkins's gentle and implied criticism of Roosevelt accurately reflects Roosevelt's
ambivalence about the fifty-four-hours bill, but probably understates Roosevelt's overall record of
support for progressive labor legislation during his years as a state legislator. See FUSFELD, supra
note 170, at 46-47 (describing Roosevelt's active support for numerous labor and employment
laws and his membership in the American Association for Labor Legislation).
516. See generally MARTIN, supra note 133, at 84-89 (discussing the fire and its aftermath,
including a description of the investigation and the mass meeting held on the fire at the
Metropolitan Opera House); Wandersee, supra note 247, at 11 (noting that Perkins worked on the
Triangle Commission after the fire, an experience that convinced her that government would need
to assume responsibility for the health and safety of America's working class).
517. See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 17.
518. Id. at 17. Perkins later served as a member of the New York Industrial Commission
under Governor Smith and when he became governor, Roosevelt named Perkins his Industrial
Commissioner. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 142-145, 205.
519. See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 17.
520. See id. at 17-18.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

83

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

Vol. 18:19

first-person experiences that Perkins plainly wished Franklin
Roosevelt had. 2'
Perkins's view of unions, although the subject of some dispute,
reflected the historical split between the living wage movement and the
labor movement. One commentator argues that her middle-class
upbringing contributed to an early prejudice against unions that Perkins
overcame after graduating from Mount Holyoke.5 2 Another doubts that
she ever viewed unions other than skeptically or, more importantly, that
she viewed union organizing as the path to eliminating exploitation in
labor markets.52 Regardless, in the coming struggle between trade
unionists and the living wage movement over the shape of national
minimum wage legislation, Perkins fell squarely into the living wage
camp. In her own famous words, "I'd rather pass a law than organize a
,
,5
union. 24
Unlike Perkins, Roosevelt never became a partisan in the contest
between conceptions of fairness in wages .5 His lack of personal
attachment to the living wage movement and his failure to witness
personally the consequences of unequal labor market power made it
possible for him ultimately to accept a legislative deal that fell
substantially short of the living wage movement's expectations. But
Roosevelt was not entirely disconnected from the early years of the
debate over fairness in wages. Secretary Newton Baker, a former
president of the NCL, launched investigations and inquiries into factory
working conditions on contracts for the War Department during the
World War I.52 Secretary Baker called on Florence Kelley to organize
an inspection service and to recommend changes. 27 The Women's
Bureau of the United States Department of Labor set up standards for
women working in factories.52 As a Baker prot6g6, Roosevelt supported

521. See id. at 18, 26, 28.
522. See Wandersee, supra note 247, at 9.
523. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 326-29.
524. Wandersee, supra note 247, at 11 (quoting Perkins's Reminiscences, Book I, 58, in the
Columbia Univ. Oral History Project, NYC). The AFL was even less enthusiastic about Perkins,
preferring Daniel Tobin of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters or AFL Legislative Rep.
Edward McGrady for Labor Secretary. See GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING VAGE FOR TE
FORGOTTEN MAN: Tan QtsT FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 1933-1941 37-38 (1996) [hereinafter
PAULSEN, A LIVING wAGE].
525. See generally PERKINS, supra note 509, at 256-67 (discussing how President Roosevelt
was trying to find a middle ground).
526. See i at 21.
527. See id.

528. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/2

84

Harris: Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act

2000]

Conceptions of Fairness

these efforts.' 9 Perkins accepted that the future President could believe
what he read in the investigators' reports,5 0even without the visceral
experience of seeing the conditions himself.
Perkins's assessment is borne out by Roosevelt's record as
Governor of New York. Roosevelt strongly supported legislation to
redress the exploitative conditions experienced by sweated workers. For
example, in 1929 and 1930, he urged the state legislature to pass bills
providing for the establishment of a fair wage board to determine wages
for women and minors in certain industries and an eight-hour day and a
forty-eight hour week for women and children in industry.53"' On April
20, 1931, as he prepared to campaign for the presidency, he signed
legislation establishing a six day, forty-eight-hour work week bill for
women and minors. 32
B. National IndustrialRecovery Act and the Conception ofBargaining
Fairness
The opening skirmish between the living wage movement and the
labor movement over national minimum wage legislation began with a
dispute over maximum hours legislation.533 Senator Hugo Black's
legislation to establish a national thirty-hour work week reopened the
disagreements that kept natural allies-the labor movement and the
living wage movement-apart.l
The AFL had traditionally been opposed to legislation that would
take the place of collective bargaining in setting work hours.535 By the
end of 1931, however, the AFL's leaders found it increasingly difficult
to sustain this position in the face of mounting unemployment. 6 In the
December 1931 issue of the AFL's newspaper, The Federationist,

529. See id. at 21-22.
530. See PERKINS, supra note 509, at 22, 26.
531. See 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE GENESIS
OF THE NEW DEAL 1928-1932 221 (1938) [hereinafter 1 ROOSEvELT PAPERS] (A Recommendation
for Specific Bills to Improve Social and Labor Conditions, March 22, 1929, Letter to the
Legislature as Governor); see also FUSFELD, supra note 170, at 155 (discussing Roosevelt's labor
agenda as Governor).
532. See 1 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 531, at 225-26 (discussing the Governor's
approval of a bill regulating hours of labor for women and minors).
533. See Elizabeth Brandeis, Organized Labor and Protective Labor Legislation, in LABOR
AND THE NEv DEAL, 195, 199 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young eds., 1957) [hereinafter Brandeis,
OrganizedLabor].
534. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 260-62.
535. See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor,supra note 533, at 199.
536. See id. at 200.
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President William Green estimated that a universal thirty-five hour
week would be needed to absorb the unemployed. 37 By August 1932, he
estimated it would take a thirty-hour week. 38 In July 1932, as the
Depression reached its deepest point, the AFL executive council urged
President Hoover to call a conference of industry and labor
representatives to develop a universal five-day work week.539 The call
was an apparent last ditch effort to avoid pursuing a legislative solution.
Hoover refused.' " While the AFL still balked at supporting legislation,
Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, speaking
at the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union's 1932 convention,
declared that "[n]ational legislation for the shorter work day is the only
way out." 4' The convention adopted a resolution "that officers continue
working for legislation to universally enforce the 6-hour day and 5-day
week."54 2 Finally, at its 1932 convention, the AFL endorsed legislation
for a thirty-hour work week. 43
Black introduced his bill in the Senate on December 21, 1932 in the
lame duck session before Roosevelt's first term as President.- 4 Senate
hearings began on January 5, 1933 with AFL President Green and
United Mine Workers President Philip Murray both testifying in support
of the bill. 45 The labor leaders would not allow the scope of the
maximum hours bill to reach minimum wages, however.546 Green made
clear that the AFL remained opposed to regulating wages: "Pass your
bill and let us handle the question of wages."' 47
Secretary of Labor Perkins, the living wage movement's voice in
the Roosevelt Administration, was faced with a dilemma when she was
invited to testify on the President's behalf. She did not want to oppose
the AFL, but she remembered the hard lessons of the IWW strike in
Lawrence.548 Shorter hours without minimum wages would mean lower
incomes for families struggling at the subsistence level. With
Roosevelt's approval, Perkins testified that Black's bill could be

537. See iL

538. See id,
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

See id.
See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor,supra note 533, at 200.
Id
lId
See id at 200-01.
See id at 201.
See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 202.
See id at 202-03.
Id. at 203.
See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 203.
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strengthened by making it conform to the conception of Bargaining
Fairness." Perkins proposed revising the bill to provide for the creation
of minimum wage boards that could analyze conditions in industries and
set both wages and hours according to the living standards of the
workers in those industries.5 As with other public bargaining laws, the
boards would act on recommendations from committees made up of
employers and workers.5 ' Green vigorously disagreed:
The Executive Council of the AFL... feels that [Perkins's proposal]

would be a dangerous experiment. While it would help some, it would
in our opinion tend to injure the efforts of the bulk of labor to raise
their living standards, to bring about increases in wages. We, therefore,
look with disfavor upon the proposal to establish minimum wage
boards except that such minimum wage boards shall be created for the
552
purpose of fixing minimum rates for women and minors.
The old battle line between the living wage movement and the labor
movement was reinforced. Victory in this first skirmish went to the AFL
as the Senate passed the Black bill by a vote of 53 to 30 on April 6,
1933, less than a month after Roosevelt took the oath of office. 53
The second, and more important, skirmish resulted in a victory for
the living wage movement, although along different lines than Perkins
had laid out in her testimony on the thirty-hours bill. Roosevelt's
alternative to the Black bill, the National Industrial Recovery Act
("NIRA"),5 4 was to become the first comprehensive, national effort to
regulate minimum wages and maximum hours for men and women in
the United States.5 It was also the first legislation proposed in service
of the conception of fairness as Fair Competition.
549. See id.
at 261-62; PERKINS supra note 509, at 195-96.
550. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 261-62; Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at
203; PERKINS, supranote 509, at 193-96.
551. See PERKINS, supra note 509, at 193-96; Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at
203-04; ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION:
BUSINESS, GOvERNMENT AND THE TRADE ASSOCIATION ISSUE 1921-1933 197-99, 203 (1976).
552. Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 204.
553. See id. at 199. The Perkins proposal was also vigorously opposed by the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE,
supra note 524, at 44. On the other hand, seven states agreed with Perkins's position, adopting
new minimum wage laws in 1933, while 11 states extended their laws. See Brandeis, Organized
Labor, supra note 533, at 198-99.
554. 15 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1997). The NIRA established the National Recovery
Administration. See id. This Act was held unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See Exec. Order No. 7252, 2 Fed. Reg. 607 (1937).
555. See HrIiMELBERG, supra note 551, at 182 ("It is widely held that at the beginning of the
Hundred Days there was no plan for a measure such as the N.I.R.A. and that a serious intention to
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wages

was

overproduction. Depression-strapped employers faced stern pressures to
cut product prices so their goods would sell in glutted product markets.
The imperative to cut product prices caused employers to use their
superior bargaining position in the labor market to impose even stingier
wage and hour deals on workers.55 6 Thus, sub-subsistence wages resulted

from a competitive pathology. Fair competition in product markets,
therefore, would require the imposition of standards for competition in
labor markets. Roosevelt's solution was the NIRA, a hybrid statute
codifying Bargaining Fairness and Competitive Fairness.
Title I of the NIRA reversed the order of the public bargaining
process found in most state minimum wage laws. Rather than tripartite
advisory boards negotiating agreements on wages and hours to be
referred to a wage board, the NIRA empowered trade or industry
associations consisting of employers, along with worker representatives
in some cases, to write codes of fair competition that included minimum
wages and maximum hours.5 The negotiated codes were thereafter
referred to separate labor, employer, and consumer advisory committees
develop a legislative proposal embodying some or all of its goals came only after passage by the
Senate of the Black Thirty-Hour bill on April 6, 1933"); see also id. at 199-204 (describing
Roosevelt's journey from Perkins's alternative, as presented in Perkin's testimony on the Black
Bill, to the NIRA). Congress had previously enacted the Davis-Bacon Act in 1931, which required
only that federal construction contractors pay their workers the locally prevailing wage and benefit
rate. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a)-7, 276d-1 to d-2, 808 (Supp. InI 1997).
556. See, e.g., ADDRESS BEFORE UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 506:
You and I acknowledge the existence of unfair methods of competition, of cut-throat
prices and of general chaos.... In almost every industry an overwhelming majority of
the units of the industry are wholly willing to work together to prevent overproduction,
to prevent unfair wages, to eliminate improper working conditions. In the past success
in attaining these objectives has been prevented by a small minority of units in many
industries. I can assure you that you will have the cooperation of your Government in
bringing these minorities to understand that their unfair practices are contrary to a
sound public policy.
ld; see also 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE ADVANCE
OF RECOVERY AND REFORM

123 (1934) [hereinafter 3

ROOSEVELT PAPERS]

(A Survey of the

Purposes, Accomplishments and Failings of the N.R.A. Extemporaneous Address Before the Code
Authorities of Six Hundred Industries, March 5, 1934):
Individuals were seeking quick riches at the expense of other individuals. Geographical
sections were seeking economic preference for themselves to the disadvantage of other
sections. Cities were recklessly offering inducements to manufacturing plants to move
away from other cities.... There was little consideration for the social point of view,
and no planning whatsoever to avoid the pitfalls of overproduction or of selling
methods which foisted articles on a gullible public, which the family budget could not
afford.
Id.
557. See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 208.
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that could suggest changes in the codes to the National Recovery
Administrator ("NRA"). 558 Direct collective bargaining might occur in
the code committees, as it had in different form in the states' advisory
boards. But indirect public bargaining might also occur through the
labor, employer, and consumer advisory committees' recommendations.
The Administrator would consider the recommendations, approve the
negotiated codes after a public hearing, and bring them to the President
for signature.5"
Approved codes would bind the entire industry to which they
applied with enforcement through the courts. Perhaps drawing on the
legacy of the National Consumers' League, additional pressure to
comply came with the issuance of "Blue Eagle" emblems to businesses
that cooperated with the NRA along with a public campaign urging
consumers to patronize these "patriotic" vendors. With an enforceable
floor for labor standards in place in every industry, wages and hours
could not be driven below subsistence levels by employer
competition.5"
Fresh from her experience with the Black bill, Perkins sought to
heal the rift between the living wage movement and the labor
movement. She met with Green to secure the AFL's support for the
NIRA. Green was not unalterably opposed to the NIRA. Instead, Green
used his bargaining power with Perkins to insist on provisions
protecting private collective bargaining."' Section 7A was quickly
included in the legislation to protect the rights to organize and bargain
collectively, and to guard against workers being forced to join company
unions. 2 As a result, neither Green nor John Lewis of the United Mine
Workers and the newly forming Committee on Industrial Organization

558. See id.
559. See id.
560. See id. at 208-10; LEVEREYT S. LYON ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY
ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 756-61 (1935); The Machinery of N.R.A. is SetUp - The Administrator Is Appointed, Executive Order No. 6173 (June 16, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE YEAR OF THE CRISIS 247-48, 254
(1933) [hereinafter 2 ROOSEVELT PAPERS]. Roosevelt's own statement suggested that he viewed
the process, at least in part, as an effort to equalize bargaining power. See, e.g., 3 ROOSEVELT
PAPERS, supra note 556, at 125 ("What we seek is balance in our economic system-balance
between agriculture and industry, and balance between the wage earner, the employer and the
consumer.").
561. See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 199-200.
562. See id.; Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 207-08. Perkins had raised the
issue of wage and hour regulation at a conference on unemployment and labor standards that was
attended by representatives of several AFL unions. See HIMMELBERG, supra note 551, at 191-92.
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opposed the wage-setting and hour-setting provisions in the bill. 3 Both
men may have mistakenly believed that the labor movement, through
the Labor Advisory Board, would draft the wage and hour provisions as
the codes were prepared."' The bill was sent to Congress on May 17,
1933, Senate debate began on June 7, 1933 and the NIRA was signed
into law on June 16, 1933.6
Roosevelt made clear in his statement upon signing the bill that he
expected every code to assure living wages for workers. s6 Living wages
were not merely an end in themselves for Roosevelt, as his sometime
advisor John Ryan might have liked, 67 but a means to increase
consumer demand to redress the overproduction that Roosevelt believed
sparked and sustained the Depression. Roosevelt's bill-signing
statement reflected his adherence to the Keynesian view of the
Depression-era economy and the socio-economists' view of labor
markets' operation. He turned away from the gender-specific concerns
Brandeis and Frankfurter had relied on in Muller, Stettler, and Parrish
and the appeals to citizenship and good health argued in Bunting.
Instead, he offered a further exposition on Competitive Fairness.
As overproduction caused competition between employers that
drove wages down, inadequate wages meant insufficient consumer
demand for an economy burdened by overproduction. Taking certain
wages and hours out of competition in the labor market, on the other
hand, would force businesses to compete in the product market by
improving their efficiency. Society's benefit, Roosevelt and Perkins
postulated, would come from a burgeoning economy driven by rising
consumer demand and increased efficiency resulting from higher and
fixed minimum wages. Thus, regulation of labor markets would
improve competition in product markets.5"

563. See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 206.
564. See George Edward Paulsen, The Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act 2223 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University) (on file with the Hofstra
Labor & Employment Law Journal).

565. See id.
566. See The Goal of the National Industrial Recovery Act - A Statement by the President on
Signing It (June 16, 1933), in 2 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 560, at 246 (Statement by FDR on
signing the NIRA, June 16, 1933) ("Its goal is the assurance of a reasonable profit to industry and
living wages for labor with the elimination of the piratical methods and practices which have not
only harassed honest business but also contributed to the ills of labor.").
567. Ryan was an enthusiastic supporter of the NIRA, and served on the NRA's Independent
Appeals Board in 1934 to hear appeals from businessmen aggrieved by the code authorities. While
he supported the NIRA, Ryan did not see it as a substitute for a statutory maximum hours and
minimum wages law. See RYAN, SociAL DOCTRINE, supra note 204, at 217-18.
568. See Presidential Statement on N.I.R.A. - "To Put People Back to Work" (June 16, 1933),
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in 2 ROOSEVELT PAPERS 251-52 (1938):
The law I have just signed was passed to put people back to work, to let them buy more
of the products of farms and factories and start our business at a living rate again.... It
seems to me to be equally plain that no business which depends for existence on paying
less than living wages to its workers has any right to continue in this country. By
'business' I mean the whole of commerce as well as the whole of industry; by workers I
mean all workers, the white collar class as well as the men in overalls; and by living
wages I mean more than a bare subsistence level-I mean the wages of decent living.
Throughout industry, the change from starvation wages and starvation employment
to living wages and sustained employment can, in large part, be made by an industrial
covenant to which all employers shall subscribe. It is greatly to their interest to do this
because decent living, widely spread among our 125,000,000 people, eventually means
the opening up to industry of the richest market which the world has known....
On this idea, the first part of the Act proposes to our industry a great spontaneous
cooperation to put millions of men back in their regular jobs this summer. The idea is
simply for employers to hire more men to do the existing work by reducing the workhours of each man's week and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter
week.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also id.at 255 ("I am fully aware that wage increases will eventually
raise costs, but I ask that managements give first consideration to the improvement of operating
figures by greatly increased sales to be expected from the rising purchasing power of the public.
That is good economics and good business. The aim of this whole effort is to restore our rich
domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity."); 3 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 556,
at 127-28 (An Extemporaneous Address Before Code Authorities of 600 Industries, March 5,
1934) ("[Tihe people in this country whose incomes are less than $2,000 a year buy more than
two-thirds of all the goods sold here. It is logical that if the total amount that goes in wages to this
group of human beings is steadily increased, merchants, employers and investors will in the long
run get more income from the increased volume of sales."); The President Recommends
Legislation Establishing Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours (May 24, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS 1937 210-11
(1941) [hereinafter 6 ROOSEVELT PAPERS] ("Today, you and I are pledged to take further steps to
reduce the lag in the purchasing power of industrial workers and to strengthen and stabilize the
markets for the farmers' products. The two go hand in hand."); id. at 435 (Fireside Chat on
Legislation for Extraordinary Session of Congress, October 12, 1937) ("I am a firm believer in
fully adequate pay for all labor. But right now I am most greatly concerned in increasing the pay of
the lowest-paid labor, those who are our most numerous consuming group but who today do not
make enough to maintain a decent standard of living or to buy the food, clothes and other articles
necessary to keep our factories and farms fully running."); A "Fireside Chat" Discussing
Legislation to be Recommended to the Extraordinary Session of the Congress (Oct. 12, 1937), in 6
ROOSEVELT PAPERS, at 435.
[A] wages and hours and child labor law will undoubtedly accomplish two great
purposes, first, an increase in employment, and secondly, an increase in the total of the
Nation's income.... The more I study the subject the more I become convinced that it
does not pay any community or any region in the long-run to maintain low wage or low
living standards. Throughout the Nation we are working toward fairly uniform
standards of pay and work in every section and in every community. And the only
exception to this will give some effect to a small differential based on an actual lower
or an actual higher cost of living in some communities or sections as compared with the
average of the country.
Address at St. Paul, Minn., on Wages and Hours Legislation (Oct. 4, 1937), in 6 ROOSEVELT
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The first code approved was the Cotton Textile Code, hailed by the
President on July 9, 1933 for establishing a forty-hour work week and
setting thirteen dollars per week and twelve dollars per week as the
minimum wages respectively for the North and the South.569 But
Roosevelt quickly became restless with the pace of code development.
NRA Administrator Hugh Johnson generated the President's
Reemployment Agreement ("PRA") on July 27, 1933 to solicit
individual employers directly to bind themselves to a set of labor
standards while additional NRA codes were being produced. The
standards set were: 1) work weeks of between thirty-five and forty
hours, depending upon the industry; and 2) weekly wages of not less
than $15.00 in any city over 500,000, $14.50 in cities between 250,000
and 500,000, $14.00 in cities between 2,500 and 250,000, and in smaller
towns to increase wages twenty percent but not to higher than $12.00;
or, for some industries an hourly rate of not less than thirty or forty
cents an hour. More than 2.3 million employers with approximately 16.3
million workers were signed to the PRA.57 0 Both the Cotton Textile
Code and the PRA established wage and hour patterns that were
extremely influential on later codes."'
According to testimony by Leon Henderson, Director of the
Research and Planning Division of the NRA, the PRA was effective in
raising wages and increasing employment without reducing hours
worked for the workers covered by its provisions. 2 Between June and
October 1933, work hours in manufacturing industries remained the
same but employment rose almost twenty percent. 3 Total employment
increased by 2,462,000 workers. 4 NRA industries increased their
employment by 11.4% while non-NRA industries increased only
4.4%.75 In June 1933, there were twenty industries with average hourly
wage rates below 32.5 cents per hour, but by October 1933, there was
only one. 6 In July, the average hourly wage rate for NRA industries
at 404-05; see also FUSFELD, supra note 170, at 192-206, 209-15 (discussing Roosevelt's
pre-Presidency education in price stabilization, overproduction, and industrial planning).
569. See 3 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supranote 556, at 276; LYON ET AL., supra note 560, at 305.
570. See 3 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 556, at 309-10, 312. Many employers
"volunteered" for the PRA under the compulsion of an executive order requiring that all Public
Works Administration and Emergency Relief contractors adhere to the PRA standards. See
PERKINS, supra note 509; BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THENRA 50-51 (1975).
571. See LYON Er AL., supra note 560, at 304.
572. See Hearings, supranote 102, at 157 (testimony of Leon Henderson).
PAPERS,

574.
574.
575.
576.

See id
See id
See id.
See id.
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was 43.8 cents, but by October it had risen twenty percent to 52.1
cents. 5s " Labor income for NRA industries increased thirteen percent,
while in other industries it increased only seven percent. 78
Eventually, almost 600 codes were established under the NIRA
with estimates suggesting that over ninety percent of industrial
employees in NRA industries were covered.5 7 9 Although it is generally
agreed that the NRA did not revive the national economy as Roosevelt
had hoped, its effectiveness matched that of the PRA in raising wages

without curtailing hours for covered workers.8 By May 1935, hourly
wage rates increased about five cents an hour and weekly average
income increased twelve percent."' Almost half of all codes had fortycent per hour minimum wage rates covering almost forty percent of total
employment in the United States!" 2 Fifty-three additional codes had

minimum wage rates of more than forty-cents covering 16.4% of total
employment.D Workers' share of the national income rose from 64% in

1932 to 66.8% in 1934 and to 67.3% in 1935.5 4 Nonetheless,
unemployment remained high and purchasing power did not return to
pre-Depression levels. 5

577. See Hearings,supra note 102, at 157 (testimony of Leon Henderson).
578. See id.
But see LYON ET AL., supra note 560, at 785-93 (concluding that the NRA caused
only a very small increase in average real wages throughout the workforce, and thereby did not
serve its purpose of increasing workers' overall purchasing power).
579. See 3 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 556, at 276; COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note
156, at 57; BELLUSH, supra note 570, at 35 (noting 546 codes of fair competition and 185
supplemental codes); LYON Er AL., supra note 560, at 308-16 (explaining that codes covered 22
million workers or ninety percent of those in industries subject to the NRA and many of the
remainder were covered by the PRA).
580. See Hearings,supra note 102, at 157 (testimony of Leon Henderson).
581. See id.
582. See id.
583. See id
584. See idt
at 158.
585. See Hearings,supra note 102, at 157-58 (testimony of Leon Henderson); see also id.at
310-15 (testimony of Isador Lubin, Commissioner of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor)
(discussing BLS study of the situation in 16 industries before and after Schechter: weekly hours
were increased substantially after the NRA was struck down, including above forty hours, and the
plants paying the least increased hours the most. Prices did not go down necessarily where wages
were cut and hours increased; and the most business went to the businesses that cut wages the
most); ALICE OLENIN & THOmAg F. CORCORAN, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOURS AND
EARNINGS IN THE UNrrED STATES 1932-40, at 4 (Bulletin No. 697) (explaining that two major
upward movements in average hourly earnings occurred during this period: one in the summer and
early fall months of 1933; mainly as a result of the President's Reemployment Agreement and the
provisions of the NRA codes; and the other in the late months of 1936 and early 1937); LYON ET
AL., supra note 560, at 871-85 (noting that the NRA did not contribute to the recovery); PAULSEN,
A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 48.
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These mixed data did not soothe the discontent of the AFL over the
failure of the NRA's public bargaining system. Where codes carried
adequate wage rates, it was most often because of private collective
bargaining. The higher paying industries were generally organized and
unions in those industries assured compliance with codes' wage and
hour provisions. But organized labor played little part in drafting the
codes' wage and hour provisions outside the industries in which they
already represented the workers. 86 There was little organization in the
large manufacturing and distributive industries where codes were
needed most and being drawn up first.5 7 In fourteen industries with
code-defined rates of thirty cents or below, there was no collective
bargaining at all.588
Further, the public bargaining system did not function as the labor
movement expected. The Labor Advisory Board, a necessary backstop
to public bargaining in the code committees, was not in a strong enough
position to press workers' point of view. Code-defined workweeks
turned out to be a disappointment sufficiently large that the AFL
continued to demand passage of the Black bill. There was also evidence
that business was exploiting the codes in an effort to prevent strikes and
wage increases. 89 The operation of the NIRA had not given the AFL any
reason to believe that public bargaining could serve as an adequate
substitute for private collective bargaining."9
The NIRA was struck down by unanimous vote of the Supreme
Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.59"' Some
employers leapt at the opportunity to cut wages and increase working
hours.
Unemployment increased and with it calls for additional
remedial action by the federal government.93 Roosevelt turned the
failure of the NRA into a campaign issue in his 1936 re-election effort.

586. See Hearings,supranote 102, at 162 (testimony of Leon Henderson).

587. See id.
588. See id. at 162.
589. See id at 204-07; see also LYON ET AL., supra note 560, at 439-44 (comparing certain
aspects of codes produced, in essence, by collective bargaining and "normal" code procedures).
590. See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor,supra note 533, at 206.
591. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Schechter was premised principally on the Court's view that the
NRA was an inappropriate delegation of legislative authority, rather than any consensus on the
freedom of contract or the merits of the labor standards established in the codes. See id. at 537-38.
592. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 378.
593. See id Congress' first response, urged by Roosevelt and Perkins, was the limited WalshHealey Public Contracts Act enacted in June 1936. See id. Walsh-Healey provided that goods and
services bought by the government in quantities over $10,000 must be manufactured under certain
conditions: eight-hour day, forty-hour week, no child or convict labor, safety and health
conditions, and payment of prevailing wages. See id. (citing 41 U.S.C. §§ 35 (1994)).
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He sided with the socio-economists in their diagnosis of the labor
market while pointing fingers at his opponents in politics and on the

Supreme Court in his famous "Economic Royalists" speech.' 5 4 In his
1937 State of the Union Address, using more temperate language,

Roosevelt reiterated his view that new legislation was needed. 95
C. Competitive Fairnessvs. BargainingFairness:The Struggle to
Define the FairLabor StandardsAct
Faced with Morehead, Schechter, and other New Deal-blocking
precedents, President Roosevelt sought an assurance that the shift in the
political balance of power effected by the Depression would reach the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, he decided that the next skirmish of the
battle for minimum wage legislation would be fought at the Supreme
Court over its allegiance to Hierarchic Fairness.
On February 5, 1937, he revealed his notorious "court-packing"
plan. The plan proposed to add fifty new federal judges, purportedly to
help with administration of the growing federal docket. Roosevelt would
also appoint six new Supreme Court justices, one for each justice who
594. See THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE PEOPLE
APPROVE 1936 233-34 (1940) [hereinafter 5 ROOSEVELT PAPERS] (Acceptance of Renomination,
Philadelphia, PA, June 27, 1936) (illustrating what an old English judge once said);
Necessitous men are not free men. Liberty requires opportunity to make a living-a
living decent according to the standard of the time, a living which gives man not only
enough to live by, but something to live for. For too many of us the political equality
we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. A small group
had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other people's
property, other people's money, other people's labor--other people's lives. For too
many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could not longer follow
the pursuit of happiness.... The royalists of the economic order have conceded that
political freedom was the business of the Government; but they have maintained that
economic slavery was nobody's business. They granted that the Government could
protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the Government could do
anything to protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live. Today we stand
committed to the proposition that freedom is no half-and-half affair. If the average
citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must have equal
opportunity in the market place.
Id.; see also id. at 624 (conveying Roosevelt's telling of his famous story of a little girl in New
Bedford who tried to hand him a note during a campaign rally that described her Dickensian
factory working conditions).
595. See 81 CONG. REC. H85 (Jan. 1937). Late in February 1937, FDR sent Congress a report
on the NRA prepared by a committee of businessmen and Cabinet members. See PAULSEN, A
LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 51. Given its hand-selected membership, the committee found
that the NRA had generally rejuvenated the economy of the country, raised wages, reduced child
labor, and increased employment. See id. With the lessons learned from the NRA's failure, the
committee believed additional reforms were possible. See id
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failed to retire from the Court within six months after reaching the age
of seventy. If enacted, the plan would ensure a favorable majority for
worker advocates' conception of fairness in wages, along with other
elements of Roosevelt's legislative program.596
Roosevelt had failed to take members of Congress into his
confidence before announcing the plan.5 It sparked intense opposition,
even among loyal supporters within his own party. Perkins felt the plan
was unnecessary. She later claimed to have identified Justice Roberts as
a potential swing vote in Parrish,both from his early positions and from
a personal acquaintanceship: Roberts was married to one of Perkins's
college classmates. Roberts always denied that the court-packing plan
played any role in his decision making. He would have switched his
vote in Morehead and overruled Adkins if he had been asked, he said
later.5 9 Nonetheless, Parrish-theso-called "switch in time that saved
nine -was decided on March 29, 1937, a few weeks after the courtpacking plan was announced.5 9 Two weeks thereafter, the Supreme
Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.t Roosevelt had seemingly won.
Perhaps insufficiently heedful of the need to marshal his political
capital, Roosevelt pressed his court-packing plan even after the Supreme
Court had relented and conservative Justice Van Devanter had retired. ° t
It was not until after Roosevelt suffered an embarrassing defeat in the
Senate Judiciary Committee that a compromise was finally reached in
June 1937.60
The damage to worker advocates' political bargaining position had
been done. After Senator Black brought the Labor Committee's report
on the FLSA to the Senate floor on July 8, 1937 and made his
valedictory speech in support of the bill, he was immediately forced into
a colloquy on the court-packing plan by Senator Burke, whom Black
described as a member of "the flying squadron who are opposed to the
President's Court plan. ''WS In this poisoned legislative environment, with

596. See MARTIN, supranote 133, at 387-88.
597. See id.
598. See MARTIN, supra note 133, at 388.
599. Some have claimed that the decision in Parrish had been reached before the courtpacking plan became public. See id.; MARTIN, supra note 133, at 387-89; Brandeis, Organized
Labor,supra note 533, at 217-18; PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 74,80.
600. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 217-18.
601. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 78.
at 78,93-94.
602. See iaL
603. 81 CONG. REc. S6894-95 (daily ed. July 8, 1937) (including the Sen. Black colloquy
with Sen. Burke).
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the country entering a new recession and the living wage movement and
the labor movement still split over a statutory minimum wage, the
legislative struggle over fairness in wages and the FLSA began.6
When doubts about the NRA's future had arisen, Perkins asked the
Solicitor of Labor, Charles Gregory, to draft a national minimum wage
bill. 5 A special lawyers' committee within the Administration led by
Roosevelt confidants Thomas Corcoran and Ben Cohen, and including
Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson, re-drafted Solicitor
Gregory's bill.6 When the draft was completed, Roosevelt held lastminute conferences with Green, Lewis, Hillman, House Majority Leader
Sam Rayburn, House Labor Committee Chair William Connery, and
Black.6w On May 21, 1937, the bill was given to Black and Connery for
introduction in both houses of Congress on May 24, 1937.6° Roosevelt
used the opportunity to remind members of Congress that "[o]ne-third
of our population, the overwhelming majority of which is in agriculture
or industry, is ill-nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed.... A selfsupporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for
the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers'
wages or stretching workers' hours." '
This original version of the FLSA would have made Bargaining
Fairness the foundation for the nation's minimum wage law. An
independent Labor Standards Board ("the board") would operate much
like the wage boards in the Oregon public bargaining statute. The board
would have broad powers to vary wages above forty-cents per hour and
hours below forty per week to maintain the physical and economic
health, efficiency, and well-being of employees. The board could
conduct investigations and, if it found substandard conditions,
recommend minimum wages and hours. The board could not set an
annual wage in excess of $1,200, orabout sixty-cents per hour for a fulltime, year-round worker. Roosevelt's version of the bill did not set a
604. See generally Brandeis, Organized Labor, supra note 533, at 217-30 (including a subchapter on the Fair Labor Standards Act and discussing its growth from proposal to finish).
605. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 54.
606. See Brandeis, Organized Labor, supra note 533, at 218; PERKINS, supra note 509, at
256.
607. See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 257-58.
608. See PAULSEN, A LtvING WAGE, supra note 524, at 78; PERKINS, supra note 509, at 219;
see also 81 CONG. REC. S4954, S4961 (daily ed. May 24, 1937) (statement of Sen. Black
introducing the Fair Labor Standards Act, S.2475, which is referred to the Senate Education and
Labor Committee).
609. The President Recommends Legislation Establishing Minimum Wages and Maximum
Hours (May 24, 1937), in 6 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 568, at 210-11 (discussing a letter to
Congress dated May 24, 1937).
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specific minimum wage or maximum hour level. The expectation was
that Congress would set the levels at forty cents and forty hours
respectively. Leaving these amounts out of the draft bill was intended,
week. 610
in part, to appeal to an AFL still dedicated to a thirty-hour work
Black and Connery agreed to hold joint hearings on the bill in an
effort to expedite committee action. These hearings exposed the fissures
in Roosevelt's coalition. The first dividing line was the old
disagreement between the living wage movement and the labor
movement. The living wage movement's dedication to Bargaining
Fairness required a statute that imposed a public bargaining regime. The
labor movement, after its experience with the NRA, remained dedicated
to unfettered private collective bargaining.
Befitting her role in the living wage movement, Perkins was the
most vigorous advocate for Bargaining Fairness at the joint hearings.
The Secretary wanted no designation of a specific minimum wage or
maximum hour level in the legislation: "I should prefer that even the
determination of the basic wage be left to the Board, to be set industry
by industry .... 6 She argued for the importance of advisory
committees of representative employees and employers, like those in
Oregon, to bargain over wages and hours and present the board with a
negotiated result. Perkins announced with little hesitation that she
wanted government-managed bargaining: "It gives both to employers
and workers some experience and61 2 some realistic education in the
technique of collective bargaining."
Perkins knew that the preservation of collective bargaining had
been the AFL's principal concern since the beginning of the minimum
wage campaign twenty-five years earlier. In response to questions from
Senator Robert LaFollette and Representatives William Connery and
Ruben Wood, Perkins attempted to lend the labor movement some
comfort. She assumed aloud that an effective collective bargaining
agreement would fix a wage as high as any that could be fixed by the
board: "I presume the Board would always honor and take into
consideration a collective bargaining agreement once it has been arrived
at, if it had been arrived at fairly. 613 Pressed on the point, however,
610. See PAULSEN, A LrvING WAGE, supra note 524, at 56-67; Brandeis, Organized Labor,
supra note 533, at 222-23.
611. Hearings,supra note 102, at 178 (testimony of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins); see
also PERKINS, supra note 509, at 258 ("The amount of the wage should have been left for the
consideration of wage boards which could scrutinize the economic problems of an industry and fix
a minimum wage for each industry as the evidence indicated.").
612. Hearings,supra note 102, at 179-80 (testimony of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins).
613. Id. at 182-83.
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Perkins suggested that the board would be empowered to inquire into
the legitimacy of a collective bargaining agreement to determine
whether a higher minimum wage should be set than that agreed to by the
union and employer. The board's inquiry, presumably, could 14result in
the board setting a higher wage than the union could negotiate.
Public bargaining remained anathema to the AFL. It threatened the
only method the labor federation considered effective for remedying
workers' inferior bargaining position in the labor market: private
collective bargaining. The labor movement foresaw that governmentdictated minimum wages would be declared the "legal" or maximum
wage in judicial actions intended to block collective efforts to achieve
higher wages. Given Perkins's suggestion that the Labor Standards
Board could set a minimum wage rate higher than a collectively
bargained rate, it is also possible that the AFL feared that unions would
find themselves competing with the board when it came to the core
collective bargaining issues of wages and hours. Beyond
embarrassment, unions' ability to organize new members or even retain
existing members might be threatened.
Green of the AFL and Lewis of the CIO testified to the views of the
labor movement's leadership at the joint hearings. As with the NRA,
both men endorsed the legislation but sought to limit the reach of
governmental wage and hour setting to those "special and limited"
circumstances in which collective bargaining did not yet exist. 15 Green
614. See Hearings,supra note 102, at 198-99, 209 (testimony of Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Robert Jackson). Although Robert Jackson actually testified before Perkins and was the first
witness at the joint hearings on June 2, 1937, Mr. Jackson actually reinforced Perkins's arguments.
See ti. Jackson's status as the first witness probably showed that the committees and the
Administration were more concerned that the Supreme Court might use Commerce Clause and
delegation arguments to strike down the FLSA than the freedom of contract arguments that had
been effectively swept away by Parrish.See id. In fact, Jackson testified that the FLSA was a
Most
direct challenge to the Court's Commerce Clause decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart.See id.
of Jackson's prepared testimony was dedicated to the constitutional issues. See id at 2-6, 8-15.
Nonetheless, Jackson also argued that the existence of the board would strengthen the
government's position if the law were challenged on constitutional grounds. See id. The board
would build up a body of experience and provide the evidence needed to justify the imposition of
particular wage and hour standards. See id.This experience and evidence would be a defense
against any claim of arbitrary and capricious congressional action. See id.The board would also be
able to avoid the danger inherent in a uniform, national minimum wage of setting a rate that could
effect a hardship on an employer that might challenge the law on due process grounds. See id.
Jackson interpreted the Constitution as permitting a fixed national minimum wage only if, while
being high enough to help some workers, the wage was not so high as to displace other workers.
See id Finally, Jackson agreed with Perkins that nothing in the law prohibited the board from
setting a minimum wage higher than a collectively bargained wage. See id at 4, 20, 23, 27, 39, 66,
79, 84.
615. Hearings,supra note 102, at 221-23,271. "We, of the United Mine Workers of America,
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made clear to the members of the Senate and House committees on
which side of the conflict between public and private bargaining he
expected them to err:
I should rather preserve the principle of industrial democracy than to
yield a right to the Board to interfere in the free exercise of collective
bargaining....

....It is better for us to preserve the principle of collective bargaining

and industrial democracy than it is to clothe some board with authority
to determine whether a collective-bargaining agreement, honestly
entered into between employers and employees, is valid and should
stand. That is a very serious matter.616
Lewis testified that section 5 of the draft bill, which created the Labor
Standards Board, should be eliminated. 17
Green proposed six amendments that would circumscribe public
bargaining and establish it as nothing more than a precursor to private
collective bargaining.1 The most important amendments would have
overridden Perkins's interpretation of the bill as empowering the board
to impose higher wages and shorter hours than those agreed to through
collective bargaining. One amendment would have required the board to
adopt collectively bargained wages and hours that prevailed in an
industry or craft.6 9 Another eliminated the danger that governmentimposed wage and hour levels would establish ceilings for private

and of the Committee for Industrial Organization, wish to pledge our general support to the
principle of a minimum wage and maximum workweek as contained in the legislation ....I shall
have some constructive changes or suggestions which I deem virtually important ....See id. at
211,271 (testimony of John. L. Lewis, representing the UMW and CIO).
The special and limited grounds on which the American Federation of Labor feels that
private industry should be subjected to government regulation over wages... require
that such regulation should continue only until private industry shows its ability
through collective bargaining to accomplish objectives of the President's message and
the legislation enacted pursuant thereto.
See id. at 221 (testimony of William Green). The AFL Executive Council endorsed the Bill by
action of its executive council on May 28, 1937 along with the amendments discussed. See
Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 221.
616. Hearings,supra note 102, at 226-27 (testimony of William Green).
617. See id. at 276 (testimony of John L. Lewis).
618. See id.
at 221-22 (testimony of William Green).

619. See id.
at 222.
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bargaining by expressly protecting the ability of unions to negotiate for
better arrangements.m0
As in the effort to enact Massachusetts' minimum wage law, the
labor movement did not speak with one voice on all issues. Lewis
disagreed with Green's view that the board should not be permitted to
raise substandard collectively-bargained wages.62' Clothing Workers
Union President Sidney Hillman disagreed with Lewis's view that
section 5 should be eliminated entirely and supported the bill as written,
preferring to take the best bill Congress would pass.622 But the
predominant view, at least within the AFL, was that the FLSA:
is not for the purpose of setting minimum wages by legislative fiat; it is
not for the purpose of interfering in the exercise of industrial
democracy or interfering in the collective bargaining relationship
between employer and employee; but rather to promote industrial
democracy and the establishment of wages, minimum wages and
maximum hours of employment, through collective bargaining.623
In sum, unions and collective bargaining should set Wages, not the
government. Congress should merely institute a national forty-cent
minimum
hourly wage, even if that wage did not amount to a living
624
wage.
The second dividing line in the minimum wage coalition arose out
of Roosevelt's redefinition of the causes and externalities of unfair wage
deals. Roosevelt's premise for governmental intervention in the labor
market was that employers used their superior bargaining power to drive
down wages so that they could cut prices in the product market. He
sought to eliminate both sinking product prices and declining consumer
purchasing power. 63 Restoring fair competition to product markets,
620. See id. at 221-22 (testimony of William Green) (listing the AFL's amendments). Lewis
was quite concerned that the minimum wage would become a maximum wage or a "legal wage"
enforced by a court of equity challenging a collectively bargained higher wage. See Hearings,
supranote 102, at 285-86 (testimony of John L. Lewis).
621. See id at274 (testimony of John L. Lewis).
622. See Hearings,supra note 102, at 943, 945-48 (testimony of Sidney Hillman, President of
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America).
623. See id at 240 (testimony of William Green).
624. See id. at 220 (listing the AFL's amendments); id at 272, 276, 303 (testimony of John L.
Lewis); id. at 953-54 (testimony of Sidney Hillman). John Ryan agreed that forty cents did not
amount to a living wage for the needs of a family. See id. at 500-01 (testimony of Monsignor John
Ryan).
625. See The President Recommends Legislation Establishing Minimum Wages and
Maximum Hours (May 24, 1937), in 6 THE ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 568, at 210
(addressing Congress).
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therefore, required that every competitor in a product market be
subjected to the same labor standards. In this conception of Competitive
Fairness, local factors like the economic condition of the employer or
geographic differentials in living standards were relevant only to
establishing a level competitive field in local product markets. They
became entirely irrelevant for product markets with a national scope.
The purest solution to unfair price competition in national product
markets would be a single minimum wage standard and a single
maximum hour standard covering every employer selling into the
product market, regardless of where the employer was located.626
Roosevelt and his allies in Congress plainly intended to reach national
product markets with their new minimum wage law.
It would have been possible, at least in theory, to construct a public
bargaining statute that served both the conceptions of Bargaining
Fairness and Competitive Fairness. Public bargaining could occur at a
national level and uniform rates could be set for each industry or trade.
But the living wage movement did not see Bargaining Fairness as a
means to the end of fair competition between employers. The goal of
Bargaining Fairness was to achieve a living wage for workers.
Assuming that the cost of living differed in different regions of the
United States, as the proponents of the FLSA did, it would not have
been possible for a national public bargaining law to set both uniform,
national wage and hour standards and assure a living wage for each
worker in different parts of the country. Uniform wage and hour
standards, no matter how they were arrived at, would not assure each
worker wages sufficient to satisfy his or her local standard of living. The
public bargaining versions of the FLSA introduced by Black and
Connery and enacted in Oregon required the wage-and-hour-setting
authorities to take into account cost of living and other necessarily local

626. A modem example might help illuminate this point. The market for fast food service is
distinctly local. Ready-to-eat grilled chicken sandwiches cannot be served to customers through
fiber-optic cable or, to this author's knowledge, shipped in a timely way via an overnight service.
Thus, fast-food servers work in a labor market probably defined by the distance customers are
willing to travel (or have their food travel if it is being delivered) to purchase a grilled chicken
sandwich or some acceptable substitute. Competitive Fairness would therefore require that the
employers of all fast-food service workers in a given local labor market be subjected to the same
labor standards. By comparison, the market for the chicken breasts that are the central ingredients
in a grilled chicken sandwich is national. Chicken producers in the Delmarva peninsula compete
with chicken producers in Arkansas for the business of fast-food establishments, among others,
across the United States. Thus, all of these chicken producers, regardless of where they are located
and the local living standards in their regions, must be subject to the same labor standards to
achieve Competitive Fairness.
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factors. 627 Achieving a living wage made such inquiries necessary. Thus,
this kind of public bargaining model, contemplating products of
bargaining sensitive to local factors if not bargaining on a local level,
could not be reconciled with Competitive Fairness.
The Mason-Dixon Line would have been a ready substitute for this
second dividing line. Progressive Southern Democrats in Congress, led
by Representative Robert Ramspeck of Georgia, joined with Perkins and
Jackson to oppose the imposition of uniform national wage and hour
standards. 62 Regional differences existed in living standards, they
argued, and the board should take these differences into account when
setting labor standards. 29 The southern congressmen feared that any
national standards would be too high and thereby impose an onerous
burden on home-state employers that paid wages below those typically
found in northern industry. 6 Roosevelt made a similar point, in less
complimentary form, in his letter conveying the FLSA to Congress:
Backward labor conditions and relatively progressive labor conditions
cannot be completely assimilated and made uniform at one fell swoop
without creating economic dislocations. Practical exigencies suggest
the wisdom of distinguishing labor conditions which are clearly
oppressive from those which are not as fair or as reasonable as they
should be under circumstances prevailing in particular industries. Most
fair labor standards as a practical matter require some differentiation
between different industries and localities."'
As with the fissure over public bargaining and private collective
bargaining, Perkins understood the importance of regional differentials
to both northerners and southerners within her party. 2 Her efforts to
provide succor to both, however, caused confusion. On the one hand,
Perkins sought to avoid rigid standards that would hamper the industrial
development of certain sections of the country or cause worker
dislocations.633 On the other hand, she argued that "industries or plants
627. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 82-83.
628. Ramspeck resisted efforts to cast the South as the only low-wage region of the country.
See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 102, at 206 (including colloquy between Ramspeck and Perkins
who noted that the worst wage exploitation she had seen was in Mt. Vernon, New York).
629. See, e.g., id. at 40-41 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson).
630. klaSee generally 6 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 568 (noting the differential between
southern and northern industries).
631. 6 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 568, at 213 (Letter to Congress, May 24, 1937,
transmitting FLSA to Congress).
632. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 86.
633. See Hearings, supra note 102, at 186-87 (testimony of Secretary of Labor Frances
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selling into the same market ought not to have any differential." 634 Her
unsuccessful efforts to reconcile Competitive Fairness with Bargaining
Fairness illustrated the irreconcilable differences dividing the forces
behind the effort to enact a national minimum wage law.
Many Democrats representing constituencies in the Northeast and
the Midwest claimed that regional wage differentials had already caused
northern industries to be lured south and northern workers to be
dislocated. Evidence from the NRA had shown that narrowing regional
differentials reduced the number of plants and industries relocating to
cheaper localities.635 Thus, Democrats from the Northeast and Midwest
argued for a Competitive Fairness law-that is, uniform, national
standards-to eliminate southern employers' price advantage in the
product market:
It seems to me that if the marketing of the merchandise is to be the
controlling factor, as probably it ought to be, in view of the fact that
this bill is among other things seeking to prevent the movement of
industry from where there are good labor conditions and high wages,
to those localities where there are, as illustrated by the boot-and-shoe
industry, lower wages paid, that the tendency would be to do away
with differentials, and that you would arrive finally at the place of
market and the competition idea, so that the high-priced labor is not
going to be in competition with low-priced labor when the goods go
into the market, and therefore that you would almost reach the
conclusion that there is no need for differentials.636
For northern Congressmen and Senators, and their labor allies, provision
for geographic wage differentials was "no more than a plea for the
continuance of low living standards in the Southern States." 637

Perkins).
634. Id. at 186. One commentator charitably characterized Perkins's unavoidably
contradictory statements as "a flexible position." PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at

86.
635. See Hearings, supra note 102, at 168 (testimony of Leon Henderson, Director of
Research and Planning Division of the NRA).
636. Id. at 202 (presenting a question by Sen. David Walsh of Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins); see also id.at 40-41 (including questions by Reps. Connery and Griswold of Assistant
Attorney Gen. Robert Jackson).
637. Id. at 272 (testimony of John L. Lewis); see also id. at 236 (testimony of William Green)
(opposing differentials); 83 CONG. REc. S3581 (daily ed. March 23, 1938) (explaining that
memorandum sent to members of Congress by the AFL on March 8, 1938 opposed differentials to
avoid industry dislocations and to provide purchasing power to the workers in the South).
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D. The Ebb and Flow of Conceptions of Fairness

1. The Revised Senate Bill: Bargaining Fairness Ascendant
The revised bill that emerged from the Senate Education and Labor
Committee after the joint hearings remained a model of Bargaining
Fairness. The Labor Standards Board remained, with essentially the
same technical authority over wages and hours.638 Only its jurisdiction
had been circumscribed.u6 The board would be permitted to intervene
only when workers were subjected to wages lower than forty-cents or
more than forty hours, and it could impose no higher wages or shorter
hours.6 The committee report accompanying the bill acknowledged that
a minimum wage of forty cents, which would yield no more than $800
per year to the small percentage of workers fortunate enough to find
fifty weeks of employment in a year, was not sufficient to maintain "the
minimum American standard of living. But forty-cents per 6hour is far
more than millions of American workers are receiving today." '
Black explained that the purpose of the board would be to perform
the detailed analyses required to address the diversity of hours, wages,
economic and living conditions, and methods of production that exist in
a host of industries. But Senator David Walsh was far more direct in
proclaiming the public bargaining purpose of the bill:
[it] is attempting to set up machinery which, if administered wisely and
prudently, ought to be helpful in providing collective bargaining
through a Government agency for the men and women who are not
organized, who are working in small industries, who are subject to the
tyranny and oppression of sweatshops and chiselers. One of the
benefits of the bill is that the board, in the absence of unions, in the
absence of organizations of employees, shall be this collectivebargaining agency and fix for the lowest wage groups a decent,
reasonable minimum wage and the number of hours per week such
employees should be required to work. 642

638. See S. RE-P. No. 75-884, at 6-7.

639. See id at 7.
640. See idU
at 6-7.
641. S. REP. No. 75-884, at 4.
642. 81 CONG. REc. S7652 (daily ed. July 27, 1937) (statement of Sen. Walsh); see also 81
CONG. REc. S7800 (daily ed. July 29, 1937) (statement by Sen. Walsh acknowledging the same
argument); 81 CONG. REC. S7926 (daily ed. July 31, 1937) (statement of Sen. Ellender agreeing
with Sen. Walsh's characterization).
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The nature of the bargaining would differ from that contemplated by the
state public bargaining laws and their worker-management-public
tripartite advisory committees. The members of the Labor Standards
Board would be selected based on geography and, presumably, would
represent their regions' interests in the board's decision-making.64
The new bill retained the board's ability to establish differential
wages and hours based on differing local conditions." Senator Black's
defense of this provision focused on the impact of uniform national
standards on workers:
the pending bill recognizes that it would be wholly and completely
impossible at this time, without a complete disarrangement and
dislocation of industry and business, to bring about overnight a
complete leveling of the wage scale throughout the Nation. It also
recognizes the fact, however, that wherever a man may live, whether it
be in the South, the North, the East, or the West, when he is compelled
to work in order to obtain food and clothing for himself and his family,
he is entitled to receive a minimum wage sufficient to prevent him
from dying from slow undernourishment and slow starvation.64
Senator Walsh, in a difficult position with his constituents because of
lost jobs in Massachusetts's boot, shoe, and textile industries, argued
vigorously against strictly geographic differentials. He justified his
support for the board's authority to establish differential wages on the
grounds that accomplishing a forty-cent minimum wage and a fortyhour week would be impractical."6 But just as Secretary Perkins sowed
confusion when she sought to reconcile Competitive Fairness with
differentials, Walsh found it difficult to explain his position supporting
the inconsistent goals. 647

643. See S. REP. No. 75-884, at 4; see also 81 CONG. REc. S7746 (daily ed. July 28, 1937)
(including a letter by Sen. Black in the congressional record which stated his view that different
regions of the country should be represented on the board "so that the board shall be familiar with
the industrial, commercial, and agricultural problems of all parts of the United States").
644. See S. REP. No. 75-884, at 7.
645. 81 CONG. REc. S7649 (dally ed. July 27, 1937) (statement of Sen. Black); 81 CONG.
REC. S7651 (daly ed. July 27, 1937) (including colloquy between Sens. Walsh and Black on the
subsistence wage); 81 CONG. REc. S7652 (dally ed. July 27, 1937) (statement of Sen. Black).
646. See generally PAULSEN, A LVING wAGE, supra note 524, at 95 ("Walsh defended the
flexible 40-hour-40-cent standard and claimed that the 40-cent rate would improve the wages of
36.7 percent of all employees in seventy-one industries.").
647. See, e.g., 81 CONG. REc. S7651 (daily ed. July 27, 1937) (including colloquy between
Sen. Black and Sen. Walsh on differentials). Walsh sponsored the amendment in committee that
established forty cents as the wage ceiling and forty hours as the workweek floor for the Labor
Standards Board. His stated purpose was "[to maintain working standards at levels of efficiency
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Like Perkins in her joint hearings testimony, Black and Walsh
sought to convince the AFL through a colloquy on the Senate floor that
the bill preserved and strengthened private collective bargaining. But the
conclusion was unavoidable, even to these advocates for the bill, that
the Labor Standards Board would have the authority to change the
substance of concluded collective bargaining agreements.61 Public
bargaining could trump private collective bargaining. 64
The AFL's position caused increasing confusion and consternation, as it
became apparent that President Green's contingent support for the bill
was too conciliatory for some of the federation's affiliates. After Black
took to the Senate floor on July 29, 1937 to snuff out rumors that the
AFL opposed the bill, Senator Burton Wheeler retorted that AFL
members had telephoned his office and those of other senators seeking
to have the bill recommitted. 650 Black responded that he had called
Green and was told that Green did not support recommittal. 1 The next
day, Black returned with a short and tepid endorsement of the bill from
Green:
The wage and hour bill in the form in which it is now before the
Senate does not meet the expectations of labor. However, we recognize
the need for the enactment of wage and hour legislation. For that
reason, rather than recommit the Senate bill for further committee
consideration, it would seem advisable to pass the best wage and hour
bill possible in the Senate, with the hope that it can be revised and
amended in the House in such a way as to make it more nearly
satisfactory and acceptable to labor.652
Senator Maloney immediately responded by reading a letter on the floor
of the Senate from I.M. Ornbum, Secretary of the AFL's Union Label
Trades Department, contradicting Green's letter. 65 Senator Connally
then came forward with a letter from John P. Frey, President of the

and to promote the well-being of workers and the profitable operation of business." PAULSEN, A
LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 91.
648. See 81 CONG. REc. S7650 (daily ed. July 27, 1937) (including colloquy between Sen.
Walsh and Sen. Black).
649. See id. (Sen. Black explained that the Board could, in limited circumstances, set aside
certain collective bargaining agreements if the facts warranted such action. The Senator also noted,
however, that "[t]he board would be very reluctant, indeed, to attempt to interfere with a bona-fide
agreement made between employer and employee.").
650. See 81 CONG. REc. S7813 (daily ed. July 29, 1937).

651. See id.
652. 81 CONG. REc. S7892 (daily ed. July 30, 1937).

653. See iti
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AFL's Metal Trades Department, and J.W. Williams, President of the

AFL's Building Trades Department, calling for the bill to be
recommitted.6
The AFL's apparent opposition to the bill did not keep the bill's
supporters from defeating a motion to recommit by a vote of 36 to 48.6"
The Senate's revised version of the Bargaining Fairness bill then passed
by a vote of 56 to 28, with two Republicans, former Secretary of Labor
Davis of Pennsylvania and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts,
joining the majority and fifteen Democrats voting with thirteen
Republicans against. 56

654. See id. The CIO and Labor's Non-Partisan League (effectively the CIO's political action
committee), on the other hand, threatened retribution if the proposal were recommitted. See
generally PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 93 ("When [John P.] Frey [of the
Building Trades Department] broke openly with [William] Green and asked the Senate to delay the
bill, the latter warned him that its enemies would justify their opposition on AFL criticism and
shift the blame for its failure to the federation."). Id.
Critics of the bill, both friendly and unfriendly to labor standards, sought to widen the
divide between the AFL and the Senate's version of the bill by fueling fear of centralized wagesetting by five unaccountable members of a federal board. "Manifestly this can be a power of
incalculable portent .... I doubt if Congress was ever asked to delegate a larger, wider, more
potentially dangerous power to a bureaucracy." 81 CONG. REc. S7720 (daily ed. July 28, 1937)
(statement of Sen. Vandenberg). Vandenberg also shrewdly raised the specter of compulsory
arbitration, in case the AFL's hated target had been forgotten in the debate. See 81 CONG. REC.
S7724-25 (daily ed. July 28, 1937) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). Sen. William Borah, a
Republican populist supporter of minimum wage laws, explained that he would have preferred a
uniform national rate to avoid repeating the bureaucratic flaws of the NRA inherent in allowing
any board to "deal with the most vital matters of human life.... 81 CONG. REC. S7797 (daily ed.
July 28, 1937) (statement of Sen. Borah). Undoubtedly, some part of these objections were based
on sincere concerns over delegating legislative authority to a five-person board. Experiences with
the NRA and other New Deal institutions, ratified by the unanimous decision in Schechter and
exacerbated by the President's court-packing plan, reinforced the view that the President's entire
enterprise was calculated to consolidate as much economic and political power in the federal
government as possible. The authority to set wages and working hours, circumscribed though it
was, would be a significant increase in that power. For these critics, the bill represented
bureaucracy, not true bargaining. Democratic Senate Leader and future Vice-President Alben
Barkley doubted the sincerity of arguments about bureaucracy, giving examples of other widely
supported boards that had been adopted and worked successfully: Interstate Commerce
Commission, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission, and the Social Security Board.
See 81 CONG. REc. S7941 (daily ed. July 31, 1937) (statement of Senate Majority Leader
Barkley).
655. See 81 CONG. REc. S7954 (daily ed. July 31, 1937).
656. See 81 CONG. REc. S7957 (daily ed. July 31, 1937).
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2. The First House Committee Bill and the First House Floor Debate:
The High-Water Mark for Bargaining Fairness
The House Labor Committee suffered a serious setback to its work
on the FLSA with the death of its chairman, Representative William
Connery. 65 Chairman Connery, in addition to being the FLSA's lead
sponsor, had vast experience successfully navigating legislation through
Congress." 8 The next ranking Democrat on the committee was Mary
Norton who had not played a significant role in labor legislation.6 9 She
also had not attended the joint hearings."5 But like Roosevelt, Norton
was not bound to any particular conception of fairness or burdened by a
history of advocacy like Secretary Perkins.66' She eventually played the
compromiser's role that allowed the FLSA to become law, albeit
without fulfilling the promise of the minimum wage campaign.6 2
The Committee began its consideration of the FLSA on July 12,
1937, after the Senate committee had completed its business, and after
considerable momentum had developed in the House for adjournment.663
The bill that emerged from the committee on August 6, 1937 was a
slight modification of the Senate's final bill, but similar in all important
respects. 6" Unlike the Senate, however, the House committee
endeavored to appease the AFL by including three amendments to
further preserve collective bargaining: 1. the board would be prohibited
from intervening if collective bargaining agreements covered a
substantial portion of the employees in the occupation or if "existing
facilities for collective bargaining [were otherwise] inadequate or
ineffective"; 2. any minimum wage set by the board would have to be
higher and maximum hours shorter than that which prevailed in the
occupation; and 3. wages and hours in collective bargaining agreements
would be prima facie evidence of appropriate wages and hours.66 The
changes appeared at the time to be sufficient. Green wrote to

657. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 91-97.
658. See generally id. at 98 ("By the time the Black-Connery Bill was taken up by the House
Labor Committee, the loss of Connery created a serious leadership problem.").

659. See id
660. See id
661. See generally id. (stating that Norton "represented a labor district and wished to serve
working people.").

662. See id
663. See id at 125.
664. SeeH.R. REP. No. 75-1452, at 1(1937).

665. See id at 15.
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Representative Wood, one of the House's negotiators and president of
the Missouri AFL, proclaiming:
The wage and hour bill, as reported by the House Labor Committee, is
reasonably acceptable and fairly satisfactory to labor.... I am,
therefore, writing you this letter, advising you of the American
Federation of Labor's endorsement and approval of the wage and hour
bill as reported by the House Labor Committee.w
At the same time the committee sought to placate the AFL, it
reinforced the idea that the board's role was to sponsor bargaining
between regions of the country, rather than between employers,
workers, and consumers. Members of the board were to be selected to
represent specific geographic regions. 66 Further increasing the
possibility that wage differentials would result, the board was directed
to take into consideration the relative costs of transporting goods and
differences in unit costs of production and "manufacturing occasioned
by varying local natural resources, operating conditions, or other factors
entering into the cost of production."6'
The rush to adjournment was compounded by the procedural
maneuvering of the bill's opponents6 9 An obstructionist majority of
Southern Democrats and Republicans on the Rules Committee blocked
the bill's progress to the House floor by refusing to issue a rule for its
consideration.!'" These steadfast opponents of labor market regulation
and their conservative colleagues gave no indication that they would
ever permit the bill to come to a vote of the House's full membership. 6 '
When liberal Democrats led by Arthur Healey of Massachusetts and the
aptly named Maury Maverick of Texas petitioned for a party caucus to
consider the bill and hold off adjournment, a sufficient number of
conservatives frustrated the effort by lingering in the hallway outside
the meeting room to avoid becoming part of a quorum. 6 The House
adjourned without taking action on August 21, 1937.6"
666. 82 CONG. REc. H1485 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (including an introduction into the
record by Rep. Wood which explains that he had personally negotiated with Green); see also
PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 98 (describing Wood's AFL credentials).
667. See H.R. REP.No. 75-1452, at 13 (1937).
668. Id. at 14.
669. See PAULSEN, A LIvING WAGE, supra note 524, at 100-01 (listing opponents).

670. See id. at 100-01.
671. See id.
672. See id. at 101.
673. See id. Rep. Martin Dies, a leader of the anti-FLSA conservative bloc, attempted to cast
the conservatives as the victims of strong-arm lobbying by John Lewis and the CIO on behalf of
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Unwilling to allow delay to defeat his wages and hours bill,
President Roosevelt announced in mid October 1937 that he would call
Congress into special session on November 15, 1937 to consider the
FLSA. 674 But Representative O'Connor, the Rules Committee's
Chairman, reported that additional time would not change the opinions
of his committee members. 67 5 Further, the AFL's concerns had hardened
to opposition. At the federation's 1937 convention, a report was
approved criticizing the Senate bill as an intrusion on collective
bargaining rights:
The experiences of our movement with the authority exercised by
N.R.A. and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of having the unwise
and conflicting decisions of subordinates reviewed and set aside, [and]
the experiences of our movement under the National Labor Relations
Act give valid reason for most searching examination before we give
our approval to the establishing of further boards or commissions
having power to determine questions of minimum wage and maximum
hours or any other phase of the relationship of employer and
employed. 7'
In an effort to rein in Green, the resolution also recommended the
AFL's president consult with the heads of the Union Label Trades, the
Metal Trades, the Building Trades, and the Railway Employee
Department before taking any further action on the bill. 677
Time ran out on Norton's continued efforts to assuage the AFL.
After conferring with the AFL's executive council, a chastened Green
issued a public statement on November 22 and sent a letter to Norton on
November 27 denouncing the bill and demanding that it be returned to

the caucus' sponsors. See 82 CONG. REc. H196 (Nov. 19, 1937) (statement of Rep. Dies). Dies's
effort to don the cloak of victimization during the debate over the FLSA at times reached a level of
high irony, such as when the future Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee
made the following plea:
I hope the time will never come in my public career, whether it lasts a long or short
time, when I shall become so intolerant and so illiberal that I cast insinuations upon the
motives and conduct of my colleagues because I happen to disagree with them. The
very essence of liberalism is tolerance.
id. at H196.
674. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 102, 106-07.

675. See id
676. 82 CONG. REC. S265 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1937) (stating the convention resolution entered
into the record by Sen. Borah); see also PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 101.
677. See Brandeis, Organized Labor, supra note 533, at 225; see also PAULSEN, A LIVING
WAGE, supra note 524, at 92.
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the Labor Committee for reconsideration. 678 In a further rejection of
Bargaining Fairness, the AFL now wanted no board and the shorter
workweek it had long sought. 679 Not yet willing to concede, however,
Norton started a drive to collect signatures on a petition that would
discharge the Rules Committee from further consideration of the FLSA.
With Majority Leader Sam Rayburn's support, the petition garnered the
necessary 218 signatures by the beginning of December 1937.6' The
motion to discharge the Rules Committee and permit the bill to be
considered on the House floor was adopted on December 13, 1937 by a
vote of 285 to 123.6" This vote would be the last victory for the
supporters of the conception of Bargaining Fairness.
On December 10, Green wrote to all members of the House saying
that the AFL would accept nothing less than a bill pure in its dedication
to Competitive Fairness: "a flat 40-cent minimum wage and an absolute
eight-hour day and forty-hour maximum week, with no overtime
permitted except in emergencies. ' ' 2 Southern conservatives seeking to
defeat any minimum wage bill joined the fray with attacks on the
purported bureaucracies in the committee's bill and accusations that
their northern colleagues were out to kill industrial growth in the
South.63 Norton brushed aside the conservatives to focus on responding
to the AFL's opposition. First, she repeated the arguments propounded
by the socio-economists: "[The bill] is intended to protect employees
who are not protected by collective-bargaining agreements. The bill, if

enacted, will in no way interfere with the program of collective
678. See generally PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 111 ("President Green sent
telegrams to all members urging them to recommit the substitute for further study."); see also
Brandeis, OrganizedLabor,supra note 533, at 225-26.
679. See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor,supranote 533, at 226.
680. See 82 CoNG. REc. H1325 (daily ed. Dec. 13 1937) (giving Mr. Rayburn's statements in
favor of the bill).
681. 82 CONG. REc. H1389 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1937).
682. Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 226; 82 CONG. REc. H1398-99 (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 1937) (including in the record the AFL's statement and Dec. 10 letter by Green).
683. See, e.g., 82 CONG. REC. H196-H197 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1937) (statements of Rep.
Dies); see also 82 CONG. REc. H296 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1937) (statement of Rep. Cox). Typically,
Dies and Cox used language far more inflammatory than that employed in the Senate, including
characterizations of the bureaucracy as the "twin brother of fascism." Id. at H197. Rep. Cox called
the Labor Standards Board "a governmental board with despotic powers over all labor..... Id. at
H296. The split within the Democratic Party was ideological rather than sectional. Progressive
Southern Democrats, like Majority Leader Rayburn and Rep. Maverick, both of Texas, supported
the bill throughout its consideration. See generally 82 CONG. REc. H325 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1937)
(chiding House Republicans, Majority Leader Rayburn "wonder[ed] how many men on that side of
the House [would] take the only course open to get this great humanitarian legislation considered
by the Congress.").
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bargaining." 4 Second, she announced that she would offer a
"committee amendment" on the floor of the House replacing the Labor
Standards Board with a single Administrator to be housed within the
Labor Department. Her amendment would preserve public bargaining,
however, as the new Administrator could act only after a wage and hour
committee representing employers, workers, and consumers had
examined the facts thoroughly and made a recommendation.i s
Norton's seeming concession to the AFL lost her the support of
Robert Ramspeck, a leader of the pro-FLSA southern Democrats and
heretofore an ally. Ramspeck understood that under Norton's new
proposal the real power in wage and hour decisions would lie with the
tripartite public bargaining committees, not the Administrator.5 6
Ramspeck finally said aloud what appeared to be true all along. He
wanted regionalbargaining that would protect his home state, not public
bargaining between workers, employers, and consumers:
The five-man board would be appointed from five sections of the
country, thus giving representation to all sections. It would have
lodged in it the real power which the bill contained to regulate
minimum wages and maximum hours.... I cannot support this new
proposal. It makes no provision which insures proper consideration for
the differences that exist in various sections of our country.67
Ramspeck protested that he was not interested in geographical
differentials, but differentials based on the local facts of living and
production6 5 But the structure and membership he sought for the Labor
Standards Board belied his protests.
Worse for Norton, her effort to salvage public bargaining did not
win over the AFL and its supporters in Congress. The AFL asked
Representative Dockweiler of California to offer an amendment
containing its proposal for a national forty-cent minimum wage and a
national forty-hour workweek.69 Progressive Democrats like
Representative Griswold of Indiana, who actually offered the
684. 82 CONG. REc. H1390 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1937) (statement of Rep. Norton).
685. See id. at H1391.
686. See 82 CONG. REC. H1497-H1498 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (statement of Rep.
Ramspeck).
687. 82 CONG. REc. H1499 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937).
688. See, e.g., 82 CONG. REc. H1497-H1498 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (statement of Rep.
Ramspeck); 82 CONG. REc. at H1595 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1937) (same); see also 82 CONG. REC.
H1465 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1937) (statement of Rep. McReynolds, another leader of the Southern
Democrats, who opposed the Administrator because it gives too much power to Secretary Perkins).
689. See PAULSEN, A LrvING WAGE, supra note 524, at 109.
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amendment, and Representatives Boileau of Wisconsin and Healey of
Massachusetts rallied around the AFL's alternative.6 Griswold, a sharptongued orator, lashed out in thinly veiled language at the middle-class
advocates of Bargaining Fairness:
I know what long hours and low pay mean in a factory.... I know
these things not because I have obtained my knowledge from a book,
not because I have heard parlor pinks, social workers, and others who
make a profession of being friends of labor talk, but because
S691I have
had the experience-because the life that labor leads was mine.
But Representative Healey best captured the shift in philosophy by
congressional advocates for workers in his endorsement of Competitive
Fairness. On the one hand, "a family composed of a man and his wife
with even only one child cannot hope to exist on the most frugal scale
on $800 a year" provided by the AFL/Dockweiler proposal. 69, On the
other hand, industries leaving Massachusetts cost his state 120,000 jobs
from 1923 to 1933:
Labor costs in the competing interstate industries through the United
States must be made uniform. The only way this can be done is
through Federal legislation. The wage and hour bill is a noteworthy
start in this direction, and its speedy enactment may ultimately prove
the solution of the national problem of industrial insecurity.6

690. See 82 CONG. REc. H1397 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1937) (statement of Rep. Griswold). This
was introduced as H.R. 8580. See id. It eliminated differentials, described in specific terms the
offense and fixed the penalties, and eliminated the Labor Standards Board. See id.
691. 82 CONG. REc. H1594 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1937) (statement of Rep. Griswold).
692. 82 CONG. REC. H1472-73 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (statement of Rep. Healey).
693. 82 CONG. REc. H1473 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (statement of Rep. Healey). Other prolabor Democrats concurred. Representative Connery, who ascended to his late brother's
congressional seat, supported the Dockweiler/Griswold amendment by claiming that his brother
preferred the AFL position to the Bargaining Fairness bill he originally sponsored and which bore
his name. See 82 CONG. REC. H1505-07, (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (statement of Rep. Connery);
82 CONG. REc. H1594-95 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1937) (including colloquy between Connery and
Rep. Ramspeck regarding the late chairman's views). Pro-labor republicans also joined. See 82
CONG. REc. H1507 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937). Rep. Hamilton Fish of New York announced his
support for the AFLJDockweiler amendment, explaining that he both opposed setting up any more
boards and generally opposed anything President Roosevelt supported. See 82 CONG. REC. H139596 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1937) (statement of Rep. Fish). Rep. Hartley, who would author legislation
sharply restricting the labor movement one decade later, praised the AFL leadership:
[it] wisely recognizes that the passage of this bill may easily sound the death knell of
the organized labor movement in the United States, for what will be the incentive to
join a union if the Government is going to set wages and hours and other conditions of
employment, and who is there who contends that labor's interests will be in better
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Healey articulated the trade off he was willing to make. He would
sacrifice the living wage in order to protect jobs in his home state.694
In the end, the combatants battled each other to a standstill. With
Norton leading the opposition, Ramspeck's substitute restoring the
original Labor Standards Board was defeated by a vote of 134 to 77.695
The Griswold/Dockweiler amendment was defeated 162 to 131.696 With
all sides unhappy, and the AFL lobbying for recommittal, the passage of
Representative Hartley's motion to recommit the bill by a vote of 216 to
198 would appear in retrospect to have been a foregone conclusion.m
3. The Second House Committee Bill and Final House Version:
Competitive Fairness Ascendant
In early 1938, FLSA-supporter Lister Hill won the Alabama
Democratic primary to replace newly elected Supreme Court Justice
Hugo Black in the Senate. Claude Pepper of Florida, another FLSA
supporter, also won his Senate primary. In addition, the Institute of
Public Opinion found in a nationwide poll that 59% of Americans
wanted Congress to pass a wage and hour bill. 69 In the South, 56% of
those polled supported the bill. 6 In New England support rose to 74%,
with 62% supportive in the mid-Atlantic, 58% in the East Central, 50%
in the West Central, 61% in the Rocky Mountains, and 59% on the
Pacific Coast.' ° Minimum wage advocates in the House quickly
interpreted these electoral and polling results as a stern warning to those
who had kept the FLSA from passing during the special session."'
hands in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians.
Id. at 1393 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1937) (statement of Rep. Hartley). Hartley announced he would
support the AFLiDockweiler amendment. See id. at 1394.
694. See 82 CONG. REc. H1473 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1937) (statement of Rep. Healy).
695. See 82 CONG. REC. H1787, H1789, H1802 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1937) (statement of Rep.
Ramspeck).
696. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 111.
697. See 82 CONG. REc. H1834-35 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1937) (statement of Rep. Hartley); see
also PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 111-12. Paulsen suggests that, while the main
causes of the bill's temporary defeat were the split in the Democratic Party, the recession, and the
opposition of the AFL, analysis later showed that the some key votes came from switches in the
Louisiana delegation because of rivalries within the New Orleans political machine and the New
Jersey delegation because Mayor and party boss Frank Hague sought to strike a blow against the
CIO which continued to support the bill. See id. at 112.
698. See 83 CONG. REc. 117283 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Curley).
699. See id. at H7284.
700. See id.
701. See Brandeis, Organized Labor, supra note 533, at 227-28; see also 83 CONG. REC.
H7292 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Maverick).
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In fact, it was Norton who heeded the warning of the special
session. She understood that a bill premised on Bargaining Fairness
would not become law. With Roosevelt pushing hard in his annual State
of the Union address for some wages and hours bill,7" Norton asked
Ramspeck to chair a subcommittee of the House Labor Committee to
negotiate a further compromise with the AFL. Roosevelt contributed to
the effort by delivering a pointed speech in Ramspeck's home state of
Georgia on March 23, 1938:
Georgia and the lower South may just as well face facts-simple facts
presented in the lower South by the President of the United States. The
purchasing power of the millions of Americans in this whole area is far
too low. Most men and women who work for wages in this whole area
get wages which are far too low. On the present scale of wages and
therefore on the present scale of buying power, the South cannot and
will not succeed in establishing successful new industries. Efficiency
in operating industries goes hand-in-hand with good pay and the
industries of the South cannot compete with industries in other parts of
the country, the North, the Middle West and the Far West, unless the
buying power of the South makes possible the highest kind of
efficiency.'O'
Preliminary discussions between Ramspeck and the AFL suggested that
the two sides might reach an agreement, and Ramspeck revealed that his
subcommittee had agreed on a minimum wage of twenty or twenty-five
cents increasing over time towards forty cents. 4 The sides became
deadlocked, however, over the question of whether an administrative
body would be permitted to vary the increases in relation to the cost of
living and other factors. 5 When Green made clear that the AFL could
support a thirty-cent minimum only if it were coupled with mandatory
annual increases, Ramspeck's negotiations broke down."'
In April 1938, Ramspeck reported a new bill to the Labor
Committee providing for a "weighted average" wage floor and a forty-

702. See Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 3, 1938), in 7 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR LIBERAUSM 1938 5-7
(1941) [hereinafter 7 ROOSEVELT PAPERS]; see also 83 CONG. REc. H8-9 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1938)
(State of the Union Address).
703. Address at Gainesville, Georgia (March 23, 1938), in 7 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note
792, at 167.
704. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 118.
705. See id.
706. See id
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eight-hours ceiling on the workweek. ° A five-member board would be
geographically selected and empowered to fix the "weighted average"
wage based on the number of workers in each wage group. 78 The board
could not raise wages more than five cents per year or exceed a fortycent cap."' The Board would take into account the wages being paid, the
number of employees involved, wages paid by employers maintaining
standards voluntarily, the cost of living, local economic conditions, and
differences in manufacturing costs occasioned by varying local natural
resources.1 " The bill earned immediate opposition from the AFL. 1
Early in April, Ramspeck's bill was placed before the Labor
Committee."' Norton knew from the disastrous series of votes taken at
the end of the special session, confirmed by a new Democratic caucus
straw poll, that a bill preserving the Labor Standards Board could not
survive the opposition of the oddly coupled AFL and anti-FLSA
southern Democrats and Republicans.7 3 She offered her own proposal
which was "entirely different in form, method of administration, and
philosophy from that presented to you at the special session., 71 4 7 It1
eliminated the board and sharply restricted the Administrator's role.
The bill provided no opportunity for regional differentials in labor
standards, a point Norton repeatedly emphasized.71 6 A uniform national
minimum wage of twenty-five cents would be set for the first year after
the bill's enactment ascending to thirty cents in the second year, thirty717
five cents in the third year, and forty cents in the fourth year.
Maximum hours would also be set at a uniform, national level of fortyfour hours per week in the first year, descending to forty-two hours in
the second year, and forty hours in the third year and thereafter, along
707. See id. at 119.
708. See ic at 119-20.
709. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 119.

710. See id
711. See id. at 120; see also 83 CONG. REc. H5919-H5920 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1938)
(statement of Rep. Norton's description of why the subcommittee and committee approved of the
bill); 83 CONG. REC. H7373-78 (daily ed. May 24, 1938) (including Rep. Ramspeck's description
of his alternative to the bill).
712. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 119-20.
713. See 83 CONG. REC. H7281 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton).
714. 83 CONG. REc. H7275 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton) ("I cannot
help but feel that many Members voted for recommittal because the bill contained differentials and
because they honestly believed that that was not the proper type of wage and hour legislation.");
see also CONG. REC. at H7280 (statement of Rep. Norton reiterating her point that her proposal
was entirely new); PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 120.
715. See PAULSEN, supra note 524, at 121; H.R. REP. No. 83-2182 at 6 (1938).
716. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. H7280 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton).
717. See 83 CONG. REC. H5920 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1938).
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with an eight-hour day.7 8 Green, disappointed by the low rates in
Norton's proposal and preferring thirty cents and forty hours, reluctantly
urged members of Congress to support the proposal. 719 The CIO also
supported Norton's bill. 70 Ramspeck's alternative was defeated 8 to 10
in the committee.?' Norton's proposal was adopted 14 to 4. "
But Norton also knew from the votes taken at the end of the special
session that a bill imposing a minimum wage significantly higher than
actual wages in many parts of the country, most notably the South,
would not become law. 723 Relying upon, or perhaps hiding behind, a
constitutional due process argument drawn from testimony at the joint
hearings, Norton explained that the new minimum wage levels would be
well below the living wage for most workers in the United States:
Where a single minimum wage is prescribed by the Congress for all
localities in the United States, as is the case in the proposed bill, under
the doctrine of the Parrish case, it should only be necessary to show
that the wage established in the statute is not in excess of that which is
required by costs of living for the region of the United States where
living is the cheapest. In other words, if the cost of living for industrial
workers engaged in interstate commerce is cheaper in Alabama than in
any other State in the Union, and the cost of living in that State
requires a wage rate of 40 cents an hour to provide the necessities of
life, such a wage rate for the entire country would appear to be
reasonable and valid. No employer could show that he was
aggrieved .
Norton then cited a BLS-Works Progress Administration study entitled
"Intercity Differences in Cost of Living in March 1935, 59 Cities"
which compared the amount of money required to meet exclusively
physical needs, the so-called "emergency level," for a family of four in
various cities throughout the United States. 70 The lowest cost of living
level was found in Wichita, Kansas at about $810 per year.72 6 Thus, the
forty-cent per hour cap in Norton's bill, or $832 in wages for full-time,
718. See 83 CONG. REc. H5920 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton
explaining her proposal); H.R. REP. No. 83-2182 2-3, 6, 9 (1938).
719. See Brandeis, OrganizedLabor, supra note 533, at 223-24.
720. See 83 CoNG. REC. H7292 (daily ed. May 23, 1938).
721. See PAuLSEN, A LrvING WAGE, supranote 524, at 120.
722. See id. at 120; see also 83 CONG. REC. H7392 (daily ed. May 24, 1938) (statement of
Rep. Fish telling Rep. Boileau that the bill has the support of both the AFL and the CIO).
723. See PAULSEN, A LwING WAGE, supranote 524, at 123, 125.
724. 83 CONG. Rac. H 5920 (daily ed. April 28, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton).
725. Id. at H5921.
726. See id
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full-year workers, was not only constitutionally sound, but
constitutionally mandated.72 7 Ramspeck responded with testimony from
Assistant Attorney General and later Justice Robert Jackson and
Roosevelt Administration lawyer Ben Cohen to challenge Norton's
constitutional analysis. Norton responded, in turn, with a letter from
Jackson stating that he had no opinion on the question of whether the
new bill would pass constitutional muster because no precedent
existed.7z Plainly, the politics of securing a majority for her proposal
played a greater role in Norton's calculations than did the Constitution.
Norton had struck the necessary compromise: low wages for
southern employers and uniform, national standards for northern
employers and the AFL. Representative Fish, speaking for many
partisan, pro-labor Republicans, grudgingly joined the pro-FLSA
Democrats in supporting the new bill: "This is the first bill I have
openly supported in the last year or more that the President of the
United States has been for, and this makes me think that possibly I may
' 9 When the Rules Committee again refused to move the bill
be wrong."7
forward by a vote of 8 to 6 with three Republicans joining the five
Southern Democrats, Norton initiated a petition drive which collected
218 signatures for discharge in three hours and thirty-two minutes."
The motion to discharge the Rules Committee was adopted 322 to 73.,7
The next day, Ramspeck's alternative was the first amendment
considered. 732 It was rejected by a vote of 70 to 139 .7" Representative
Connery offered an amendment to increase Norton's starting minimum
wage of twenty-five cents to forty cents immediately; it, too, was
defeated.M Finally, a motion to recommit the bill was offered and
soundly defeated. The FLSA, codifying the conception of Competitive
at H5920-21; see also 83 CONG. REC. H7308 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement
727. See id.
of Rep. Healey concurring with Rep. Norton using the same study for support); 83 CONG. REC.
H7373 (daily ed. May 24, 1938) (statement of Rep. Randolph also concurring with Rep. Norton);
cf.83 CONG. REC. H7291-92 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Maverick endorsing
Rep. Norton's proposal).
728. See 83 CONG. REC. H7306 (daily ed. May 23, 1938).
729. 83 CONG. REc. H6255 (daily ed. May 4, 1938) (statement of Rep. Fish); see also 83
CONG. REc. H7282 (daily ed. May 23, 1938) (statement of Rep. Welch also endorsing the bill).
730. See PAULSEN, A LIvING WAGE, supra note 524, at 122-23; 83 CONG. REC. H6395-96
(daily ed. May 6, 1938) (discharge petition filed).
731. See 83 CONG. REc. H7278 (daily ed. May 23, 1938); PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra
note 524, at 123.
732. See 83 CONG. REC. H7373 (daily ed. May 24, 1938).
733. See PAULSEN, A LtvING WAGE, supranote 524, at 124; see 83 CONG. REC. H7389 (daily
ed. May 24, 1938).
734. See 83 CONG. REC. H7415-16 (daily ed. May 24, 1938) (statement of Rep. Connery).
735. See 83 CONG. REc. H7449 (daily ed. May 24, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton).
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Fairness, passedthe House of Representatives on May 24, 1938 by a

vote of 314 to

97.736

4. The Conference Committee and the Final Form of the FLSA:
Competitive Fairness Prevails
The differences between the Senate and House bills required a
conference committee for their resolution and one last opportunity for
the Bargaining Fairness forces to modify the bill. 737 In order to avoid a
filibuster by Southern Senators, Senate Democratic Leader Barkley
agreed to give "proper" representation on the committee and some
flexibilit on standards and differentials.733 Senators Pepper and Ellender
were added to the conference to represent southern senators. Ramspeck
was the only House southerner.
Early agreement was reached on the basic wage of twenty-five
cents.739 The sticking point, once again, was whether the bill should
create an administrative entity with discretion to vary wages and hours
according to local conditions. 7* Senator Walsh proposed annual
increases of three cents until forty cents was reached. The Southerners
objected because there would be no flexibility.74 ' Senator Elbert
Thomas, who had replaced Hugo Black as chair of the Senate Labor and
Education Committee, suggested a seven-year plan beginning at twentyfive cents with annual two and one-half-cent increases to thirty cents
and boards appointed thereafter to determine the rate at which wages
should be increased to forty cents by the seventh year.742 After the
seventh year, the boards and any administrative discretion would
disappear. 743 The Southerners again balked, unwilling to designate a time
certain for arriving at forty cents and seeking to retain some flexibility
between thirty and forty cents. 744

736. See id; PAULSEN, A LIvING VAGE, supranote 524, at 125.
737. See generally 83 CONG. REc. S7560 (daily ed. May 26, 1938) (Senate seeks conference
committee and appoints Senators Thomas, Walsh, Murray, Pepper, Ellender, Borah, and La
Follette as conferees); 83 CONG. REc. H7770 (daily ed. May 31, 1938) (House agrees to
conference committee and appoints Reps. Norton, Ramspeck, Griswold, Keller, Dunn, Welch, and

Hartley as conferees).
738. PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supranote 524, at 125-26.
739. See iL

740. See id
741. See id
742.
743.
744.

See id
See PAULSEN, A LrvING WAGE, supranote 524, at 125-26.
See id. at 126-27.
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The final compromise gave only a small additional nod to the
southerners and an equally small concession to Bargaining Fairness.745
Neither concession sullied the complete victory for the proponents of
Competitive Fairness.746 The bill established a new Administrator in the
Labor Department empowered to create "industry committees" with an
equal number of worker and employer representatives and disinterested
parties. 747 Secretary Perkins called this provision "a compromise with
Ramspeck and me." 748 The minimum wage would be set at twenty-five
cents, increasing to thirty cents in the second year for five years
thereafter, and forty cents in the seventh year after enactment. 74' The
policy of the Act was to prevent "substantial curtailment of employment
[and have] higher minimum rates not exceeding 40 cents an hour to be
fined industry by industry."7' 0 Thus, acting on an industry committee's
recommendation, the Administrator could accelerate the increase in the
minimum wage or, if a forty-cent minimum wage would "substantially
curtail employment in the industry," set a lower rate in the seventh
year.75 ' Representative Norton made clear that these would be
"exceptional circumstances" without which the forty-cent per hour rate
would apply "automatically. 752 The final compromise set maximum
hours at "44 hours for the first year, 42 hours for the second year, and
40 hours for the third" and thereafter, with fifty
753 percent premium pay
maximum.
the
of
excess
in
worked
for any time
Little solace could be found for the advocates of a living wage.
Thomas conceded that $800 for a full year of work "certainly does not
provide in any part of the country an excessively high standard of living
745. See PERKINS, supranote 509, at 264-65.
746. See PAULSEN, A LtVtNG WAGE, supra note 524, at 126-7 (discussing the compromises
during the debates).
747. PERKINS, supra note 509, at 264-65.
748. Id. at 265.
749. See id.; see also 83 CONG. REC. S9164 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen.
Thomas).
750. 83 CONG. REc. S9164 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. Thomas).
751. 83 CONG. REc. H9526 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Rep. Norton).
752. Id.
753. 83 CONG. REC. S9164 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. Thomas explaining
the revised and final FLSA); see also 83 CONG. REC. H9256 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement
of Rep. Norton); see also id. at H9158- 62 (indicating that Rep. Norton submitted the conference
report in the Senate). The industry committee mechanism permitted the Labor Department to
escalate minimum wage increases throughout the economy at a more rapid pace.
Recommendations made by the industry committees and accepted by the Administrator resulted in
virtually all segments of the economy being covered by a forty-cent per hour minimum wage long
before seven years elapsed in 1945. See WILLIS J. NORDLUND, THE QUEST FOR A LIVING WAGE:
THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MNMMiM WAGE PROGRAM 52 (1997).
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'
for an American family in the twentieth century."75
Another senator
used the BLS-WPA study relied on by Norton to be more precise about
Congress' failure to assure a living wage."' The maintenance level for a
family of four in the U.S. was $1,261 and the emergency level was
$903.756 The revised final bill assured a beginning annual minimum
wage of $572 rising only to $832. 7"7
Nonetheless, the votes lay elsewhere. Hillman expressed his
support for the bill. Green also supported it, albeit less enthusiastically,
because of "cumbersome" and "undesirable" methods of administration
and an understanding that the low rates would have little effect on the
skilled trades that dominated the AFL. The CIO, committed to the idea
that the exercise of power through the political process could effectively
advance bargaining in mass production industries, supported the bill,
although Lewis lost interest because of the low wage rates and ceded
leadership to Hillman.75
Thomas's compromise was adopted 12 to 4 in the conference
committee. The Senate passed the FLSA by voice vote on June 14,
1938. 7' 9 The bill passed the House on the same day by a vote of 291 to
89.70 President Roosevelt
signed the FLSA into law on June 25, 1938
76'
fanfare.
little
with
Eleven million workers were covered when the bill became law,
including 300,000 receiving wages below twenty-five cents per hour
and more than 1,384,000 working longer than forty-four hours each
week.762 Roosevelt was able to proclaim:

After many requests on my part the Congress passed a Fair Labor
Standards Act, commonly called the Wages and Hours Bill. That
Act-applying to products in interstate commerce-ends child labor,
sets a floor below wages and a ceiling over hours of
labor.... [w]ithout question it starts us toward a better standard of
754. 83 CONG. REc. S9163 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. Thomas). Paulsen
properly pointed out that the beginning of the end of the living wage principle in the FLSA came
when the Senate Committee's bill strictly limited the scope of public bargaining with a forty-cent
ceiling and a forty-hour floor. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 96-97.
755. See 83 CONG. REc. S9171 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. Wheeler).
756. See id

757. See id
758. See PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 257, 261-63.
759. See 83 CONG. REc. S9178 (daily ed. June 14, 1938).
760. See id at H9266-67.
761. See PAULSEN, A LiVING WAGE, supra note 524, at 226-27, 231-32, 235.
762. See Carroll R. Daugherty, The Economic Coverage of the FairLabor StandardsAct: A
StatisticalStudy, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 406,406-07 (1939).
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living and increases purchasing power to buy the products of farm and
factory.763

The Bureau of Labor Statistics confirmed in a later study that the
FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions were two of the many
forces at work in the industrial economy between 1932 and 1940 that
resulted in substantially larger weekly earnings to the average factory
worker.6 The FLSA passed constitutional muster with a more pliant
Supreme Court in United States v. Darby.76
VI. STEALING THE VICTORY: FAIRNESS IS AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
Congress's codification of Competitive Fairness settled the broad
debate over which conception of fairness would define the Fair Labor
Standards Act's regulatory framework. Section 206 requires every
employer in every labor market, other than those specifically excluded
by Congress, to pay the prescribed minimum wage "to each of his
employees who... is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce."7 66 Section 207 contains an almost identical
requirement for the payment of overtime premiums, except that the
word "any" was substituted for the word "each."7 67 Broadly inclusive
definitions are given for "[c]ommerce," "enterprise engaged.., in the
production of goods for commerce ..... and "produced." 7
Since our constitutional system vests courts with the authority to
apply congressional mandates to particular cases, however, the FLSA's
entry into the statute books did not finally answer the question of which
workers are entitled to the Act's minimum wage and maximum hours
protections. In fact, the courts have narrowed the scope of coverage
763. Fireside Chat (June 24, 1938) in 7 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 702, at 392.
764. See ALICE OLENIN & THOMAS F. COCoRAN, HouRs AND EARNINGS IN THE UNITED
STATES,

1932-40, U.S. BUREAU

OF LABOR STATISTICS,

at 2 (Bulletin No. 697 1942).

765. 312 U.S. 100 (1940). The Supreme Court's endorsement was sealed not only by Justice
Roberts's vote in Parrish,but by FDR's elevation of eight new appointments between 1937 and
1941, including such minimum wage stalwarts as Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H.
Jackson. See BAER, supra note 8, at 168.
766. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994).

767. Id. at § 207(a) (1).
768. Id. at § 203(b), (j), (r) (2) (C) (s) (1). Competition in several labor markets is expressly
excluded from the rules set by the FLSA. See id. § 213. These exemptions actually reflect the
political power of the exempted industries, but superficially represent Congress' view that wage
floors and hours ceilings either were not appropriate to the circumstances of that labor market or
were not necessary to assure fair competition in those markets. See id. This list of exempt
occupations and industries was substantially longer in the FLSA as enacted in 1938. See 83 CONG.
REC. S9161 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (§ 13 as originally enacted).
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while Congress has sought to expand it.769 As a general matter, Congress
has brought previously exempt industries and occupations within the
FLSA's coverage."0° At the same time, judicial interpretations of the
FLSA have established a threshold that excludes some workers from

coverage purportedly because they are not "employees" for the purposes
of sections 206 and 207.
The courts have relied on the facial circularity of the statutory
definitions of "employer," "employee," and "employ" to justify their
intervention.772 The FLSA defines an employer as "any person acting
M
T

directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.

.

."; an "'employee' ... [includes] any individual employed

by an employer"; and to "'[e]mploy' includes to suffer or permit to
work." 7 Courts have been quick to point out that there is nothing in the
legislative history or in subsequent amendments that provides any
further explanation of how Congress intended "employer," "employee,"
or "employ" to be interpreted.7 4 So, courts have felt empowered to
769. See NORDLuND, supranote 753, at 99; Goldstein et al., supra note 131, at 983.
770. See generally NORDLUND, supra note 753, at 71-77, 97-108, 109-16, 12443 (discussing
amendments to the FLSA that changed the coverage provisions).
771. See Goldstein et al., supranote 131, at 1105.
772. See id at 1103-04.
773. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (e)(1), (g); see also id. § 202(a) (stating the purpose of the FLSA in
the language of Competitive Fairness); see also Darby, 312 U.S. at 109-10 (citing 29 U.S.C. §
202(a)). The apparent circularity of the three definitions has been addressed by Goldstein and his
co-authors in their comprehensive history of the phrase "suffer or permit to work" which the FLSA
uses to define "employ." See Goldstein et al., supra note 131, at 1136-38. If a judge employs a
strict textualist philosophy of statutory interpretation then this history lends support to their
conclusion that employers, particularly those in the garment and agriculture industries, should not
be permitted to escape liability for minimum wage, maximum hours, and child labor violations by
their subcontractors. See Goldstein, et al., supra note 131, at 1136. For a judge interpreting a
statute according to its purpose, a single phrase within a statute gains its meaning principally from
the role it plays in effecting the statute's broader purposes, absent compelling evidence that
Congress intended some other interpretation when it included the phrase in the statute. See, e.g.,
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1169, 1169-71 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
eds., The Foundation Press, Inc. 1994).
774. The definitions contained in the cited subsections have not changed materially since the
conference committee agreed on the bill. See 83 CONG. REC. S9159 (daily ed. June 14, 1938); 83
CONG. REC. H9246-47 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (including Conference Committee reports). For
example, Congress amended the definition of "employee" in 1974 from "the term 'employee'
means any individual employed by an employer" to "'[e]mployee includes any individual by an
employer." The amendment had no apparent substantive effect. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet
Co., 548 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1977). An effort in the late 1950s to change the definition of
"employee" to match the narrower common law definition failed. See Goldstein et al., supra note
131, at 1104-05.
When courts have reviewed the legislative history of the FLSA for some insight into the
definition of "employee," Hugo Black has often been cited for his declaration early in the
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decide that, apart from the Act's express exclusions, those workers
within the boundaries of "employee" benefit from the law's protections

and all others do not.
A. Giving Effect to Competitive Fairness
Before examining the conception of fairness courts have implied in
the FLSA, it is worth considering how a judge with a philosophy of
statutory interpretation which fully respected Congress' purpose for
enacting the FLSA would decide coverage questions under Sections 206
and 207.n' As discussed at length in the preceding section, the goal of
Competitive Fairness, and therefore the purpose of the FLSA, was to
limit unfair price competition in product markets through the regulation
of wages and hours in labor markets. The means Congress selected to
accomplish this end was uniform, national standards that would take
certain low wages and long working hours out of competition in labor
markets regulated by the statute. The expected result was that
competition in national product markets would focus more on

legislative debate that the definition of "employee" in the FLSA is "the broadest definition that has
ever been included in any one act." See, e.g., United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3
(1945) (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. S7657 (daily ed. July 27, 1937)). But see Goldstein et al., supra
note 131, at 1097 (debating the definition of "employee" only in the context of a discussion of the
coverage of farm labor). Apart from this quote, the legislative history lacks deeper discussion of
the general definition of "employee," a detail that appeared to be wholly unimportant to the
sponsors and critics of the legislation. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 75-884, at 6 (1937) ("'Employee' is
defined to include all employees with the exception of persons employed in a bona-fide executive,
administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, persons employed as seamen or fishermen,
railroad employees subject to the Hours of Service Act, and persons engaged in agriculture and
such processing of agricultural commodities as is ordinarily performed by farmers as an incident of
farm operations."); 81 CONG. REc. S7750 (daily ed. July 28, 1937) (showing senator Walsh
entering into the record a Department of Labor analysis of the original Senate bill giving the plain
definition of "employee."); 81 CONG. REC. H8205 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1937) (entering into the
record a similar analysis by Rep. Martin of Colorado); H. REP. No. 75-1452, at 11 (1937) (House
Labor Committee) ("'Employee' is defined to include any individual employed or suffered or
permitted to work by an employer, but does not include any person employed in a bona-fide
executive, administrative, professional or local retailing capacity (excluding salesmen]." Seamen
and fishermen, railroad employees, common carrier employees, and agricultural employees are
also excepted from the definition); H. REP. No. 76-2182, at 8 (1938) ("Employee' is defined to
include any individual employed or suffered or permitted to work by an employer." The
exemptions had been moved to a separate section of the statute); 83 CoNG. REC. S7112 (May 19,
1938) (showing that a "side-by-side" of the bill prepared by the Labor Department also does not
suggest a change in the plain meaning of "employee").
775. This philosophy, associated with the methodology of "purposive statutory
interpretation," is most often identified with the Legal Process school of the New Deal and the
decades immediately following. See generally HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 773 (widely
acknowledged to be the Bible of the Legal Process movement).
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productivity and less on labor-cost-cutting.

Respecting Competitive Fairness necessarily means subjecting
every employer competing in a product market to the FLSA's wage and
hour standards. If an employer were permitted to reduce wages below

the uniform, national minimum or work its employees in excess of the
uniform, national work week without paying a premium, then that
employer could charge lower prices in the product market than its
776
competitors without losing profits simply by cutting its labor costs.

For example, assume two cucumber growers compete to sell their
cucumbers to pickle companies. If one cucumber grower could arrange
to charge a lower price for its cucumbers by paying its migrant farm
workers a lower wage, then it is reasonable to assume that the pickle
companies would buy the lower-priced cucumbers and stop buying the
second grower's higher priced cucumbers. The second grower would
then be forced to cut its prices and, in order to afford those lower prices

and sustain its profit margin, use superior bargaining power in the labor
market to drive down the wages of its farm workers." This very fear of

cutthroat price competition inspired the defeat of the original version of
the FLSA, the version enacted by the Senate, and the version first
considered by the House. These proposals would have permitted
geographic wage and hour differentials between competitors in the same
national product market.
Courts giving full effect to Competitive Fairness in particular
cases, therefore, would read sections 206 and 207 as protecting every
worker of every employer, unless either the worker or the employer is
expressly exempted from coverage by the Act. " Coverage would
776. In the alternative, that employer might not take a price advantage in the product market
and merely reap a larger profit than its competitors. The consequences in this situation would be
more likely felt in the capital market than in the product market.
777. Compare Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that migrant
farm worker "pickle-pickers" are "independent contractors" and not entitled to the minimum wage)
with Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that migrant farm
worker "pickle-pickers" are "employees" entitled to the minimum wage).
778. At least two of the typical critiques of "purposive statutory interpretation" do not apply
to this analysis of the FLSA. WILLAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
26-34 (Harvard University Press 1994). First, this interpretation of the FLSA does not depend upon
any rosy notions about legislative reasonableness. It relies on the history of the debate over
fairness in wages, including an unromantic review of the realities of the legislative process and the
activities of interest groups inside and outside that process. Second, this analysis does not treat the
FLSA as though it were intended to serve exclusively public-regarding ends. Rather, it documents
the involvement and success of rent-seeking interest groups. But even public choice scholars
shrink from the conclusion that all statutes are mere contracts between rent-seeking interest
groups. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Cu. L. REV. 263 (1982) (acknowledging that some legislation is public-
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operate something like an "on/off' switch. If the FLSA expressly
exempts a category of workers or employers, then the coverage switch

would be "off." 779 In all other cases, it would be "on."
This "on/off' test is quite different from the means suggested by
the common law for determining which workers are "servants" and
which employers are "masters. ' ' s In fact, the Supreme Court tacitly
endorsed the "on/off' test in several early decisions fully understanding

that they were following a path quite different from the common law.7 1
The leading case, NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc.,7 2 interpreted the

National Labor Relations Act, but nonetheless evidenced the Court's
fealty to giving effect to Congress's purposes for enacting statutes rather
than forcing statutes to conform to the existing common law.
Hearst Publications arose out of the refusal of four Los Angeles
newspapers to bargain with a union representing newsboys who sold
their papers. After a hearing, the National Labor Relations Board
concluded that the newsboys were "employees" protected by the NLRA
regarding and some is rent-seeking). This history strongly suggests that the FLSA is both a rentseeking statute and a public-regarding statute. It conferred benefits on employers in high-wage
regions of the United States to the disadvantage of employers in low-wage regions. It also raised
wages of the lowest wage workers while, if one believes Roosevelt's gloss on John Maynard
Keynes's theories, battling underconsumption and cutthroat price competition. By including as
many workers as possible within the scope of the FLSA's coverage provisions through a faithful
application of the conception of Competitive Fairness, courts would emphasize the publicregarding purposes of the statute and reinforce positive behaviors in Congress. See ESKRmIDGE, JR.,
supra note 778, at 156-59; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 225 (1986).
779. Apart from expressly excluded occupations and industries, the statute exempts
professional, administrative, and executive employees even within covered labor markets. See 29
U.S.C. § 213(a) (1) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 541 (1998).
780. See infra text and accompanying notes 10-11.
781. See Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 360:
This legislation was designed to raise substandard wages and to give additional
compensation for overtime work as to those employees within its ambit, thereby
helping to protect this nation 'from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low
to buy the bare necessities of life and from long hours of work injurious to health'....
No reason is apparent why piece workers who are underpaid or who work long hours do
not fall within the spirit or intent of the statute, absent an explicit exception as to them.
Id. at 361 (quoting S. REP. 76-884 (1937)); see also Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S.
27, 36 (1987); Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 299-300; Powell v. United States
Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 509-17 (1950); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 70607 (1945); Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944). No less an authority than Justice Black, the FLSA's original sponsor in the Senate, also
urged courts to follow the direction taken in Rosenivasser."This Act contains its own definitions,
comprehensive enough to require its application to many person and working relationships which,
prior to this Act, were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category." Wailing v.
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1947).
782. 322U.S. 111(1944).
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and ordered the newspapers to bargain with their union. The Court of
Appeals disagreed and set aside the Board's order and the Board, in
turn, sought review by the Supreme Court."3 The newspapers argued to
the Court that the newsboys were "independent contractors" under
common law, not "employees," and therefore excepted from the
NLRA's protections. Common law standards should apply, the
employers argued, because Congress did not explicitly define
",employee."78
Speaking for the Court, Justice Rutledge rejected the newspapers'
appeal to the common law: "The argument assumes that there is some
simple, uniform and easily applicable test which the courts have used, in
dealing with such problems, to determine whether persons doing work
for others fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not true.""'
Variations in application could be found across jurisdictions and within
a jurisdiction depending upon the law at issue.786 For the NLRA,
Congress plainly meant for a single test to yield the same results
regardless of geography or "the attitude of the particular local
'
jurisdiction in casting doubtful cases one way or the other."787
After seemingly dispensing with the common law test for defining
"employee," Justice Rutledge set about constructing a test premised on a
classic application of purposive statutory interpretation. 8 The question
of how to define "employee" in a statute, said Rutledge,
must be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of
the legislation. The word is 'not treated by Congress as a word of art
having a definite meaning....' Rather 'it takes color from its
surroundings... [in] the statute where it appears,' and derives
meaning from the context of that statute, which 'must be read in the
light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.'7 9
Rutledge concluded that Congress sought a "broad solution" to the

783. See id. at 114-15.
784. Id. at 120. Without expressly reversing this holding, this very argument was accepted by
the Supreme Court 35 years later to determine the definition of an employee under ERISA. See
Nationwide Ins. Co., Inc. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 303,318 (1992).
785. Hearst Publications,322 U.S. at 114-15.
786. Id. at 121-22.
787. Id. at 123.
788. Id. This test was not new beyond the Supreme Court. Judge Learned Hand had applied a
similar test three decades earlier in the context of a state workers' compensation law. See Lehigh
Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705
(1915).
789. HearstPublications,322 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
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problem of industrial strife by safeguarding the rights of workers to
organize and bargain collectively in the NLRA. Judging the statute's
scope of coverage by looking to "the immediate technical relation of
employer and employee" found in the common law of master and
servant would defeat this broad solution.l The common law would
exclude large numbers of workers from the law's safeguards, said
Rutledge, and entangle the administration of the statute in "the same
sort of technical legal refinement as has characterized the long evolution
of the employee-independent contractor dichotomy in the courts for
other purposes. 79'
The statute, Rutledge found, was designed to encourage private
collective bargaining in an effort to remedy individual workers' unequal
bargaining power in the labor market. The result would be to avert
interference with the free flow of commerce caused by strikes and other
forms of industrial strife. 7" Rutledge concluded that the interruption of
commerce by strikes or unrest could result from labor disputes
involving common-law independent contractors as well as common-law
employees. Thus, the NLRA's coverage should extend broadly, even
beyond the scope of the common law's definition of "employee., 793 The
Court restored the decision of the NLRB ordering the newspapers to
bargain with their newsboys. M
Unfortunately, Justice Rutledge did not choose the shortest
distance to his point. Purposive statutory interpretation would have
permitted the Court to declare that the newsboys were "employees"
simply because the newsboys' right to organize was needed to equalize
their bargaining power with that of their employers. But Rutledge
digressed. He went on to quote the NLRB's decision and the facts it
deemed relevant to the determination of "employee" status:
In this case the Board found that the designated newsboys work
continuously and regularly, rely upon their earnings for the support of
themselves and their families, and have their total wages influenced in
large measure by the publishers, who dictate their buying and selling
prices, fix their markets and control their supply of papers. Their hours
of work and their efforts on the job are supervised and to some extent
790. Id.
791. Id. at 125.
792. Id. at 126.
793. Id. at 128-29. Justice Rutledge discussed a Senate Committee Report on the NLRA
addressing this issue. Id. at 128.
794. Hearst Publications,322 U.S. at 130-32. The Court also addressed the question of the
NLRB's selection of the collective bargaining unit, which is not relevant here. Id. at 132-35.
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prescribed by the publishers or their agents. Much of their sales
equipment and advertising materials is furnished by thepublishers with
the intention that it be used for the publisher's benefit.79
Rutledge's recital of these facts cast doubt on his commitment to a
purposive methodology for defining "employee." Most problematic,
Rutledge's list of dispositive facts from the NLRB's inquiry closely
resembled the common-law analysis of the master-servant relationship
that Hearst Publicationsappeared to reject.796 With this short paragraph
of dictum, the Court opened a door to a new conception of fairness in
wages that, to this day, excludes some workers from the FLSA's
protections and undermines the conception of Competitive Fairness.
B. Fairnessis an Implied Social Contract
The starting place for understanding Fairness is an Implied
Contract is the common law of agency. During the New Deal and the
FLSA's early years, the common law considered master-servant
relationships principally to determine whether it would be fair to hold
the master liable to a third party for the tortious acts of a servant.797 The
798
touchstone was the extent of the master's "control" over his servant.
According to the Restatement of Agency, a worker is a "servant" in any
situation "in which the [worker's] physical activities and his time are
surrendered to the control of the master."799 The Restatement listed nine
factors, of which six were considered important indicators of the
requisite degree of closeness: the master controls the details of the
servant's work ("control");m the servant is not employed in a distinct
occupation or business ("opportunity for profit or loss"); the servant's
work does not require special skill ("special skills"); the master supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and place of the servant's work
("investment"); the relationship with the master is permanent
("permanence"); and the servant's work is a regular part of the master's
business ("integral to business")Y1
795. Id. at 131.
796. Rutledge had earlier identified the Restatement as a definitive source on the common law
in this area. See id. at 128 n.27.
797. See RESTATEMENT OFAGENCY § 220(1), cmt. a (1933).
798. Id. at § 220(1).
799. Id. at § 220(1), cmt. c.
800. The Restatement also suggests that courts consider whether the servant's work is
typically performed under the direction of a supervisor. Logically, this factor is a necessary part of

the employer's control of the details of the employee's work. Id.
801. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 220(2). The Restatement also lists the method by which
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On June 16, 1947, the Supreme Court announced two decisions that
rejected Hearst Publications' approach to statutory interpretation and,
instead, sought to reconcile the FLSA with this common law test. In
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,02 a unanimous Court established
the methodology for determining whether a worker is an "employee"
under the FLSA. In United States v. Silkw a divided Court addressed
the same question under the Social Security Act. Justice Reed spoke
both for the narrow majority in Silk and the unanimous Court in
RutherfordFood.
Silk consolidated two cases in which employers disputed the
Internal Revenue Commissioner's determination that workers were
"employees" for the purposes of employment taxes. The statute and the
legislative history were silent on the definition of "employee,"' 4 so
Justice Reed reiterated the rule of Hearst Publications: "The word
'employee,' we said, was not there used as a word of art, and its content
in its context was a federal problem to be construed 'in light of the
mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.""'8 5 Reed described
the mischief to be addressed by the Social Security Act as "the burdens
that rest upon large numbers of our people because of the insecurities of
Congress
modem life, particularly old age and unemployment."''
selected periodic payments to the elderly and the unemployed funded by
employment taxes to redress this mischief.s Since "employment" and
"employee" were to be construed to accomplish the purposes of the
legislation, "a constricted interpretation... would only make for a
continuance, to a considerable degree, of the difficulties for which the
remedy was devised and would invite adroit schemes by some
employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the
expense of the benefits sought by the legislation." ' Thus, workers are
"employees" if the "economic reality" of their circumstances so
dictate.0
the master pays the servant ("method of pay"), and whether the parties believe that a masterservant relationship exists ("subjective belief'), although these factors are considered less
important to the result. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1) (1957).
802. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
803. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
804. Id. at705, 711.
805. Id. at 713 (quoting HearstPublications).
806. Id. at710.
807. Id.
808. Silk, 331 U.S. at 712; cf Darden,503 U.S. at 326 (stating that the FLSA has far broader
interpretation of "employee" than the common law).
809. Silk, 331 U.S. at 713. This phrase came to define subsequent applications of the
'economic realities test' by courts. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301;

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

131

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

Vol. 18:19

Reed turned to long-standing Treasury Department regulations that
offered a common-law-like test for defining "employee":
Generally, the relationship exists when the person for whom services
are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who
performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by
the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is
accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of
the employer not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be
done.... The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating
that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors
characteristic of an employer are the furnishing of tools and the
furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the
services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or
direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the
work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the
result, he is an independent contractor, not an employee."D
He also examined the common-law factor of whether the work involved
was integral to the employers' business: "Few businesses are so
completely integrated that they can themselves produce the raw
material, manufacture and distribute the finished product to the ultimate
consumer without assistance from independent contractors. The Social
Security Act was drawn with this industrial situation as a part of the
surroundings in which it was to be enforced. ' ..
By giving effect to an express social contract enacted in the Social
Security Act, Silk successfully united the common law with Congress'
purpose for enacting the Social Security Act. 1' 2 The Social Security Act
imposed taxes on an employer to pay benefits to that employer's
"employees" during old age, disability, or unemployment." 3 The Court

Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28,33 (1961).
810. Silk, 331 U.S. at 714-15 n.8 (emphasis in original).
811. Id. at714.
812. This striving for horizontal integrity in statutory interpretation took as its principal goal
the reconciliation of the statute under review with the body of law, particularly the common law,
already in existence. According to this philosophy of statutory interpretation, statutes should be
interpreted to "fit"within the path of common-law reasoning or, if they were found to derogate the
common law, construed narrowly. In its purest form, a commitment to horizontal integrity is
associated with a "formalist" philosophy of statutory interpretation. Formalism, the judicial
equivalent of the pre-socio-economic methodology of classical economics, treated law as the
objective product of deductively reasoned rules derived from long-established axioms. See
generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908) (common
law courts have a natural antipathy to statutes).
813. Silk, 331 U.S. at710-11.
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essentially held that Congress intended only that employers knowingly

binding themselves to particular workers and receiving the full benefits
of the workers' loyalty and efforts would be responsible for the
worker's economic support when the worker became unable to work. It
by a definition of
turned out that those purposes were best served
"employee" consistent with the common law. s14
The so-called "economic realities" test established by Silk employs
the same six factors from the Restatement's "control" test. The
employer has "control," the worker has little "opportunity for profit or
loss," the worker's "investment" is slight, the relationship is
"permanent," the work requires no "special skill," and the work is
"integral" to the employer's business. 1 5No one of these six factors is
determinative, say the courts. The totality of the circumstances govern.
Balancing these six factors is a means of assessing whether the
worker is sufficiently "dependent" upon the employer to warrant the
protections due an "employee." "Economic dependence" matters most,
say the courts: "[The final and determinative question must be whether
the total testing establishes the personnel are so dependent upon the
business with which they are connected that they come within the
protection of FLSA or are sufficiently independent to lie outside its
ambit."" 6' As one court said, the factors should disclose "whether the

814. Seeid.at 711-12.
815. Some courts include "integral to business" in their list of the relevant factors while others
do not. See, e.g., Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994)
(applying six factors); Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cr. 1991) (listing all
six factors); Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1534-35 (listing six factors); Donovan, 736 F.2d at 1117-20
(listing six factors); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979)
(six factors); Brock, 840 F.2d at 1059 (using five factors, but also announcing that "any relevant
evidence may be considered" beyond those factors); Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311 (using five factors,
excluding "integral to employer's business"); Donovan v. Derby Refining Co., 607 F. Supp. 82 (D.
Kan. 1985) (same five factors). Cf. EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983)
(applying the five factor FLSA test in a Title VII case). The confusion over whether there are five
or six factors is nicely illustrated by Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d
Cir. 1985), in which the district court applied a five-factor test and the court of appeals applied a
six-factor test. Id. at 1383 n.6. See generally MARC LNDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE 198-99 (1989) (making the same
comparison in the context of congressional rewriting of the factors to be applied in defining
"employee" under the NLRA).
816. Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311-12. "Dependence" had its origins in Bartels v. Birmingham, 332
U.S. 126, 130 (1947), a Social Security Act case building on the precedent in Silk. See also
Mednick v. Albert Enterps., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[n]n the application of social
legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the
business to which they render service.") (quoting Bartle, 332 U.S. at 130) The Court also stated
that:
Under these decisions [Silk, Rutherford, Bartels, and Hearst], the act is intended to
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individual is or is not, as a matter of economic fact, in business for

himself." '17 A common description of "dependence" has been that
workers must be "dependent upon the business to which they render
service. ' Workers are "employees" only if they "'are dependent on a
particular business or organization for their continued employment' in
that line of business." 81 9
It is not mere happenstance that "dependence" and "control" are
derived from the same six factors. Silk established an unstated
connection between "dependence" and "control." If the "employer"

makes poor managerial or investment decisions, its "employees" suffer
and have no alternative. The employer makes all of the important
decisions that govern its and the workers' economic fate. The employer
controls the details of the work. It owns the means of production. It sells
the product of the work in the product market and assumes the
opportunity for gain or loss. Thus, the employee depends upon the
protect those whose livelihood is dependent upon finding employment in the business
of others. It is directed toward those who themselves are least able in good times to
make provisions for their needs when old age and unemployment may cut off their
earnings. The statutory coverage is not limited to those [whose work activities satisfy
the common law "control" test] but rather to those who, as a matter of economic reality,
are dependent upon the business to which they render service.
Id. (quoting Fahs v. Tree Gold Coop. Growers of Fla., Inc., 166 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1948)).
817. Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981). Courts appear to be
searching for a way to distinguish the wage laborer from the artisan. The distinction apparently lies
between a worker who produces commodities directly for sale in the product market, and the
worker who depends upon the employer for success in the product market. Cf. Marc Linder, What
is An Employee? Why it Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 LAv & INEQ. J. 155, 160-72 (1989)

(viewing the history of independent commodity producers and employees in the development of
capitalism through the lens of class).
818. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1293 (citations omitted); see also Reich v. Circle C Inv., Inc.,
998 F.2d 324,327 (5th Cir. 1993).
819. See Lauritzen, 814 F.2d at 1054 (quoting DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385, which cited
PilgrimEquipment, 527 F.2d at 1311) (emphasis in original). Other courts have framed the some
concept somewhat differently. See, e.g., Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d
1317, 1327 (5"Cir. 1985) ('The concept of 'employee' under that Act must be instead broadened
to include those 'whose livelihood is dependent upon finding employment in the business of
others") (quoting Fahs, 166 F.2d at 44); Castillo, 704 F.2d at 190. Fahs is not an FLSA case. It
arose under the Social Security Act and applied Silk to determine the "employee" question. Fahs
and its progeny among the FLSA cases demonstrate the negative consequences of treating three
statutes with related, but very different, purposes the same for the purpose of statutory
interpretation.
It is also worth noting that courts have concluded that workers who work for more than
one employer can be economically dependent. See McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875,
877 (5th Cir. 1989); Lauritzen, 814 F.2d at 1054. The same is true for workers who do not rely on
a particular employer for their primary source of income. See DialAmerica,757 F.2d at 1385. Yet,
workers' ability to offer their services to many different customers suggests that they would not be
employees. See id. at 1385-86.
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employer for the continuation of his employment. The employee has
sacrificed the individual bargaining power that comes with skills,
decision-making authority, ownership of the means of production, and
direct access to the product market, and lashed himself to the
employer's ship of fate "permanently." Thus, employers' control breeds
employees' dependence.
But Silk did not stop at establishing a connection between
"dependence" and "control." Some necessary relationship between
"dependence" and the compensation required by the Social Security Act
was necessary to close the logical circle. Silk apparently concluded that,
since the employee is dependent upon the employer, the employee is
entitled to some socially mandated compensation. If the employee
subjects his livelihood entirely to the exigencies of the employer's
control, then the employer undertakes the social obligation to provide
the employee with the benefits required by the Social Security Act. This
social obligation is derived from an implicit contract in which the
employer reaps the benefits of the employee's subsistence through the
employee's labor and the employer pays a wage that supports the
employee's subsistence. But before an employer may be asked to
provide compensation and pay the taxes that support that compensation,
the worker should be proven to have given his full labors and loyalty to
the employer such that he has become dependent.' ° In sum, control
breeds dependence and dependence must be compensated.
C. The Shrinking Social Contract
The fateful decision to abandon purposive statutory interpretation
of the FLSA came when the Court elected to treat Rutherford Food as
the third in a trilogy of cases with HearstPublicationsand Silk. As with
the NLRA and the Social Security Act, the FLSA's statutory language
did not give conclusive definition to the terms "employ," "employee,"
or "employer," so Reed and the Rutherford Food Court felt empowered
to define these terms further. Starting from the fact that the FLSA, like
the NLRA and the Social Security Act, was a part of the social

820. Putting aside the third element in the syllogism, this argument is quite close to that used
by the socio-economists to support the concept of a living wage. It is also true that John Ryan,
purveyor of the conception of Absolute Fairness, argued that employers should serve as "society's
paymasters" in the payment of a living wage. But Ryan's view was principally rights-based, not
contractarian. Ryan posited the existence of an absolute, natural right inherent in every human
being who works. The employer's obligation did not arise primarily out of a contract of exchange.
Employers are the repositories for wealth and, therefore, its stewards.
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legislation of the 1930s, Reed deduced that the decisions defining the
employee-employer relationship under the NLRA and the Social
Security Act should govern consideration of the same question under the
FLSA.' l In other words, Reed would look to the judicial interpretations
of the other two statutes rather than to the legislative history of the
FLSA.
Justice Reed repeated Hearst Publication's purposive test for
defining "employee" and concluded that Rutherford Food's workers
were "employees" under the FLSA. But he also listed the facts he
considered relevant to defining "employee":
the determination of the [employee-employer] relationship...
[depends] upon the circumstances of the whole activity. Viewed in this
way, the workers did a specialty job on the production line.... The
premises and the equipment of Kaiser were used for the work. The
group had no business organization that could or did shift as a unit
from one slaughterhouse to another. The managing official of the plant
kept close touch on the operation. While profits to the [workers]
depended upon the efficiency of their work, it was more like
piecework than an enterprise that actually depended for success upon
the initiative, judgment or foresight of the typical independent
contractor.sm
This list of factors mimicked the list of common-law factors in the
Treasury Department's regulation that governed in Silk: "control,"
"opportunity for profit or loss," "investment," and "integral to
business." More important, these factors became the dependence test
821. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947). Reed reached this
conclusion without reference to Rosenwasser, an earlier, on-point interpretation of the FLSA's
coverage provisions that relied on the conception of Competitive Fairness. See supra notes 774821 and accompanying text. After Hearst Publications and Silk, Congress amended both the
NLRA and the Social Security Act to assure the courts would employ common-law principles for
assessing worker-employer relationships. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25; LINDER, supra note
815, at 196-211. In light of the analysis in this article, Reed's rationale would have accommodated
Congress' redefinition of "employee" for these other two statutes.
822. Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 730. Reed undertook this fact-laden analysis over the
objections of the government's lawyers who urged the Court to acknowledge Competitive Fairness
as the governing principle of the FLSA and the answer to the question of which workers are
"employees." See Goldstein et al.,
supra note 131, at 1100-01 (quoting the appellate briefs
submitted by the Labor Department's Solicitor's Office).
823. The Court looked to the common law in spite of a specific warning in the Restatement of
Law not to do so. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENcY at § 220(1), cmt. (d) ("Statutes have been passed
in which the words 'servant' and 'agent' have been used. The meaning of these words in statutes
varies. The context and purpose of the particular statute controls the meaning which is frequently
not that which the same word bears in the Restatement of this Subject."). A later edition of the
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applied by the lower courts.2 4 Rutherford Food thereby seemed to
reconcile the FLSA's definition of "employee" with both the common
law's control test and the Social Security Act's dependence test.
The question the Court did not answer, however, is whether the
FLSA could be made to fit within the "control-breeds-dependencewhich-must-be-compensated" syllogism that lay at the heart of Silk.
Implicitly, the answer must have been "yes" if the NLRA, the Social
Security Act, and the FLSA were three statutory peas in a New Deal
pod. The justification is the conception that Fairness is an Implied
Contract.
The implied contract requires viewing the Social Security Act and
the FLSA as establishing two parts of a minimum compensation level
for workers. The FLSA establishes a minimum wage and premium pay
for overtime for all covered workers while they work. The SSA requires
employers, via taxation, to provide economic support to covered
workers who cannot work for specified reasons. Superficially, this
appears to be a rejuvenation of the socio-economists' argument that
employers should be required to pay workers at least a subsistence wage
because employers benefit from the labor made possible by the workers'
sustenance. Absent such a requirement, employers could and did receive
a subsidy from the workers' families, charity, or less dignified sources.
Thus, without looking any further, Fairness is an Implied Contract
resembles the moral lodestar of Bargaining Fairness-that is, the living
wage.
But careful examination exposes something quite different. First,
workers paid the statutory minimum wage set by the FLSA do not
receive a living wage because the Social Security Act's benefits are also
available. This point may be best illustrated by comparing the living
wage as defined by John Ryan with the faux living wage of Fairness is
an Implied Contract. Ryan promised a wage that would assure workers
and their families food, clothing, and housing sufficient to maintain
health, comfort, good morals, and faith while they were working, plus
security in the event of retirement, sickness, accident, and disability, as
Restatement expressly cites federal wage and hour law as establishing such a broader definition.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY at § 220, cmt. (1) (g).
824. It is possible to criticize purposive statutory interpretation as too indeterminate to offer
predictable and readily discernible results. Different judges may well find different purposes in
their review of legislative proceedings, perhaps in service of a result at which they have already
arrived, and the same judge may find different purposes in a single statute to serve the interpretive
needs of different cases. See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 778, at 30-33. In this instance, however,
the selection of the "wrong" purpose appears to have been an intentional effort to reconcile the
FLSA with the Social Security Act and the common law. This is not indeterminacy.
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well as opportunities for recreation, social intercourse, education, and
church membership. Bound by the specific, statutorily determined
minimum wage level in the FLSA, Justice Reed's implied contract
offers a minimum wage intentionally set below subsistence by
Congress. The Social Security Act's benefits do not increase the level of
the wage workers receive while they are working. In essence, they are
deferred compensation for retirement, sickness, accident, and disability.
Public subsidies of workers' wages are still required." In sum, in return
for abandoning their bargaining power and making themselves
dependent upon their employers, Justice Reed's implied social contract
cannot deliver to workers even the subsistence wage it seems to
promise,
much less the more generous living wage defined by John
826
Ryan.
Second, even if Fairness is an Implied Contract could deliver a
subsistence wage, the dependence test establishes a threshold that
excludes some workers from even that protection. Again, Ryan's
conception of Absolute Fairness offers a useful comparison. For Ryan,
all work entitled the individual to subsistence. The quality and
circumstances of the work were not relevant. For Reed, the employer's
obligation to pay the minimum wage, overtime premiums, and the taxes
that finance deferred income was triggered only if the totality of the
worker's employment situation suggest sufficient closeness to the
employer. Under Reed's dependence test, people who are undeniably
engaged in work are denied the protections of the FLSA.
In this sense, Fairness is an Implied Contract offers a form of
fairness to employers that is very different from the FLSA's conception
of Competitive Fairness. Employers can be asked to pay statutorily
mandated direct and deferred wages only to those workers who have
demonstrated complete loyalty and given their full labor. This approach
is a modem echo of the short-lived conception of Commutative Fairness

825. We may conclude that Congress has continued its policy of keeping the minimum wage
below the level of family subsistence by referring to its policy for addressing inadequate wages,
that is, to subsidize workers being paid wages insufficient to support a family through the Earned
Income Tax Credit and Food Stamps. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1994) (referring to earned income
tax credit); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2001-32 (1994) (food stamps).
826. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, MINIMUM WAGE AND OVERTIME HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS Acr: 1998 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS REQUIRED BY SECTION 4(a) (1) OF THE FAIR

LABOR STANDARDS Acr 12-13 (June 1988) (showing charts illustrating that a full-time, full-year
worker earning the minimum wage has fallen below the poverty level for a family of four since
1966 and for a family of three since 1981, and the declining value of the minimum wage compared
with average hourly earnings for all production, non-supervisory workers).
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suggested by Justice Sutherland in Adkins v. Children's Hospital. It
requires equivalence of exchange between worker and employer. But
this contractarian view of the obligation to pay a subsistence wage is

inconsistent with both the social obligation to pay a living wage that
Ryan posited and the efficiency arguments in support of a living wage
advanced by the socio-economists.
Third, Fairness is an Implied Contract turns on its head the
empirical basis for the living wage campaigns that preceded passage of
the FLSA. In effect, the dependence test rejects the premise of the
debate over fairness in wages that began with the elimination of slavery.
Workers in low-wage labor markets did not have sufficient bargaining
power to assure themselves subsistence wages when bargaining with
employers. Under the Court's conception of Fairness as an Implied
Contract, however, that conclusion must be supported by proof
according to each worker's individual circumstances. s27 Workers must
827. An argument could be made that this conclusion serves the goal advanced by organized
labor and its congressional supporters during the FLSA debates of leaving certain workeremployer relationships unregulated by government so that private collective bargaining can
proceed unmolested. This argument would require concluding that Congress intended to leave
certain workers unprotected by the FLSA so that they would redress their insufficient bargaining
power in the labor market by organizing unions and bargaining collectively pursuant to the
processes in the NLRA. In fact, this argument might be the best hope for extending Justice Reed's
efforts at connecting the NLRA with the Social Security Act and the FLSA.
This argument faces several barriers it cannot overcome. Organized labor's concerns
during the FLSA legislative debates related to public bargaining as competition for private
collective bargaining and the danger that any wage arrived at through public bargaining would be
adjudged the "legal wage." Once the mechanisms of public bargaining were removed from the
legislation and the minimum wage set by statute, these concerns evaporated and organized labor, if
grudgingly, supported the bill. There is no evidence that organized labor sought to exclude
individual workers or the workers of an individual employer from coverage in order to increase the
likelihood that those workers would turn to the NLRA to improve their wages.
Further, for this argument to succeed, its proponents bear the burden of showing that
organized labor had reason to believe that the workers who would be excluded from coverage
under the FLSA by the dependence test would be likely to join unions. Even more, if organized
labor went to the bother of somehow encouraging such a result, it might be fair to hold proponents
of this argument to the higher standard of showing that organized labor believed that the workers
excluded from FLSA coverage were more likely to join unions. If we take the dependence test
seriously, these are workers with greater individual bargaining power resulting from some
combination of greater skills, control of the means of production, and direct access to the product
market. As a matter of logic, these are hardly the low-wage workers most likely to join unions. As
a matter of fact, union density rates among all workers in low-wage industries and occupations was
low at the time the FLSA was enacted and it remains low. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGs 221-22 (January 1999) (charts
showing union affiliation of employed wage and salary workers by occupation and industry and
median weekly earnings of full-time salary workers by union affiliation, occupation, and industry
demonstrate that many of the lowest paying occupations and industries-agriculture, service, and
retail, for example-have union density rates that are both low in absolute terms and well below
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have permanently abandoned their bargaining power before they may
reap the benefits of Justice Reed's implied social contract. Absent this
showing, workers are left unprotected by government enforcement of a
social contract, with only their individual bargaining power to protect
them against exploitative deal-making in the labor market.
Finally, even if Fairness is an Implied Contract could claim the
moral and economic arguments that supported the effort to enact a
living wage, the legislative history of the FLSA establishes that the
proponents of the living wage and Bargaining Fairness lost their fight in
Congress. The FLSA did not codify the conceptions of Bargaining
Fairness or Absolute Fairness. Competitive Fairness won the legislative
debate over fairness in wages."' For this reason, the decision to treat the
FLSA, the NLRA, and the Social Security Act as three parts of a single
whole was error. Congress designed the three statutes to serve different
purposes, even though these three laws were enacted during the same
era in American political life. By failing to credit these different
congressional purposes, the courts have constructed and enforced the
stingiest and least worker-protective conception of fairness since
Hierarchic Fairness and the Lochner era faded into history.
The consequences for a legal system that values transparent and
predictable legal rules are real. The dependence test that enforces
Fairness is an Implied Contract fails both comparatively and in absolute
terms. The "on/off' test requires only reading the FLSA's coverage
provisions to determine whether Congress expressly excluded a worker
or employer from those provisions. Under the "on/off' test, the statutory
text would tell a cucumber grower that migrant farm workers are
entitled to the minimum wage. Under the dependence test, however, the
grower must assess how a court might balance six factors to determine
the state of the migrant farm worker's bargaining power. Further
exacerbating the problem, the dependence test's six factors are
susceptible to manipulation. An employer seeking to cut the pay or
extend the hours of his workers in search of a product price advantage,
or merely to increase profits regardless of competition, can modify the
circumstances of employment to tip the balance of factors in the
dependence test.
Absurd results have followed, with employers arguing at various
times that farm workers, laundry workers, people selling fireworks at
road-side stands, gasoline station operators, delivery-truck helpers, and

the national average for the private sector).
828. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(c) (1994).
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janitors are independent contractors with individual bargaining power,
and some courts agreeing. 9 Fairness is an Implied Contract invites the

risk that courts examine employer-employee relationships designed to
evade a judicial test rather than "economic realities." Even worse, it

inspires litigation by employers that low-wage workers with earnings at
or near the subsistence level can ill afford. The dependence test
establishes a substantive threshold, a process threshold, and a
perseverance threshold that workers may be required to cross before
being assured the minimum wage and overtime pay. The "on/off' test

does not.
Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc."" offers a useful
illustration of the differences between the dependence test and the
"on/off' test. Donald Driscoll had an agreement with Driscoll
Strawberry Associates (DSA) to grow strawberries. In turn, Driscoll
entered into individual agreements with a group of farm workers.
Driscoll and other employees prepared the land and planted the
strawberries. He determined the quantity and proportion of each type of
strawberry to be planted and his employees placed marks in the ground
signaling how far apart the plants should be spaced. The farm workers
agreed to furnish the labor necessary to care for the strawberries, harvest

829. See, e.g., Usery, 527 F.2d at 1315 (reversing district court's ruling that laundry operators
are not "employees"); Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1981) (district
court and appeals court both rejected employer's argument that dry cleaning workers were not
"employees"); Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d 1042, 1042 (5th Cir. 1987) (overturning a
district court's ruling that workers at fireworks stands are not "employees"); Selker Bros., 949 F.2d
at 1286 (district court and appeals court both rejected employer's argument that gas station
operators were not "employees"); Marshall v. Truman Arnold Distrib. Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 906, 911
(8th Cir. 1981) (same); Derby Refining, 607 F. Supp. at 84 (stating that the district court rejected
employer's argument that gas station operators were not "employees"); Dunlop, 529 F.2d at 302
(stating that delivery truck helpers are not "employees"); Shultz, 432 F.2d at 267-68 (reversing
district court's ruling that janitor is not an "employee").
Cheating by seeking implied exemptions from the FLSA is not the most egregious means
for evading the statute's requirements. Employers seeking price advantages over their competitors
may either move their facilities overseas to unregulated labor markets or violate the law in the
United States, often by importing undocumented foreign workers who feel, rightly or wrongly, that
they have less ability to solicit government intervention in the labor market on their behalf. The
garment industry provides a tragic illustration of these forms of cheating. See Goldstein et al.,
supra note 131, at 995-99 (discussing the use of undocumented workers and the high rate of
violations associated with the sweatshop conditions in parts of the domestic garment industry); id.
at 1055-61 (describing the history and structure of the garment sweatshop system); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION,
1998 REPORT ON LoW-WAGE INMATIVES 13-14 (February 1999) (showing overall compliance
with the FLSA's wage and hour provisions in the garment industries of San Francisco, New York,
and Los Angeles to be 79%, 37%, and 22% respectively).
830. 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the strawberries, and sort, grade and pack the strawberries for marketing
by DSA. The farm workers furnished their own hoes, shovels, clippers,
and hand carts, and exercised some judgment as to the care of the
strawberry plants. Driscoll provided the heavier equipment, such as
irrigation pipes. The farm workers were paid a set percentage of the net
proceeds received from Driscoll's sale of the berries to DSA. The
agreements offered no guarantee that the payments would satisfy the
FLSA's minimum wage requirements."3
On these facts, the district court granted summary judgment to
DSA and Driscoll after finding that the farm workers were "independent
contractors" rather than "employees." The court of appeals, reviewing
the same facts and applying the same dependence test, found a genuine
issue of material fact, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded
for trial. 32 The dependence test is broad and indeterminate enough for
one court to decide that farm workers are not entitled to the minimum
wage and for a second court to conclude that a genuine issue existed as
to whether they are protected by the FLSA. Under the "on/off' test, the
district court would merely look at the statute, find that farm workers
are not expressly excluded from the minimum wage coverage
provisions, and issue a summary judgment that the workers are entitled
to the minimum wage. No strawberry grower could increase profits or
gain a price advantage from lower wages because all farm workers
tending and harvesting strawberries, wherever located, would be entitled
to the minimum wage. If it was necessary at all, litigating Real under the
"on/off' .test would have taken weeks or months, not years. 33
Admittedly, non-English-speaking farm workers who are paid
below the minimum wage after being made to sign a seventeen-page
legal document written in English offer a sympathetic case for the
"on/off' test.sM More difficult questions would arise around workers
who most modem observers would describe, at least colloquially, as
"independent contractors." For example, a plumber who performs home
plumbing repairs in the evenings after he has completed his day job at a
plumbing contracting firm would offer a harder case. Undeniably,
plumbing is a "special skill." The plumber "controls" the details of his

831. Id. at750-52.
832. Id. at 755-56.
833. The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit requiring a trial at the
district court level was issued in 1979. The decision suggests that the agreements may have been
entered into in 1976. See id at 751. Thus, the farm workers were forced to litigate the question of
the FLSA's coverage for three years without receiving a final disposition of their case.
834. See id. at 750 n.1.
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own work. He bears all the "opportunity for profit and risk of loss" from
his moonlighting employment. He "invests" in his own tools. The
plumber's relationship with the house's owner is certainly not
"permanent." Under the dependence test, the plumber would almost
certainly be adjudged an independent contractor. Under the "on/off'
test, the plumber is an employee of the owner of the house entitled to
the minimum wage and premium pay should he work overtime. s
But why should a plumber with obvious individual bargaining
leverage-controlling the means of production, possessing a significant
level of skill, and maintaining direct access to the product market (i.e.,
the market for plumbing services) receive the protection of the FLSA?
The answer came during the legislative debates over the FLSA.

Competitive Fairness is not concerned with remedying unequal
bargaining power in labor markets. It is concerned with competition in

product markets. When this plumber moonlights, he competes against
his co-workers at the plumbing contracting firm just as though he was

another plumbing contracting firm. Congress' goal was to assure that
the wages of the plumber's daytime co-workers would not be slashed
below a certain specified level so that the owner of the plumbing
contracting firm could match the moonlighting plumber's nighttime
prices." 6 The rules must apply to every competitor; therefore, courts

employing the "on/off' test in an honest effort to satisfy the conception
of Competitive Fairness would not recognize any worker in a covered
labor market as an "independent contractor."
In sum, Competitive Fairness would include more workers within
the FLSA's coverage and protect the least paid workers in our society
from needless, costly litigation over the minimum wage. Ultimately,
Fairness is an Implied Contract undermines Competitive Fairness and
the forces that used their political bargaining power to produce it.
Fairness is an Implied Contract facilitates the creation of individual
835. There is an exception in the FLSA for very small employers that would almost certainly
exclude the plumber from coverage. The current thresholds for coverage require that the individual
worker be engaged in interstate commerce and that the employer have an aggregate annual revenue
of $500,000 or more. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(s) (1) (A). Similarly, the Congress that enacted the
FLSA had good reason to doubt whether the Commerce Clause permitted them to reach commerce
at the intrastate level. See Hearings, supra note 102, at 41-42 (Robert Jackson testified that the
FLSA was a direct challenge to Hammer v. Dagenhart,the prevailing Commerce Clause decision
preceding the FLSA's enactment). These considerations are being put aside for the purposes of this
hypothetical.
836. Of course, it is unlikely that reasonably skilled workers like a plumber would be paid at
or near the minimum wage. But there is some danger that the plumber, if he is able to find enough
hours in the week, could waive his overtime premium pay to gain a cost advantage over a
plumbing contracting firm.
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exceptions to ,the uniform, national standards that were at the heart of
the heated struggle over the FLSA. Even the versions of the FLSA that
would have codified the conception of Bargaining Fairness would not
have permitted individual exceptions, and these Bargaining Fairness
proposals were rejected by Congress because their fact-based
differentials undermined the conception of Competitive Fairness. Rather
than basing differentials on empirical evidence regarding living costs
and working families' budgets as Bargaining Fairness would have
required, differentials arising from the dependence test are the

consequence of an individual employer's appetite for litigation and its
hunger for an advantage over its competitors. TAs a result, Fairness is
an Implied Contract deprives the forces supporting the FLSA,
particularly the workers excluded from its coverage, the benefits of the

legislative victory their temporarily enhanced political bargaining power
won for them in 1938.
VII. CONCLUSION

The history of the debate over fairness in wages is, in large part,
the story of the dynamic and comparative political bargaining power of

837. Some readers may understandably infer from this article an argument for the judicial
reversal of the conception that Fairness is an Implied Contract. But before any such reversal may
take place, courts must engage in a thorough consideration of the exigencies of stare decisis with
respect to the judicially constructed definition of "employee" in the FLSA.
Further, nothing in this article is intended to suggest that Competitive Fairness as
codified in the FLSA serves its intended purpose in the new economy of increasingly global
product and labor markets. Competitive Fairness presupposes rules of competition that apply to all
competitors. By limiting itself to employers operating within the United States, the FLSA
necessarily challenges its own conception of Competitive Fairness. Where living standards differ
across borders and jobs can be relocated to lower wage countries, workers and employers have
good reason for concern about losing out to wage-cutting competitors outside the United States. It
is worth noting, however, that the problem of cutthroat international competition has existed since
William Connery sought to address it in 1937 with respect to foreign competitors who are not
subject to the FLSA's wage and hour provisions.
While valid, this criticism can be overstated. At least a sizable plurality of workers
subject to the FLSA's minimum wage provisions are employed in industries like agriculture,
construction, government, and services that are largely site specific. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WAGE & HOUR DVISION, MINIMUM WAGE AND
OVERTIME HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT: 1998 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 4(d) (1) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr 23 (June 1998) (chart
showing estimated number of employed wage and salary workers by industry). Until a fast-food
hamburger can be delivered through the Internet or a cucumber picked by a digital assistant, these
site-specific jobs are unlikely to chase lower wages outside the United States. Nonetheless, the
problem of international labor standards remains a significant part of the debate within the United
States over fairness in wages for many workers whose jobs can be exported.
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workers and their advocates. There was little dispute over the empirical
evidence that unregulated wage deals between employers and workers in
the United States' post-Industrial Revolution labor markets resulted in
some workers' wages being driven below the level needed to sustain a
family. Rather, the debate was organized around competing normative
visions of what, if anything, should be done to remedy this consequence
of unequal bargaining power in labor markets. The conception of
Hierarchic Fairness, holding that society's interests are best served
when nothing is done, prevailed in the first three decades of the
twentieth century as workers and their advocates were largely unable to
overcome their inferior political bargaining position. But economic and
social crises caused by wrenching strikes, catastrophic industrial
accidents, and the labor supply crisis of World War I, along with savvy
political organizing by the living wage movement and reformist
intellectual and empirical scholarship, shifted the balance of political
bargaining power during limited periods of these three decades. As a
result, some state legislatures and the federal government adopted the
conception of Bargaining Fairness in the form of public bargaining laws
to regulate wage deals in the low-wage labor market. The ultimately
unattainable substantive goal of these procedural statutes was a living
wage as articulated by John Ryan in his conception of Absolute
Fairness.
The most significant shift in political bargaining power came with
the onset of the Depression. The result was the FLSA. But the longstanding split between natural allies in the labor movement and the
living wage movement blunted their collective political bargaining
power. The FLSA eventually codified the conception of Competitive
Fairness to ameliorate cutthroat competition between employers in
increasingly national product markets, rather than assuring Bargaining
Fairness and a living wage for all workers. Since the end of World War
II, however, courts have refused to give effect to the conception of
Competitive Fairness, partly depriving workers and their advocates of
the fruits of the limited victory made possible by their temporarily
improved bargaining position in the 1930s. Instead, courts have adopted
their own conception that Fairness is an Implied Contract which
excludes some workers from the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum
hour protections, and forces other workers to litigate their way into
coverage by the Act.
A substantial question remains as to how courts should interpret
remedial statutes like the FLSA given this article's observations that (1)
political bargaining power is dynamic, (2) remedial statutes might not
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be enacted absent significant economic and social crises that shift
political bargaining power, and (3) remedial statutes may serve mixed
public-regarding and rent-seeking purposes. While the relevant Supreme
Court decisions strongly suggest that an undue commitment to
reconciling statutes with the common law and one another produced
courts' current interpretation of the FLSA's coverage provisions, it is
also possible that post-World War II interpretations of the FLSA reflect
courts' judgment that the current state of political power relationships
should guide their decisions."' With the end of the Depression and any
labor supply crisis that might have accompanied World War II, courts
may have concluded that comparative bargaining power in the political
market had returned to the conditions which prevailed through much of
the first three decades of the twentieth century. Employers sit atop a
political hierarchy and low-wage, unorganized workers languish near
the bottom. Based on this positive political observation, courts might
have decided that post-war Congresses would intend a narrow
construction of the FLSA that imposed the minimum possible burden on
employers.
One difficulty in applying this sort of analysis to the FLSA is the
uncertainty as to whether the dependence test and Fairness is an Implied
Contract better serve employers as a class than would Competitive
Fairness and the "on/off" test. Competitive Fairness protects employers
from certain destructive competitive tactics by other employers as much
as it protects workers from employers' superior bargaining power in the
labor market. Returning to the example of our cutthroat cucumber
growers, while it is true that the migrant farm workers picking
cucumbers for the first grower are deprived of the minimum wage, it is
also true that the second cucumber grower and all other growers are
deprived of fair competition in product markets. Employers as a class do
not necessarily benefit from Fairness is an Implied Contract."9 Further,
838. This would be one illustration of "institutional dynamism" which is, in turn, an element
in a philosophy of statutory interpretation which William Eskridge has dubbed "dynamic statutory
interpretation." See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 778, at 74-80.
839. A counter argument might suggest that all cucumber growers benefit from a judicial
decision holding that one cucumber grower's migrant farm workers are not covered by the FLSA
because that decision can serve as persuasive authority in litigation where other growers seek to
pay migrant farm workers less than the minimum wage. This counter argument assumes several
things. First, every cucumber grower must exactly recreate the employer-worker relationship
constructed by the successful litigant cucumber grower to satisfy the dependence test. If, for some
reason, conditions make it impossible to cede control over cucumber picking or to require workers
to provide their own tools, then other cucumber growers might not benefit from the precedent.
Second, even if every grower constructs the same "economic reality," then every court must weigh
the dependence test's factors in the same way. But see supranotes 809-16 and accompanying text
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the employers in high-wage jurisdictions that sought and benefited most
directly from the rent-seeking aspects of the FLSA are not
systematically helped by the geographically random exemptions won
through litigation under the dependence test. Only individual litigious
employers certainly benefit, and it would be hard to argue that only
these employers have sat atop the political power hierarchy since World
War II.
Purposive statutory interpretation of the FLSA, informed by an
honest historical assessment of the interest group politics that led to
enactment of the law, best serves the interests of the statute, the
legislative process, and workers. Fairness is an Implied Contract would
no longer undermine Competitive Fairness. Courts would give effect to
the historical evidence. Courts would act on a common-sense
understanding of Congress' actual mode of operation; that is, competing
political interests and their congressional allies actually coalesce around
legislation's broad purposes. Assuming agreement on a particular,
isolated form of words employed in the legislation defies common sense
and the realities of Congress. Perhaps most important, workers would
receive the full fruits of their temporarily improved political bargaining
power by substituting the "on/off' test for the dependence test. Every
worker of every employer would be entitled to the minimum wage and
premium pay for overtime, unless expressly excluded.
At the same time, courts would acknowledge the role of interest
groups in carving themselves out of the statute's coverage without
conferring the same exemptions on individual employers or industries
that did not wield sufficient political influence to have themselves
expressly excluded. By refusing to shy away from the sometimes messy
realities of the legislative process, purposive statutory interpretation
could acknowledge that the existence of exceptions or conditions need
not make legislative purposes any less valid. But by requiring interest
groups to secure their exemptions through specific statutory language,
purposive statutory interpretation would frustrate rent-seeking behavior.
Members of Congress have an incentive to promote the public-regarding
nature of statutes, so full disclosure in the legislative text of benefits to
be doled out to particular interests would carry with it a sizable
disincentive.m

(citing cases which suggesting that other outcomes are possible). Finally, the first court's decision
must be accepted as persuasive authority. Thus, the excessive susceptibility of the dependence test
to variant litigation outcomes is as much a problem for employers as it is for workers.
840. See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 778, at 27, 158-59.
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At least within the limited context of the debate over fairness in
wages and the history of the FLSA, purposive statutory interpretation
can be reconciled with positive observation of the political process. It
would be fair to say that, in this case, they are inseparable.
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